Essays in macroeconomics and finance by Clymo, Alex
                   1 of 2 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays in Macroeconomics and Finance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alex Clymo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London, July 2015 
                   2 of 2 
 
Declaration 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have 
clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out 
jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full 
acknowledgement is made.  This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third 
party. 
 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 54331 words.  
 
 
 
Essays in Macroeconomics and Finance
Alex Clymo
July 2015
Abstract
I present a thesis in three chapters on the topics of Macroeconomics and Finance. In
the first chapter, I study the ex ante effects of the fear of future financial crises. Crises
are modelled through multiple equilibria driven by a self-fulfilling fall in asset prices.
I study the effects of allowing agents to anticipate such an event. In a financial crisis,
capital is pushed away from experts and towards less productive households, worsen-
ing the allocation of capital. Anticipation of this lowers asset prices, investment, and
growth today, even if experts are currently well enough capitalised to survive a crisis.
The possibility of future crises also creates a state-dependent“financial crisis acceler-
ator” which can amplify business-cycle shocks. In the model, prudential policy can
simultaneously increase growth and stabilise the economy, in contrast with common
arguments that prudential policy should decrease growth.
In the second chapter, I present evidence that countries which experienced greater
declines in total factor productivity (TFP) during the Great Recession experienced
milder contractions in hours worked. Thus I show that there is a tension between the
crisis manifesting itself either as a problem with productivity or with labour markets.
Additionally, countries with larger falls in real wages tend to be those with TFP, and
not labour market, problems. Inspired by these facts, I build a model of sticky wages,
and prove that wage adjustment determines the extent to which a financial crisis leads
to declines in TFP or hours worked. Larger falls in real wages protect labour markets
from reductions in hours. However, lower real wages reduce the incentive to reallocate
resources across firms during the crisis, leading to larger declines in productivity.
In the final chapter, I introduce financial frictions into the labour market matching
model, and study interactions between the two frictions. I demonstrate a feedback
between asset and labour markets which amplifies the model’s response to exogenous
shocks. Shocks which increase equity holders’ net worth allow them to fund more
vacancies, raising market tightness and lowering the ease with which firms can hire
workers. This increases the value of being an existing firm, causing stock prices to
appreciate. This increases experts’ net worth further, amplifying the initial shock
in a mechanism akin to the traditional financial accelerator. I derive an arbitrage
equation in my model similar to the standard free entry condition. I show that
any matching model which possesses this arbitrage equation, including the standard
matching model, is able to match 82% of the volatility in US market tightness if
calibrated to match the volatility in asset prices.
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Chapter 1
Growth, Business Cycles, and the
Fear of Financial Crises
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have served as a painful reminder that modern economies are not safe
from financial crises. While the eventual source of financial crises is often overlooked,
looking forward there is a widespread perception that future crises are possible. A
casual search for “next crisis” on Google News yields a long list of recent articles on
the topic. Whether because changes in regulation in response to the last crisis were
inadequate, or even laid the foundations for the next crisis,1 or just because crises
seem to happen every seven years,2 there is no shortage of potential future crises. In
this paper, I ask what the ex ante effects are of such “crisis fear”.
I build a model featuring endogenous financial crises due to multiple equilibria,
and study the general equilibrium effects of expectations of the possibility of future
1“In the U.S. and Europe, the private sector’s dependence on government support is fostering be-
haviors – excessive risk-taking, distortions in capital markets and maybe even inflationary pressures
– that could lay the foundations for the next crisis.” – WSJ (2012)
2“Financial crises come round every seven years on average. There was the stock market crash
of 1987, the emerging market meltdown in the mid-1990s, the popping of the dotcom bubble in
2001 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. If history is any guide, the next crisis should be
coming along some time soon.” – Guardian (2014)
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crises. The model is an extension of Brunnermeier & Sannikov’s (2014a, henceforth
BrS) continuous time model of an economy with a financial sector. Their model
features multiplicity of equilibria in some regions of the state space: if leverage is
high enough, a self-fulfilling fall in asset prices which bankrupts the financial sector
is possible. Brunnermeier & Sannikov (2014b) point out this multiplicity, and the
conditions under which it can arise. However, they do not model it formally in
agents’ expectations: ex ante, agents place zero probability on a crisis happening.
My contribution is to treat crises as a sunspot event, allowing agents to understand
the probability distribution over future crises. I then show that the fear of future
crises has negative effects on both growth and business cycles, and implications for
the tradeoffs of prudential policies.
The model features two classes of agents, productive “experts” and less produc-
tive “households”. Experts borrow from households in order to buy capital to take
advantage of their superior production technology. However, in some states of the
world a self-fulfilling fall in asset prices is possible, since a fall in asset prices may
bankrupt the expert sector, forcing them to liquidate their capital to unproductive
households at fire-sale prices.
The first result is the effect of crisis fear on growth. During a crisis, the liquidation
of capital to the less productive household sector reduces the average productivity
of capital, and hence the possibility of future crises lowers the expected return on
capital. This lowers asset prices and hence investment and growth today, even if
experts are currently well-enough capitalised to survive a crisis. Thus I demonstrate
that the potential future misallocation of capital across agents has implications for
growth. The model features endogenous growth via an “AK” structure based on
Romer (1986), so changes in the investment rate have permanent growth effects based
on a capital externality in production.3
3If we considered a standard neoclassical growth model, the reduction in investment would instead
slow down the transition to the balanced growth path and change the steady state level of capital.
Modelling endogenous growth allows me to study the interaction between financial crises and long-
run growth, and is computationally convenient because the equilibrium is linear in capital.
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The second result is the existence of a state-dependent “financial crisis accelera-
tor”: negative shocks which push the economy closer to the region where crises are
possible reduce asset prices, which reduces expert net worth, bringing us even closer
to the crisis region, reducing asset prices further in a vicious cycle. This operates on
top of the traditional financial accelerator, making the overall size of the accelerator
both state-dependent and asymmetric: positive shocks near the steady state have
smaller effects than negative shocks. In terms of policy, these results suggest that
there are both growth and stability benefits to dealing with financial crises, which
are felt even in times when banks are well capitalised.
Thirdly, I show that while experts may deleverage in response to crisis fear in par-
tial equilibrium, they may also actually take on more leverage in general equilibrium.
This is because of general equilibrium price effects and limited liability. The fear of a
crisis pushes down asset prices, which actually increases expected returns conditional
on there not being a crisis in the near future. Since experts don’t personally suffer all
of the losses incurred during a crisis, the increase in this conditional return encour-
ages experts to leverage up. On the other hand, experts are encouraged to deleverage
because this reduces their borrowing costs by reducing the incidence of exogenous
default costs. If the model features no exogenous default costs, then leverage is ev-
erywhere higher when agents fear crises. This adds an interesting interpretation to
the link between leverage and crises: we typically think of high leverage causing crisis
risk, but I show that the effect also works in the opposite direction, with crisis risk
causing high leverage.
Finally, I show that several of BrS’ results that are driven by exogenous shocks
can be replicated using sunspots. In particular, their model features a bimodal distri-
bution with serious but rare financial disasters driven by bad sequences of exogenous
shocks. I show that several of their results hold if we instead consider rare crises
driven by multiple equilibria. For example, they show that decreasing the volatility
of exogenous shocks in their model increases the amount of endogenous volatility cre-
15
ated in general equilibrium. I show that decreasing the volatility of exogenous shocks
can increase the probability of experiencing a financial crisis, since lower volatility
encourages experts to increase leverage, exposing themselves to crisis risk.
The model also highlights a crucial question: why would the financial sector expose
itself to such costly crisis risks? I show that in my model, in the absence of the
endogenous-growth externality, an expert who is prudent and takes on low enough
leverage to allow herself to survive a crisis would earn infinite value when the crisis
hits. The reason for this is intuitive: it is wonderful to be the only expert in town.
Prices are low and you operate a better technology than everyone else. In this case,
crises cannot exist in equilibrium, since any expert would deviate and take on low
leverage if others were taking on high enough leverage to put the economy at risk.
I show that, in the presence of my endogenous-growth externality, crises become
possible in equilibrium. The structure I adopt has the productivity of an individual
expert being dependent on the total capital managed by the aggregate expert sector.
Thus, during a crisis, when other experts are liquidating their capital, your produc-
tivity is lowered. This removes the benefit of being the only surviving expert, and
allows experts to coordinate on a high leverage, crisis-inducing equilibrium.4
My model has implications for the effects of prudential policy, which is often cast
as a tradeoff between stability and growth. It is often argued that leverage constraints
reduce volatility, but reduce growth by reducing the ability of banks to intermediate
capital on average. British Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne is quoted
as conceding that regulators have to strike a trade-off between risk and economic
growth in the aftermath of the recent crisis: “We dont want the financial stability
of the graveyard” (FT, 2011). This is a view widely held in the popular press and
within businesses. KPMG argue that regulation “... reduces the returns to investors
4As I discuss, there are empirical reasons to think the interpretation of it being wonderful to
be the only expert in town is probably flawed. My assumption is meant to capture the idea that
disruptions to financial markets during a crisis would make it hard to profit from low asset prices.
An alternative explanation for experts coordinating on a high leverage equilibrium could be the
expectation of receiving bailouts.
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in financial institutions. And it reduces economic growth. This has been seen most
powerfully and immediately in the downward spiral of bank deleveraging and weak or
negative economic growth in Europe” (p. 2, KPMG, 2013). Think tanks have even
estimated the negative effect of the recent Dodd-Frank act on growth (AAF, 2015).
While the forces which lead regulation to cause low growth are still operational in
my model, the fear of crises introduces a counteracting effect, and well-designed
prudential policies can simultaneously reduce volatility and increase growth.
The intuition for this result builds on the previously discussed growth and volatil-
ity results. The fear of future crises reduces growth, and thus prudential policies
which reduce the probability (and hence fear) of a future crisis will tend to increase
growth. In other words, leverage constraints could promote growth by making the
system safer. This positive effect of policy on growth competes with the usual negative
effects from reducing the ability of banks to raise funds. Thus whether prudential
policy increases or decreases growth is ultimately a quantitative question of which
effect dominates.
I consider a policy which forces experts to reduce leverage just enough to rule
out crises at all times, which I call the “minimally active” leverage constraint. This
policy is countercyclical in asset prices, requiring experts to hold lower leverage when
asset prices are high. In a calibrated model, I show that this policy increases growth
in equilibrium for a wide range of calibrations for the frequency of financial crises.
Since experts’ debt is reduced by the leverage constraint, the increase in growth must
be financed by an increase in equity. In the model, experts are unable to issue equity,
but equity increases because experts retain more earnings by consuming less, which
can be interpreted as paying lower dividends. They retain more earnings because
eliminating crises increases the value of internal net worth, since it is less likely to
be lost during a crisis. If the frequency of crises is high enough, implementing this
policy is welfare-improving regardless of the current state of the economy, while it is
not welfare-improving in the same model if we ignore crisis risk.
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Of course, whether such a policy is implementable in practice is an important
question. The optimal degree of countercyclicality, or average level of the minimally
active leverage constraint, requires knowledge of the structure of the economy that
a policymaker might not possess. I show that the minimally active leverage con-
straint increases welfare, and investigate the effects of policies which are too tight
or loose relative to this benchmark. Policy which is too tight can ultimately lead to
the misallocation costs dominating, and hence lead to lower welfare. This suggests
the existence of an “inverse-U ” relationship between leverage policy and welfare: ex-
cessively tight leverage constraints will reduce welfare, excessively loose constraints
will do nothing, and only intermediate policies can increase welfare. The degree of
flexibility a policymaker has in trading these two effects off is a quantitative question,
but the range of welfare-improving policies is large in the baseline calibration.
Overall, the aim of the above policy discussion is to highlight that the common
stability-vs-growth narrative may be overly simplistic. Even if hoping for an increase
in growth from prudential policies might be too much to ask in a practical sense,
the positive effects highlighted in this paper could mitigate the negative effects and
ultimately reduce the costliness of such policies.
I also discuss bailout policies and market-based solutions. As in Diamond &
Dybvig (1983), bailouts can completely rule out the bad equilibrium and hence incur
no distortions, since they are never used in equilibrium. However, this is due to
the simple structure of the model, and bailouts which are used in equilibrium may
lead to distortions. Finally, I show how a simple market-based solution, offering
experts insurance which pays off during a crisis, does not rule out crises. Indeed, the
same forces which lead experts to be willing to take on high enough leverage to let
themselves go bankrupt during a crisis are precisely those which lead them to adopt
no insurance against the event.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, I review related
literature. In section 1.3 I set up the model and describe some key features. In section
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1.4, I solve a version of the model where agents place no weight in their expectations
on crises happening, and present preliminary results. In section 1.5, I solve the full
model where agents anticipate the possibility of future crises, and present the paper’s
main results. In section 1.6, I present policy results, and in section 1.7 I conclude.
1.2 Related literature
My paper builds most on the ideas and framework of Brunnermeier & Sannikov
(2014a). While they don’t explicitly mention the possibility of crises in this paper,
they discuss it in an international economics framework in Brunnermeier & Sannikov
(2014b). In some states of the world, a second “bad equilibrium” exists in their model
whereby experts can go bankrupt in a self-fullfilling crisis. While they discuss the
existence of such an equilibrium, they do not allow agents to anticipate that a crisis
might happen, and hence cannot discuss how the fear of a potential switch to the bad
equilibrium affects behaviour ex ante.
Another recent paper which discusses financial crises in a general equilibrium
framework is Gertler & Kiyotaki (2013). Their model features crises via the same
mechanism (a fall in asset prices bankrupting banks), and additionally they discuss
the effects of anticipated crises. My contribution relative to their paper is that I solve
my model globally and nonlinearly, allowing me to study the state dependence of the
effects of crisis fear, whereas they linearise around the non-stochastic steady state.
Additionally I am able to study growth effects, whereas they assume a fixed stock of
capital. Ennis & Keister (2003) also model the effect that the expectation of financial
crises has on growth. They use an overlapping generations framework, and model
financial crises in a way closer to to the original Diamond & Dybvig (1983) model.
In their model, a crisis destroys a fraction of the capital stock, whereas in my model
it worsens the allocation of capital across agents.
In an international context, Perri & Quadrini (2014) solve a two-country model
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with financial crises due to multiple equilibria. Their focus is on explaining how the
multiplicity implies that financial crises should be correlated across countries. Crises
in their model are also anticipated events, with a known sunspot probability attached
to them. Other papers also examine the link between financial frictions and multiple
equilibria, and it is well known that financial frictions can lead to multiplicity. For
example, Martin & Ventura (2014) and Kocherlakota (2009) present models with
collateral constraints and multiple equilibria. The key idea is that higher asset prices
relax collateral constraints, increasing the demand for assets and thus justifying the
higher asset prices. Martin & Ventura (2014) also point out that the expectation that
you might change equilibrium in the future affects today’s equilibrium, which is a key
theme of my paper.
The literature above and my paper could be viewed as a way to endogenise exoge-
nous financial shocks, which have been shown to generate reasonable macroeconomic
features in a recently emerging literature. Eggertson & Krugman (2012) and Jermann
& Quadrini (2012) are two notable examples with models close to the representative
agent framework, while Khan & Thomas (2013) and Guerrieri & Lorenzoni (2011)
study heterogenous firm and consumer models respectively. Theoretically, one issue I
am abstracting from is the ability of banks to issue equity. Admati & Hellwig (2013)
emphasise that fears of the costs of leverage requirements could be overstated because
banks can substitute equity for debt. In a Modigliani-Miller world this is exactly true,
and in a world with frictions the costs of reducing debt depend on the relative size
of the frictions in equity and debt issuance. My paper complements this idea by
showing that even in the extreme case where banks cannot raise any equity the costs
of leverage constraints might be overstated, since improvements to the stability of the
system can encourage banks to retain earnings by paying less dividends.
Other papers provide evidence supporting or related to my model. Reinhart &
Rogoff (2009) document that the historical average duration of recessions surrounding
banking crises to be 1.9 years, which they describe as being unusually long compared
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to normal recessions, which last on average less than a year. They find that the
recoveries in unemployment tend to be even more protracted. Claessens & Kose
(2013) find similar results, and additionally find that severe financial disruptions
have slower recoveries than less severe ones.5 My model can be interpreted as one
rationalisation of this fact: if the fear of future crises rises (rationally or irrationally)
following a financial crisis, then investment and growth will be unusually slow in the
aftermath.
My model also revolves around the idea that financial crises are anticipated, in
the sense that agents worry about future crises, understanding the states of the world
in which they occur, and with what probabilities. This is consistent with evidence
from financial markets that agents price in future “run risk” for individual financial
institutions. Schroth, Suarez & Taylor (2014) present evidence from the asset-backed
commercial paper (ABCP) crisis which started in July 2007, which has been widely
interpreted as a run due to the short-term nature and widespread withdrawal of
financing. They show empirically that spreads on ABCP forecast future runs, consis-
tently with run risk being priced in to lending decisions. Additionally, the economic
mechanism behind crises stressed in my paper is that a large fall in asset prices
severely reduces the net worth of the financial sector. In historical data, Reinhart &
Rogoff (2009) show that equity prices fall on average by 55.9% during banking crises,
and that housing prices fall by an average of 35.5%. Additionally, Claessens & Kole
(2013) show that asset prices also fall faster during financial crises than they do in
normal recessions, which is supportive of their central role.6
Finally, my result that policy can simultaneously improve growth and reduce
5Some authors have argued that financial crises tend to have faster recoveries than normal re-
cessions. Reinhart & Rogoff (2012) provide a summary of this argument, and evidence supporting
their original work.
6The large fall in asset prices in the US during the recent crisis is well documented and broad-
based, whether we look at equity or land aggregates, or more exotic financial securities. For example,
the S&P500 index lost 45% of its value between September 2008 and March 2009, and over 50%
from its peak in October 2007. The S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index started
falling much earlier, and dropped over 40% of its value between April 2006 and May 2009.
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volatility relates to empirical work on the relationship between economic growth and
volatility. Ramey & Ramey (1995) and Imbs (2007) present cross-country evidence
that economies with lower volatility tend to have higher growth rates on average,
which could be interpreted as broadly supportive of my proposed mechanism.
1.3 Model
The model is an extension of BrS’ model to allow agents to expect crises, and the
underlying framework is very similar. The derivations are thus very similar to the
derivations in the original model, with the exception that I need to introduce a sunspot
jump variable to allow agents to rationally take into account the possibility that the
economy can experience a crisis. Additionally, to formalise the idea of endogenous
growth I derive their linear production functions as a special case of Romer’s (1986)
growth model.
1.3.1 Technology
There are two types of agent, each with unit mass. Households are relatively ineffi-
cient at production compared to experts, but experts will be financially constrained
and hence limited in their ability to accumulate capital. Production is carried out us-
ing capital using constant returns to scale production functions7: Each household has
production function
¯
yt =
¯
a
¯
kt, where under-bars are used throughout to denote house-
hold variables as opposed to expert variables. Each expert has production function
yt = akt, where a >
¯
a. Productivity is constant over time for each class of agent, and
the exogenous shock to the economy will instead be a capital quality shock. Capital is
accumulated by converting the consumption good into capital. There are adjustment
costs, so the price of capital, denoted by qt, is not equal to unity. Household capital
7There is no labour supply in the original BrS model. The linear production functions here should
be considered linear after labour has been optimally chosen.
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accumulation is given by:
d
¯
kt = (Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ)
¯
ktdt+ σ
¯
ktdZt (1.1)
Households’ capital depreciates at the rate
¯
δ, and if they invest at rate
¯
ιt (where this
is investment per unit of installed capital) they generate new capital at rate Φ(
¯
ιt).
Finally, their capital stock is subject to an aggregate Brownian shock, dZt, which has
an effect proportional to their installed capital. This is the aggregate capital quality
shock, whose variance is controlled by the parameter σ. Expert capital accumulates
according to:
dkt = (Φ(ιt)− δ) ktdt+ σktdZt (1.2)
Households have the same exposure to the shock as experts, and the same adjustment
cost function, but have lower productivity and a potentially higher depreciation rate,
¯
δ ≥ δ. In the appendix I prove that these linear production functions can be viewed
as the reduced form of a modification of Romer’s (1986) endogenous growth model.
1.3.2 Sunspot & price process
In solving this kind of model it is typical at this point to conjecture that prices evolve
as drift-diffusion process, with unknown drift and loading on the exogenous diffusion,
dZt. However, given that this economy features a multiplicity of equilibria we can
introduce a sunspot variable and conjecture that prices evolve as a function of this
variable too. This obviously has to be verified in equilibrium. I guess that the capital
price evolves according to:
dqt = µ
q
tqtdt+ σ
q
t qtdZt + (
¯
q − qt)dft (1.3)
Where dft is the change between t and t + dt in a counting variable which increases
by one in that interval with probability ρe,tdt, and doesn’t increase with probability
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1 − ρe,tdt. Thus the price evolves as a combination of time varying drift, diffusion
from the exogenous capital quality shock, and a jump component from the sunspot.
The final term is the sunspot term which says that the price could jump down from
qt to
¯
q with some probability. This is what happens in a crisis. The cause of the fall
in price will be the bankruptcy of all of the experts in the economy. Thus the jump
in prices will also coincide with default and their joint consequences for the other
variables of the economy.
The jump intensity, ρe,t has both endogenous and exogenous components, and
hence has to be determined in equilibrium. For example, in regions where banks are
well enough capitalised to survive a crisis this will be endogenously zero. However,
in regions where a crisis is possible, the modeller has freedom to choose how likely it
is that a crisis occurs. As usual with models of multiple equilibria, there is nothing
intrinsic in the model which tells us when we should switch equilibria. This means
that I must look outside the model for equilibrium selection, which is why sunspots
are required.
The crisis price,
¯
q, is also endogenous and at this point undetermined. Intuitively,
this is the price at which capital would trade if all experts go bankrupt and cease to
intermediate capital. This is going to be lower than the current price, because this
means that only inefficient households can purchase capital.
1.3.3 Markets
As well as the markets for consumption and for trading units of capital, there is a
restricted set of financial markets. In particular, experts and households can only
trade risky debt, and not state contingent claims (such as equity). Banks borrow
from households at interest rate, rt. In the case of default their net worth is reduced
to zero, and households seize their capital less a proportional default cost.
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1.3.4 Households
Households are risk neutral and allowed negative consumption, so their required ex-
pected return on any asset is always simply their subjective discount rate, ρh. Since
experts may default in a crisis, they borrow at a rate above the risk free rate. In the
appendix I show that the interest rate charged to an expert is:
rt =

ρh : φt <
1
1− ¯q
qt
ρh + ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ) ¯q
qt
φt
φt−1
)
: φt ≥ 1
1− ¯q
qt
(1.4)
Where χ is the fraction of expert assets exogenously destroyed during default. φt ≡
qtkbt
nt
is the leverage of a typical expert. The term in brackets is necessarily positive,
leading to an interest rate spread, and it is possible to show that the interest rate is
increasing in bank leverage. Note that the interest rate charged to any one expert
depends optimally on that expert’s own leverage, and not aggregate leverage.
Using the household capital evolution equation and conjectured price process we
can calculate the household’s return on holding capital. Ito’s lemma with jumps gives
us:8
d
¯
rkt =
(
¯
a−
¯
ιt
qt
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ + µqt + σσ
q
t
)
dt+ (σ + σqt ) dZt + ¯
q − qt
qt
dft (1.5)
Note that the realised return on capital could involve a non infinitesimal loss in the
case of a jump. The expected return will remain infinitesimal because this only
happens with probability of order dt: Etdft = ρe,tdt. The expected return for a
household is:
Ed
¯
rkt =
(
¯
a−
¯
ιt
qt
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ + µqt + σσ
q
t + ¯
q − qt
qt
ρe,t
)
dt (1.6)
8The return is composed of a dividend
¯
a plus a capital gains term. Capital gains are computed
as
d(qt
¯
kt)
qt
¯
kt
which includes the capital gain from price changes and from changes in the capital stock
itself, due to either the shock or investment and depreciation.
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In continuous time the investment decision is a static problem, and we can deter-
mine the optimal investment rate as the rate that maximises the above return (or
equivalently the expected return). Differentiation with respect to
¯
ιt yields:
Φ′(
¯
ιt) =
1
qt
(1.7)
Thus the optimal investment rate depends only on the current price of capital, and
from now on we can think of
¯
ιt as implicitly being defined by qt. Households are not
allowed to short the capital stock so, given the assumption of risk neutrality, either
they hold zero capital, or are indifferent about their capital holdings, or want to hold
infinite capital (which is ruled out by market clearing). Thus we can summarise the
household’s capital optimality conditions as:
¯
a−
¯
ιt
qt
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ + µqt + σσ
q
t + ¯
q − qt
qt
ρe,t ≤ ρh (1.8)
Which holds with equality if the household holds capital. Define ψt ≡ kt/Kt as the
share of the total capital stock owned by experts (where kt is the integral over the
identical holdings of the unit mass of experts). Then the above inequality is binding
in equilibrium if and only if ψt < 1.
Finally, it is convenient at this point to ask what the price of capital would have
to be if the household was to hold all of the capital stock forever (i.e. if the household
was the only agent in this economy). In this case we can use the household’s capital
FOC, (1.8), to give the capital price. Guessing that in this case the price of capital
is constant (µqt = σ
q
t = 0) gives:
¯
a−
¯
ιt
qh
+ Φ(ι(qh))−
¯
δ = ρh ⇒ qh = ¯a− ι(qh)
ρh +
¯
δ + Φ(ι(qh))
(1.9)
We see that our guess that µqt = σ
q
t = 0 is confirmed since there are no time varying
elements in the above equation.
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1.3.5 Experts
Experts are also risk neutral, and have subjective discount rate ρb. Experts, unlike
households, must have non-negative consumption. This means that they can become
financially constrained, because if they are lacking in net worth they will only be
able to expand capital holdings by issuing risk free debt, which comes at the cost
of magnifying risk. Denote an expert’s net worth by nt, where this is the market-
to-market book value of her assets minus liabilities. I define the current maximised
value of her utility by θtnt. Thus θt is an expert’s value per unit of net worth, which
I call experts’ “marginal value”, and which will be a function of the aggregate state
in equilibrium. Conjecture that marginal value follows:
dθt = µ
θ
tθtdt+ σ
θ
t θtdZt + dft (¯
θt − θt) (1.10)
Where
¯
θt is the value of an expert’s marginal value following a crash, which is to be
determined. An expert earns the following return on capital:
drkt =
(
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
dt+ (σ + σqt ) dZt + ¯
q − qt
qt
dft (1.11)
This return is maximised by the same choice for investment as households: Φ′(ιt) =
1/qt. They pay an interest rate which depends on how much leverage they take on,
as in (1.4). I derive the solution to the expert’s problem in the appendix. A very
important issue is what happens to the individual expert during a crisis. Remember
that the crisis is an aggregate event, and the expert does not think that she has any
power to affect whether it happens or not. This is because a crisis is a fall in asset
prices, which individual agents take as given. But an expert does have the power to
control whether or not she personally goes bankrupt during a crisis. To see this, note
that if the price of capital instantaneously falls from qt to
¯
q, an expert’s net worth
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falls to:
¯
nt = max
{
nt − qtkt +
¯
qkt, 0
}
= max
{
nt
(
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
))
, 0
}
(1.12)
The expert will go bankrupt during a crisis if the term inside the max operator is
less than zero, leaving
¯
nt = 0, and will survive the crisis if
¯
nt ≥ 0. Note that while
the occurrence of a crisis is a random event, it is completely deterministic whether
an expert survives the crisis. If prices fall in a crisis then 1 −
¯
q/qt > 0, meaning
that
¯
nt decreases in leverage, and an expert can be certain to survive the crisis by
choosing low enough leverage. In the extreme, an expert could choose to buy no
capital (φt = 0) and be certain to always survive a crisis, since then
¯
nt = nt > 0.
This introduces a kink into the expert’s value function, because there is a threshold
leverage choice φˆt = qt/(
¯
q− qt) above which the expert goes bankrupt in a crisis, and
below which she does not. Thus a key element of equilibrium will be which region
the expert optimally chooses: a crisis cannot be an equilibrium if the existence of a
crisis causes all of the experts to deleverage to avoid it. Understanding the conditions
under which experts do and do not expose themselves to this crisis risk is clearly an
important question. However, the focus of this paper is on understanding the general
equilibrium effects of such crisis risk, and as such I make assumptions to ensure that
if all other experts are choosing high enough leverage to make a crisis possible then
you are also happy to take on that high level of leverage.
In particular, the appendix details the endogenous growth structure behind the
reduced-form linear production technologies used in the main text. These use an
aggregate capital externality based on Romer (1986), whereby the productivity of
any individual expert depends on the total capital being intermediated by the entire
expert sector. In this case, if all other experts take on enough leverage to expose
themselves to a crisis, you have a strong incentive to as well. This is because during
a crisis the rest of the experts will have to shed all of their capital, reducing your own
productivity during a crisis via the capital externality. In the appendix I prove that
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this leads to experts optimally maintain high enough leverage to expose themselves
to a crisis, if all other experts are doing so.9
I relegate the derivation of the expert’s problem to the appendix, and present the
key results here. The expert’s leverage first order condition gives:
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt − ρh = −σθt (σ + σqt ) + ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ) ¯q
qt
)
(1.13)
This is identical to BrS’ original FOC, with the addition of the final term. The FOC
can be interpreted as a simple marginal benefit / marginal cost comparison. On the
left hand side is the marginal benefit of increasing leverage, which is the expected
excess return on capital over the risk free rate. On the right hand side is the marginal
cost of increasing leverage. The first term is common with the original BrS model, and
is the increase in risk the expert faces by increasing leverage. The financial friction
makes the expert effectively risk averse, and since she has to finance risky capital
using less than fully-contingent debt her risk is magnified as she leverages up. The
final term is the marginal cost of increasing leverage related to crises. By leveraging
up the expert splits her collateral more thinly across her creditors, leading to a higher
required interest rate as there is less security per unit lent. The first order condition
for consumption gives:
θt ≥ 1 (1.14)
with equality if dct > 0. The marginal utility gained from consuming today is al-
ways one due to the risk neutrality assumption. As in BrS, the expert thus consumes
nothing if the marginal value of retaining earnings exceeds one. If the value of retain-
9In the appendix I provide a thorough discussion of the conditions under which an expert would
allow herself to go bankrupt during a crisis. My technological assumption is a stand in for the idea
that disruption in financial markets during a crisis makes it hard to take advantage of the high
expected returns that come with temporarily low asset prices. Alternatively, the expectation of
bailouts could explain why institutions expose themselves to such risk. The question then becomes
why individuals do not reduce their exposure to the crisis. In the words of Citygroup chief executive
Chuck Prince, “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long
as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.” (FT, 2007)
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ing earnings ever falls to one the expert is indifferent about consuming and holding
capital, placing a lower bound of one on θt. At the optimum, and when dct = 0,
evaluating the value function gives:
µθt = ρb − ρh (1.15)
This gives us our solution for µθt , and solving the expert’s problem now just requires
finding a solution for σθt at every point in the aggregate state space. One important
thing to note is that neither of the optimality conditions pins down an exact value for
optimal leverage. The expert is in fact indifferent about her choice of leverage as long
as (1.13) holds. This is a product of the risk neutrality assumption, and surprisingly
even holds when we add crisis risk.
1.3.6 Market clearing
In equilibrium prices adjust to clear the consumption, capital and bond markets.
Consumption market clearing requires that expert and household consumption and
investment flows equal the flow of production. The risk neutrality of households
ensures that this market clears. Capital market clearing requires that expert and
household capital demand sums to the supply of installed capital:
kt +
¯
kt = Kt (1.16)
Where Kt is the current stock of capital, which is an aggregate state variable. In
equilibrium, the price of capital adjusts so that the sum of expert and household
capital demand equals the existing total installed capital stock. In practice, given
the linearity of both sets of agents’ policy functions, this means adjusting the price
to ensure that they are either indifferent about their capital holdings, or don’t want
to hold any at all.
Experts will always hold capital in equilibrium, since they are more productive
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than households. Households may not find it profitable to do so depending on the
current return. There are thus two regions of the state space, corresponding to
whether or not the household holds capital. If the household doesn’t hold capital
then we determine the price of capital using the expert’s leverage first order condition,
(1.13), and need to check that (1.8) holds with inequality. That is, in this region:
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt − ρh = −σθt (σ + σqt ) + ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ) ¯q
qt
)
And:
¯
a−
¯
ιt
qt
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ + µqt + σσ
q
t + ¯
q − qt
qt
ρe,t < ρh
Since the household is not holding capital, we only need to adjust the price of capital
to make sure the expert is indifferent about her leverage choice. In the region where
the household does hold capital, both agents’ FOCs hold with equality, so we can set
(1.8) to bind and subtract it from (1.13) to give:
a−
¯
a
qt
+
¯
δ − δ − ρe,tχ ¯
q
qt
+ σθt (σ + σ
q
t ) = 0 (1.17)
This is the counterpart to BrS’ equation (17) when we allow for anticipated crises.
This equation is important because it tells us what has to be true to make experts
and households simultaneously happy to hold capital. Intuitively, we have to some-
how make both experts and households indifferent about their capital holdings, even
though experts are more productive and would hence tend to be happier to interme-
diate. Notice that in the absence of the risk or jump terms this would be impossible
since a >
¯
a and
¯
δ > δ, and no qt could make the above equation hold.
In the original BrS model without crises the capital market is actually cleared
by adjusting the level of endogenous risk. To make both sets of agents happy to
hold capital the experts’ productivity advantage is offset by the fact that they dislike
risk, while the household does not. This is where the actual value of expert leverage
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is determined. Remember it is not pinned down by individual optimisation, since
they are individually indifferent about their leverage levels. The level of leverage is
determined in general equilibrium, as the level which creates enough risk to satisfy
the above equation. Remember that increasing leverage increases risk, by increasing
the experts’ exposure to risky assets while funding them with risk free debt.
In the model with anticipated crises, there is also the jump term to consider. If
we are in the crisis-prone region and χ > 0 then the jump term tends to reduce
leverage, all else equal, because it pushes up expert borrowing rates and increases the
marginal cost of leverage. In order to reduce the marginal cost to restore indifference
we need to reduce the amount of endogenous risk, which is achieved by lower leverage
in equilibrium as discussed above.
The other state variable is total bank net worth, Nt. The capital quality shock
is i.i.d and therefore there is no need to include its value as a state. The sunspot
also doesn’t introduce a new state variable conditional on the current state, since it
is simply a flow probability of moving between equilibria. Thus we can completely
describe the equilibrium of the economy on the state space (Nt, Kt).
1.3.7 State space representation
I noted that the state variables are (Nt, Kt). BrS show that the equilibrium of the
economy scales linearly in Kt if we use bank net worth as a proportion of total net
worth as a state instead of Nt:
ηt ≡ Nt
qtKt
(1.18)
In other words, we use (ηt, Kt) as a state. Most variables, such as qt and φt, will only
depend on ηt in equilibrium. Others, such as total consumption, output and capital
demand, will depend on ηt, but also scale linearly in Kt. Conjecture the following
law of motion for ηt:
dηt = µ
η
t ηtdt+ σ
η
t ηtdZt − ηtdft (1.19)
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The drift and volatility terms are to be determined along with the drifts and volatil-
ities for qt and θt. The jump term says that in a crisis the value of ηt jumps down
to zero. This is because in a crisis Nt jumps to zero, and hence so does Nt/(qtKt).
The variables qt, θt and ψt are functions only of ηt in equilibrium. Given ψt and ηt it
is easy to calculate leverage as φt = ψt/ηt. Using Ito’s lemma we can solve for all of
the unknown drifts and volatilities as functions of the parameters and the unknown
functions above. I relegate the derivations to the appendix.
1.3.8 Crisis equilibrium
At this point we can construct the crisis equilibrium. Suppose that at some time
t experts have leverage φt, net worth Nt, and face a price of capital of qt. The
multiplicity I investigate is whether a fall in price from qt to
¯
q is enough to bankrupt
the experts. The fall in price causes net worth to fall from Nt to:
¯
Nt = Nt − qtkt +
¯
qkt = Nt
(
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
))
(1.20)
If
¯
Nt < 0 the experts go bankrupt. Given knowledge of
¯
q, a crisis is thus possible at
the current state if:
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
< 0 (1.21)
The question is now whether the bankruptcy of experts can justify why the price fell
to
¯
q. This is true if the equilibrium price post bankruptcy is
¯
q. Given that the price
is a function of the state of the economy,
¯
q is an equilibrium object: it is the price
that capital trades at once experts go bankrupt. Thus calculating this price requires
specifying what happens in the economy after a crisis.
At the moment a crisis hits expert net worth drops to zero, as they do not have
enough to pay off their creditors. With zero net worth experts have no money to
purchase capital, and they cannot leverage off zero net worth. Hence households have
to hold the whole capital stock in equilibrium (ψt = 0) immediately following a crisis.
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However, this is not enough information to price capital, since even the household’s
first order conditions are forward looking, and so the crisis price of capital will depend
on the expectation of future prices.
However, note that experts’ policy functions are linear in net worth. This means
that once their net worth drops to zero, it must remain there indefinitely. Intuitively,
with no net worth they cannot invest, and hence cannot generate any new net worth.
This means that, in the absence of any intervention, a financial crisis would be per-
manent in this model. This makes it easy to price capital: the price when households
hold the whole capital stock forever can be simply solved from (1.9). For simplicity,
this is the assumption I maintain in the baseline model.
To facilitate non-permanent crisis, I consider the following extension. In order
to spur the recovery of the experts, I can introduce an exogenous equity injection
to restore them to positive net worth. This can be thought of as originating from
either households or from a government sector. Specifically, I assume that following
a crisis, the expert sector will receive an equity injection with probability ρrdt in any
interval dt. This injection is sufficient to restore η to some ηˆ, and once it is given
no further equity injections are given until another crisis occurs. Once the equity
injection is given, capital is priced via the normal equilibrium and hence the price
jumps up to q(ηˆ). Until this happens only households are holding capital, and hence
we can price capital using the household’s capital first order condition. The price
will be constant at
¯
q until the experts are recapitalised. Taking this into account, the
return a household earns on capital during a crisis is:
d
¯
rkt =
(
¯
a−
¯
ιt
¯
q
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ
)
dt+ σdZt +
q(ηˆ)−
¯
q
¯
q
dgt (1.22)
The drift and diffusion terms give the return if we remain in a crisis. Note that during
a crisis the price is constant at
¯
q, so there are no price appreciation or volatility terms.
The last term gives the capital gain the household makes in the even that experts are
recapitalised, which is the jump event dgt. In equilibrium the expected return equals
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the household’s subjective discount rate:
ρh = ¯
a−
¯
ιt
¯
q
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ +
q(ηˆ)−
¯
q
¯
q
ρr (1.23)
This gives one equation to determine
¯
q given q(ηˆ). Notice that as ρr → 0 the price
of capital approaches the price of capital if households are expected to hold all of the
capital stock forever. Once ηˆ and ρr are chosen, and knowing the equilibrium price
function in normal times, q(η), we thus have enough information to calculate the price
of capital during a crisis. I solve a version of the model with ρr > 0 in the appendix,
and restrict myself to permanent crises (ρr = 0) for the baseline calibration.
The fundamental cause of crises in this model is the misallocation of capital. A
crisis causes experts to go bankrupt, which pushes all of the capital stock into the
hands of inefficient households. Since these households are inefficient and produce
less from the capital stock the price of capital falls to reflect this. This model is thus
fundamentally a model of multiplicity due to endogenous misallocation of capital, and
a crisis manifests itself as a drop in measured total factor productivity (TFP). An
important question is whether modelling the real effects of crises as a drop in measured
TFP is empirically correct, a question I tackle in depth in my second chapter.
1.3.9 Selecting equilibria
In a region of the state space where a crisis is possible, between t and t + dt the
economy carries on as usual with probability 1− ρe,tdt, and experiences a crisis with
probability ρe,tdt. The intensity ρe,t is a variable that the modeller gets to choose,
and intuitively controls the probability that agents coordinate on the belief that a
self fulfilling fall in asset prices will happen. A simple assumption would be to set
ρe to a constant value, which would mean the probability of experiencing a crisis is
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constant (whenever a crisis is possible). This leads to the following form for ρe,t:
ρe,t =
 ρe : ¯Nt < 00 :
¯
Nt ≥ 0
(1.24)
So far I have only discussed switching from the “normal” equilibrium to the crisis
equilibrium, but is it possible to switch back? The answer is no, as once we enter
a crisis expert capital holdings fall to zero, and it is hence not possible for changes
in capital prices to push expert net worth around, which was the mechanism for
our jumps. Instead, we return to the normal equilibrium once experts’ net worth is
restored via an equity injection.
1.3.10 Equilibrium
This section is the equivalent to BrS’ Proposition II.4 in my model. We solve for the
unknown functions q, θ on state space η ∈ [0, η∗]. All other variables are implicitly
defined by (q, θ, η). At any point in the state space where
¯
N(η) < 0 the economy may
experience a crisis, and does so at the endogenous rate ρe,t which is solved for along
with the other equilibrium variables. η∗ is an upper bound on η because at this point
returns are so low that experts consume their net worth. There are five boundary
conditions:
q(0) = qh θ(η
∗) = 1 q′(η∗) = 0 θ′(η∗) = 0 lim
η→0
θ(η) =∞ (1.25)
Given the current state, η, and (q(η), q′(η), θ(η), θ′(η)) we can calculate (q′′(η), θ′′(η))
using the following procedure.
1. Find ψ such that
a−
¯
a
qt
+
¯
δ − δ − ρe,tχ ¯
q
qt
+ σθt (σ + σ
q
t ) = 0 (1.26)
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where:
σηt η =
(ψ − η)σ
1− (ψ − η)q′(η)/q(η) σ
θ
t =
θ′(ηt)σ
η
t ηt
θt
σqt =
q′(ηt)σ
η
t ηt
qt
(1.27)
and
ρe,t =
 ρe : 1−
ψ
η
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
< 0
0 : 1− ψ
η
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
≥ 0
(1.28)
If ψ > 1 set ψ = 1 and recalculate (1.27).
2. Compute
µηt = −σηt (σ + σqt + σθt ) + ρe,t(1− χ) ¯
q
qt
+
a− ιt
qt
+ (1− ψt)(
¯
δ − δ) (1.29)
µqt = ρh−
a− ιt
qt
−Φ(ιt) + δ− σσqt − σθt (σ + σqt ) + ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ) ¯q
qt
)
(1.30)
µθt = ρb − ρh (1.31)
q′′(η) =
2 [µqtq(η)− q′(ηt)µηt η]
(σηt )
2 η2
θ′′(η) =
2
[
µθtθ(η)− θ′(ηt)µηt η
]
(σηt )
2 η2
Finally, ηˆ is a given parameter, and the crisis price,
¯
q, solves:
ρh = ¯
a−
¯
ιt
¯
q
+ Φ(
¯
ιt)−
¯
δ +
q(ηˆ)−
¯
q
¯
q
ρr (1.32)
1.3.11 Looking through the equations in partial equilibrium
To begin understanding the effect that anticipated crises have on equilibrium, it is
helpful to look through the equations of the model, as summarised above. This allows
us to trace where crises enter the equilibrium and gain some intuition as to the effects.
Notice that the probability of a crisis, ρe,t, enters via three equations: (1.26), (1.29)
and (1.30).
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Equation 1.26: Leverage
Starting with equation (1.26), the following result is useful:
Proposition 1. Suppose we are at a given state η in the interior of the crisis re-
gion, and where both experts and households intermediate capital. Then for given
(q(η), q′(η), θ(η), θ′(η)) an increase in the probability ρe of selecting the crisis equilib-
rium reduces expert leverage if and only if χ > 0.
Note that the reason we condition on (q(η), q′(η), θ(η), θ′(η)) in the proof is that
this parallels how we actually solve for leverage in the numerical solution. The proof
is simple and relegated to the appendix, but the intuition is more subtle and I discuss
it here. This is not a true partial equilibrium experiment, in the sense that we study
a single agent’s actions when we take prices as exogenous. To see this note that I
have taken expert value, θ, as given too.
Remember that we form equation (1.26) by subtracting the household’s capital
first-order condition (if it is binding) from the expert’s leverage first order condition.
Thus (1.26) holds if both agents are holding capital, and is necessary for them both
to be indifferent about their capital holdings. ρe,t only enters equation (1.26) if χ > 0,
and does not if χ = 0. This means that in the absence of exogenous default costs
(χ = 0) crisis risk has no immediate impact on who prefers to hold capital.
To see this, note that increasing the probability of selecting a crisis affects the
optimality conditions for both experts and households. For households, it increases
the probability that they suffer a large capital loss on the capital in a crisis, reducing
their expected return on capital, as in (1.8). For experts the story is slightly different.
While an increase in the probability of a crisis does reduce their expected return, they
do not care directly about this. This is because they go bankrupt during a crisis, and
hence place no weight on this loss in their optimisation. Instead, experts only care
about the probability of a crisis because it affects the spread they pay on their debt.
When experts consider taking on an extra unit of leverage they understand that they
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will have to repay one extra unit at the current interest rate r(φ), and will also face
a marginal increase in their interest payments r′(φ) because their collateral becomes
more thinly spread across their debtors. An increase in the probability of a crisis
increases both the current interest rate and the marginal increase.
Interestingly, when χ = 0 these effects are of exactly the same magnitude, and
crisis risk does not hurt one group more than the other. Thus when we subtract the
two first order conditions from each other, no terms involving ρe,t remain. However,
when χ > 0 this is not true, and a term involving ρe,t does remain. This term causes
us to reduce leverage in response to crisis risk. Intuitively, this is because when we
add exogenous default costs the interest rate the expert pays increases faster as she
increases leverage, encouraging her to deleverage.
In sum, if exogenous default costs are positive, increasing the probability of a
crisis harms both the experts and the household, but harms the expert more on the
margin. Given this, to restore both agents to indifference we will need to help the
expert, which is achieved by reducing equilibrium leverage. This helps the expert by
reducing the amount of endogenous risk, as discussed in Section 1.3.6, which helps
experts since they are effectively risk averse.
Thus I have established that in partial equilibrium anticipation of crises reduces
expert leverage if and only if χ > 0, which pushes capital into the hands of inefficient
households. However, we will see in the numerical section that this partial equilibrium
result is overturned by general equilibrium forces in some areas of the state space,
meaning that leverage could even increase in response to crisis risk.
Equation 1.30: Capital gains
Equation (1.30) allows us to compute the drift in the capital price, µqt once we have
computed the volatilities. Since 1− (1− χ)
¯
q/qt > 0, we see that this equation gives
us a higher µqt whenever ρe,t is higher, all else constant.
The intuition for why this is the case is relatively simple. Equation (1.30) is
39
the expert’s leverage first order condition, rearranged to solve for µqt . Increasing ρe,t
increases the expert’s marginal cost of leverage by increasing the interest rate the
expert pays on debt. In order to return the expert to indifference about her leverage
choice we must increase the marginal benefit of leverage, which is done by increasing
the expected return to capital. Since we are (for the purposes of this discussion) taking
all else as given, this is achieved by increasing µqt which increases capital gains.
This reasoning leads us to expect that we should expect that expected returns
conditional on there not being a crisis should be higher when agents attach a high
probability to there being a crisis in the near future. We can see this by rearranging
(1.30) and using the definition of drkt :
Et
[
drkt |dft = 0
]
= ρh − σθt (σ + σqt ) + ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ) ¯q
qt
)
(1.33)
While this is true for the expected return conditional on there being no crisis, it is
less so for the overall expected return. Nonetheless, the conditional expected return
is interesting because it tells us how the economy behaves in the scenario that we
don’t experience a crisis.
Equation 1.29: Expert net worth
The final equation ρe,t appears in is the drift of the aggregate state, µ
η
t . The aggregate
state is expert net worth as a fraction of the value of the capital stock, and tends to
grow when expert net worth grows. Like µqt , it is also increasing in ρe,t all else equal.
This is a reflection of the higher expected returns (conditional on no crisis) that the
experts earn when crisis risk increases.
This suggests a potentially interesting trade off: higher crisis risk means that the
economy is more likely to suffer a large fall in the net worth of the financial system,
but conditional on there not being a crisis we should expect expert net worth to
increase faster, because the fear of crises pushes up conditional expected returns.
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1.4 Unanticipated Crises
I now move on to analysing the equilibrium of the model and presenting results. Since
the model is solved numerically, parameter choices are important, and I thus calibrate
the model. I calibrate the model to provide a reasonable description of the data
outside of crises times, as I detail below. However, given the rarity of financial crises
I do not calibrate the model to match exact properties of financial crisis data. Instead,
I provide results for a range of calibrations (specifically, a range of crisis frequencies)
and present results across this range. In this section I consider the model with what
I call “unanticipated crises”. This is the solution to the model where I set ρe = 0 so
that the sunspot places no weight on selecting a crisis. Nonetheless, the model will
still occasionally venture into the region where crises are possible. The model will
then never select the crisis equilibrium, and agents will correctly anticipate this in
their expectations. Solving the model like this first has the advantage of allowing me
to investigate what forces drive the model into states of the world where crises are
possible without interference from the effects of crisis fear on the equilibrium itself.
1.4.1 Calibration
I choose the following parameters for the baseline calibration. One unit of time is
set to one year. I set ρh = 0.05 to generate an annual risk free rate of 5%. The
deprecation rates are both set to δ =
¯
δ = 0.05. Expert productivity is set to a = 0.1,
which can be considered a normalisation.10 The remaining non-crisis parameters are
set according to the following calibration strategy. Firstly, I attempt to match the
following three moments of the US post-war data: 1) a mean quarterly growth rate
of logged, HP-filtered11 output of 0.46%, 2) a standard deviation of quarterly, logged,
HP-filtered output of 0.0167, and 3) a standard deviation of the quarterly, logged, HP-
10This measures the number of output goods produced from one unit of capital, and thus appro-
priate scalings of the other model parameters can be found such that different values of a correspond
to different definitions of the “number” of output goods.
11I use the standard smoothing parameter of 1600, corresponding to quarterly data.
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filtered investment-to-capital ratio of 0.0692. The sources for these data are detailed
in the data appendix of my second chapter. I choose parameters such that the model
without crises (ρe = 0) generates moments close to these data. Finally, I target that
the model with ρe = 0 spends 10% of its time in states where crises become possible.
This part of the calibration is somewhat arbitrary, but ensures that the model is able
to generate crises, which is necessary for my exercise.
I parameterise the investment adjustment cost function as quadratic:
ιt = Φt +
κ
2
(
Φt − Φ¯
)2
(1.34)
κ measures the degree of adjustment costs (κ = 0 corresponds to no adjustment
costs), and Φ¯ is the reference investment rate away from which adjustment costs are
paid, which I take to be the average investment rate. I set Φ¯ = 0.07 to match the
targeted growth rate of output, which requires an investment rate of approximately
0.07. There are four remaining non-crisis parameters: households’ productivity,
¯
a,
experts’ discount rate, ρb, the volatility of the capital quality shock, σ, and the degree
of adjustment costs, κ. These are chosen to target the four data moments above, and
I use a numerical minimisation routine to minimise the squared sum of deviations
from the target by varying the four parameters.
This leads to the following parameter choices:
¯
a = 0.07456, ρb = 0.05089,
σ = 0.02591, and κ = 2.1992. These lead to the model generating the following
values of the targeted moments, when calculated as they are in the data: 1) a mean
quarterly growth rate of logged, HP-filtered output of 0.38%, 2) a standard devia-
tion of quarterly, logged, HP-filtered output of 0.0174, 3) a standard deviation of the
quarterly, logged, HP-filtered investment-to-capital ratio of 0.0756, and 4) the model
spending 10% of its time in the region where crises are possible.
The remaining parameters to choose correspond to aspects of financial crises. For
the remainder of the paper I consider the limit case of permanent crises, setting
ρr = 0. This simplification allows me to quickly compute the crisis price from (1.9).
42
None of the results depend qualitatively on crises being permanent: the anticipation
effects of rare but permanent crisis are much the same as the effects of more frequent
but shorter crises. To demonstrate this, in the appendix I provide an example of the
solution to the model with non-permanent crises. As of yet I have not set the sunspot
parameter, ρe, or the exogenous destruction cost, χ, as they are not needed for the
solution to the model with ρe = 0. I discuss their values in section 1.5.
Finally, it is worth noting that this calibration leads to Brunnermeier & San-
nikov’s (2014a) bimodal distribution effectively vanishing. Their paper argued that
the economy could endogenously spend a lot of time in very low capitalisation states
following bad enough sequences of technology shocks, resulting in a regime that looks
a lot like a financial crisis. However, given my calibration the probability of entering
this regime is extremely small (see the stationary densities in Figure 1.6), and the
crises driven by multiple equilibria are thus effectively the only forms of crises in the
model.
1.4.2 Unanticipated crises: proximate causes & crisis-prone
region
Figure 1.1 presents the numerical solution to selected variables from the model in
the baseline calibration. As expert capitalisation (η) falls, experts intermediate less
of the capital stock (ψ falls) which causes the capital price to fall as more of it is
held by unproductive households. As the price of capital falls, returns increase for
both experts and households. This encourages experts to increase their leverage (φ
increases).
The bottom right panel of Figure 1.1 plots
¯
nt/nt, and crises are thus possible
whenever this line is negative (of course, given that ρe = 0 agents think that crises
will never be selected in equilibrium). Crises become possible whenever expert capi-
talisation, η, is low enough. To understand this result, recall that
¯
nt/nt being negative
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Figure 1.1: Selected variables, model with unanticipated crises
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Solution to the model with ρe = 0. η gives expert net
worth as a fraction of the total value of the capital stock.
In all panels, η∗ is the rightmost limit of the x-axis.
is equivalent to
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
< 0 (1.35)
Since 1 −
¯
q/qt < 0, higher leverage pushes us towards crises being possible, because
banks have increased their exposure to the fall in qt but financed this using fixed debt.
For low values of η, where banks are relatively undercapitalised, leverage is high in
equilibrium and this gives the model a tendency to predict crises as η falls.
On the other hand, crises are also only possible if the fall in asset prices is large
enough, i.e.
¯
q/qt is small. Graphically a crisis is a jump from the current value of
η down to η = 0, and so the price falls from its current value down to the value at
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the intersection with the vertical axis. For low values of η, asset prices are already
low, meaning that they don’t have as far to fall in a crisis. This means that for a low
enough η crises stop being possible. However, for this calibration this region is very
small, to the extent that it is not visible in the plot.
The economy naturally gravitates towards higher values of η in the absence of
shocks, and spends most of its time around the higher values of η near η∗. Hence in
this calibration the economy is immune from crises near the steady state, and only
becomes susceptible to crises if the experts become undercapitalised. This happens
if a sequence of negative capital quality shocks erode expert net worth.
What does this tell us about the model where ρe > 0 and we actually do select
crises in equilibrium? A crisis will happen in the crisis region, which the above logic
tells us we will reach following a bad sequence of negative capital quality shocks.
Once we are there, a crisis occurs if the “bad” sunspot is drawn, in which case the
experts go bankrupt following a self-fulfilling fall in asset prices. In a crisis, η jumps
from its current value down to zero, since aggregate expert net worth falls to zero.
1.4.3 Parameter sensitivity: fundamental causes of crises
Having established that crises become possible when leverage is high and asset prices
have far enough to fall, and having identified the region of the state space where crises
are possible, I now turn to their fundamental causes. What I mean by this is that
I conduct parameter sensitivity to understand what kind of economies are more or
less prone to financial crises. I conduct sensitivity for three key parameters, which all
have important and economically interesting effects on the size of the crisis region.
The first panel of Figure 1.2 plots 1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
across the state space for three
different values of household productivity,
¯
a. The other parameter values are all
held at their baseline values. The thin, blue line in all three panels is the baseline
calibration, and the dashed red and thick green lines are for a lower and higher value
of the parameter respectively. For
¯
a we see that, holding all else constant, increasing
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Figure 1.2: Parameter sensitivity: crisis net worth across changes in three parameters
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Each panel plots
¯
n/n across the state space, η. A negative value of
any line means a crisis is possible at that η. Each panel calculates this
variable for three values of a given parameter, holding all other param-
eters at their baseline values. For
¯
a. the high and low values refer
to 5% deviations from the baseline value, 15% for σ, and 30% for κ.
¯
a reduces the size of the crisis region, and decreasing a increases it. This corresponds
directly to reducing and increasing the probability of being in the crisis region, as can
be seen in Table 1.1 where I give the fraction of time spent in the crisis region under
the stationary distribution for each deviation.
I showed in the previous section that crises occur because either 1) leverage is
high or 2) the price of capital is high relative to the crisis price
¯
q. Figure 1.11 in
the appendix shows that it is the latter effect that is operating here. Increasing
¯
a
increases the productivity of households and hence increases the fire sale price of
capital. This makes crises less severe, reducing the range of states for which leverage
is high enough to enable a crisis. Figure 1.11 shows that leverage is actually slightly
higher after increasing
¯
a, and hence moves in the wrong direction to explain the
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reduced size of the crisis region. Hence the productivity differential between a and
¯
a is important in explaining the size of the crisis region because it controls how far
prices have to fall in a crisis.
Table 1.1: Fraction of time spent in crisis region
¯
a σ κ
Low 0.26 0.41 0.03
Baseline 0.10 0.10 0.10
High 0.04 0.04 0.28
Fraction of time spent in crisis region under station-
ary density for deviations of three parameters from base-
line values when all other parameters are held at base-
line. For
¯
a. the high and low values refer to 5% devia-
tions from the baseline value, 15% for σ, and 30% for κ.
The second panel demonstrates the effect of fundamental uncertainty (σ) on the
crisis region. Increasing fundamental uncertainty reduces the size of the crisis region,
and makes entering the crisis region less likely under the stationary distribution.
Figure 1.11 shows that, in this case, the effects of leverage and prices both work in
the same direction: higher fundamental uncertainty causes experts to deleverage and
reduces asset prices, both of which make the system safer from crises.
Finally, the third panel demonstrates the effect of the adjustment cost parameter
κ on the crisis region. The larger this parameter is the more costly it is to adjust
your capital stock, and hence the less sensitive is investment to the capital price. Or
conversely, with high values of κ the capital price is more sensitive to investment. This
means that equilibrium price function is steeper when κ is high, as overall investment
is increasing as experts get richer. Given our earlier discussion, a steep price function
makes crises more likely as it increases the gap between q and
¯
q, even if
¯
q is fixed. The
sensitivity of the crisis region to κ was discussed in Brunnermeier & Sannikov (2014b),
who interpret κ as technological illiquidity.
The effects of
¯
a and σ on the size of the crisis region are also interesting because
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they mirror earlier results in the original BrS paper. In the original model, reducing
¯
a
increases the level of endogenous risk the model generates. For example, the volatility
of the capital price is higher as you reduce
¯
a. My result thus complements the original,
by showing that not only is the volatility higher as you reduce
¯
a, so is the risk of a
crisis. Similarly for σ, BrS show that as you reduce the level of exogenous risk, the
level of endogenous risk increases. I show that as you reduce σ the risk of a crisis
increases, complementing the original result.
1.5 Anticipated crises
Having established the mechanics behind crises, I now move on to the general equi-
librium effects of anticipating crises. At this point I need to give values for the final
parameters of the model, which control various aspects of the crisis. I solve the model
setting χ = 0, so there are no exogenous costs of default. This choice is motivated by
the fact that since in this model all experts default at the same time, any exogenous
default costs would involve a large part of the economy’s capital stock being exoge-
nously destroyed. Instead, by restricting χ = 0 I focus on the case where the value
of the economy’s capital stock falls, driven by price effects.
The final parameter to set is the probability of coordinating on a crisis, ρe. This
parameter controls how likely crises are in the model. Recall that in the baseline
calibration crises are permanent, so ρe can also be thought of as controlling the
expected time until the economy permanently enters the crisis state. Choosing this
parameter is tricky for two reasons: Firstly, financial crises are rare, so an appropriate
measure of their forward-looking frequency is, by nature, a tough empirical exercise.
Secondly, the model features permanent crises, and so I need to choose a relatively low
probability of having a crisis to compensate for how severe the crisis state is. I settle
for a value of ρe = 0.1, which implies that the expected time until the economy enters
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the crisis state is 357 years.12 This is obviously extremely high, but compensates for
the severity of the permanent crisis. In section 1.5.5 I discuss the effects of varying
ρe, and in the appendix I solve a version of the model with non-permanent crises.
1.5.1 Price & crisis region
Figure 1.3 gives the solution to key model variables for the model with anticipated
crises (ρe > 0) and without (ρe = 0, which thus repeats the results of the previous
section). The top left panel shows us that the price of capital is globally lower when
agents anticipate that a crisis is possible. This is intuitive, since the possibility that
the price will fall in the future will be reflected in a lower price today. Given that
asset prices control the level of investment, this will have important consequences for
growth as we shall see later. The lower middle panel plots 1 − φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
. Crises
are possible if this quantity is less than zero. We thus see that anticipation of crises
reduces the size of the crisis region relative to the solution with ρe = 0, where agents
don’t anticipate crises, because the red, dashed line is negative for less of the state
space than the solid blue line. This can also be seen by comparing the fraction of
time spent in the crisis region, which is 0.10 for the model with ρe = 0, and falls
to 0.036 for the model with ρe = 0.1.
13 Thus the model pushes back against crises
once you allow agents to anticipate them. The shrinkage of the crisis region reflects
either a rise in
¯
q/qt driven by the fall in qt, or a decrease in leverage. However, in
the bottom left panel we see that leverage actually increases compared to the model
without crises and hence the effect is driven by the fall in asset prices.
12This is calculated starting from an initial value of η0 = η
∗. Details of the computation and
simulation procedure are provided in the appendix.
13The fraction for the model with ρe = 0.1 is calculated using the stationary density excluding
crisis realisations.
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Figure 1.3: Model solution with and without anticipated crises. Key variables
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The dashed red line gives the solution to the model with the
baseline positive value of ρe, meaning the economy will eventu-
ally experience a crisis. The solid blue line gives the solu-
tion where ρe = 0 and agents never coordinate on a crisis.
1.5.2 Leverage
Before discussing the main results, it is instructive to understand the effect that the
fear of crises has on leverage. The model solution reveals that leverage is higher
across the state space in the model where agents anticipate crises. This solution is
for the case without exogenous default costs (χ = 0) so the as the earlier discussion
of the equations in Section 1.3.11 suggests, we should not expect financial crises to
give experts any immediate reason to deleverage. In this section I discuss the general
equilibrium forces which lead to higher equilibrium leverage.
50
The key is that the fear of crises tends to increase expected returns conditional
on there not being a crisis by reducing asset prices. Even though experts are exposed
to the downside risk of crises, they do not take this into consideration since they
know they will go bankrupt in these states anyway. Thus from their point of view
the main change between the two models is the higher expected returns in the model
with anticipated crises, and they leverage up to take advantage of this.
Alternatively, we can see this by looking again at equation (1.26), which is the
equation which determines leverage:
a−
¯
a
qt
+
¯
δ − δ − ρe,tχ ¯
q
qt
+ σθt (σ + σ
q
t ) = 0
Lower asset prices increase the return differential between experts and households by
increasing
(a−
¯
a)
qt
. This increases the advantage that experts have over households, and
requires us to create a disadvantage for experts to return them both to indifference.
This is done by increasing leverage, which increases the amount of endogenous risk.
Thus we see that experts lean in to crises, rather than reducing leverage to try and
avoid their exposure to them. This is due, of course, to the assumptions that make
avoiding crises unprofitable for experts. If we add exogenous default costs (χ > 0)
then it is possible that experts might deleverage in some regions of the state space,
because exogenous default costs (which are only paid if capital is in the hands of
experts) provide us an incentive to put capital in the hands of households instead. I
present the solution for χ = 0.25 in the appendix for comparison with the baseline
model.
1.5.3 Investment & growth
My first main result is the effect that financial crises have on growth. The left panel
of Figure 1.4 plots the policy function for the investment rate, Φt, in the models with
and without anticipated crises. This picture mirrors the effect that crisis fear had
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on asset prices, which is unsurprising given the tight link between asset prices and
investment in the model. Note that due to the linearity of the production functions
in capital, the investment rate becomes independent of the capital stock, and the
model features long-run, endogenous growth. The investment rate, along with the
depreciation rate, then pins down the growth rate of the capital stock according to
the expert and household accumulation equations, (1.1) and (1.2). Aggregating these
two equations when δ =
¯
δ, as is true in my calibration, yields the evolution of the
total capital stock:
dKt = (Φ(ιt)− δ)Ktdt+ σKtdZt (1.36)
In the model where agents anticipate crises, the investment rate is everywhere lower
because asset prices are always lower. Given the lower asset price, there is less
incentive to invest since the (static) profits from investing are lower. Alternatively,
we could could think about this as a rough discounted sum. A crisis scenario involves
handing the capital stock to the household to intermediate. Given the household’s low
productivity this means that the discounted sum of profits from investing are lower,
leading to lower investment. The growth effects of expected crises are illustrated in
the second panel of Figure 1.4. Here I simulate the models, plotting a sample path
for output (Yt = (aψt +
¯
a(1 − ψt))Kt). The widening gap between output, driven
by the under-accumulation of capital in the crisis economy is clear. For the current
calibration, the average quarterly growth rate of output falls from 0.38% to 0.19%.
Growth rate effects are likely to have much larger effects on welfare than level effects,
and the halving of growth rates adds up over a long enough horizon. Given that other
studies have focused on level effects of crises, this suggests an important alternative
motivation for policy to address financial crises. Additionally, it could present an
explanation for the slow recovery in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, a
time where fear of a repeat was surely escalated, as I discuss further in section 1.5.5.
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Figure 1.4: Investment policy function & output sample path
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Left panel plots the investment policy function in the models with
(ρe > 0) and without (ρe = 0) crises. Right panel plots a
simulated time path for output for both economies, normalised to
one in the first year for both. The path for the economy with
crises is constructed so that no crises occur during the sample path.
1.5.4 The financial crisis accelerator
In this section I discuss the financial crisis accelerator. This is the result that the
fear of crisis increases the endogenous volatility of the economy. Specifically, in some
regions the fear of crises makes the economy more responsive to the exogenous capital
quality shock. This can be seen in the first two panels of Figure 1.5 where the volatility
terms for both qt and ηt are plotted. These volatilities give the impact responses to
the capital quality shock dZt.
The results are very state dependent: for both qt and ηt, the increase in volatility
is larger in the middle of the state space. What drives this result? As explained by
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Figure 1.5: The financial crisis accelerator
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The first two panels plot the loading on the Brownian motion
of the capital price and state variable, η. The final panel
plots the dependence of σq on ηση, as described by (1.38).
BrS, the financial accelerator in continuous time can be understood as the interaction
between the volatility terms of ηt and qt. For example, a negative shock reduces
bank net worth, reducing ηt. But reducing ηt reduces the price qt as more capital is
intermediated by inefficient households. The reduction in qt further reduces ηt, and
the cycle continues. This can be seen by the interdependency between the equations
for σqt and σ
η
t (which are derived in the appendix):
σηt ηt = ηt(φt − 1)(σ + σqt ) (1.37)
σqt =
q′(ηt)σ
η
t ηt
qt
(1.38)
Each depends on the other, and solving the two together gives the solutions for the
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volatilities in (1.27). The slope of the price function, q′(ηt) is important because this
tells us how much prices are going to fall in response to a marginal fall in ηt. A steep
price function thus gives a severe financial accelerator because prices fall a lot in
response to a fall in net worth, making the secondary effect on net worth larger. The
other determinant of the size of the multiplier is the current leverage of the experts,
φt. High leverage means that experts have a large exposure to qt, and makes their net
worth more sensitive to changes in asset prices, worsening the financial accelerator.
The changes in the volatility terms between the two solutions can thus be un-
derstood by appealing to the changes in leverage and the slope of the price function
caused by the fear of crises. As previously mentioned, the model with anticipated
crises has higher leverage than the model without, which thus contributes to the in-
crease in volatility. The changes in the slope of the price function are plotted in the
last panel of Figure 1.5. In the central region where the volatilities are increased
most relative to the model without crises, we see that the slope of the price function
is increased.
This region overlaps closely with the region where crises are possible. As we
move deeper in to the crisis region we expect to remain there for longer, placing
more and more downwards pressure on asset prices because they might suddenly fall
if we experience a crisis. This makes qt very sensitive to our position in the state
(ηt) around this region. This is the essence of the financial crisis multiplier: shocks
that push the economy closer to (or deeper into) the crisis region will push down
asset prices a lot as agents anticipate a possible crash, making the standard financial
accelerator more powerful.
It is only in and near to the crisis region that the financial crisis accelerator
emerges. This also creates an intuitive asymmetry in the model: starting from the
steady state, the financial accelerator is worse in response to negative shocks than it
is to positive shocks. This is because a series of negative shocks bring us closer to
the crisis region, prompting asset prices to fall faster, harshly eroding net worth and
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so on. In response to positive shocks we move further away from the crisis region.
The probability of crisis in the near future was already close to zero, and remains so,
leading to smaller changes in asset prices and a smaller financial accelerator.
Table 1.2 gives the standard deviations of output and the investment rate across
several values of ρe. This reveals that the financial crisis accelerator effect is rather
large for the investment rate (and hence also for asset prices) and quantitatively less
important for output itself. In particular, going from the baseline value of ρe down
to zero more than halves the volatility of investment, but only reduces the volatility
of output by around 3%.
Finally, it is worth noting that these results again echo results in the original BrS
paper. In their paper they show that the financial accelerator can be made quan-
titatively more powerful by understanding that their model is prone to occasional
prolonged periods of financial distress. The model features a bimodal stationary dis-
tribution, where a sufficiently bad series of exogenous shocks can lead to the economy
getting trapped with low net worth (low ηt) for a long time. This possibility is what
allows asset prices to fall a lot in response to negative shocks, as agents anticipate
that this outcome becomes more likely. My result thus complements theirs, because
I show that their financial accelerator can also be rationalised by appealing to crises
of a self-fulfilling nature.
1.5.5 Stability & growth
In this section I demonstrate how varying the probability of coordinating on a crisis
affects equilibrium. Clearly, reducing this probability will, by construction, reduce
the likelihood of crises in the model. It also has intuitive effects on the growth rate
and volatility of the economy. Table 1.2 gives various moments of the model across a
range of values for ρe.
The first column gives the solution to the model where agents never coordinate
on crises (ρe = 0), and successive columns increase ρe, up to the baseline value in the
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final column. The first row gives the expected time until the economy enters the crisis
state, which is infinity by construction when ρe = 0, and falling as the probability of
coordinating on a crisis is increased. The second row gives the effect on the average
quarterly growth rate of output, which is decreasing as the probability of coordinating
on a crisis is increased. The final two rows give the effects on the volatilities of output
and the investment rate, which are increasing as the probability of coordinating on a
crisis is increased, demonstrating the financial crisis accelerator.
Table 1.2: Effects of varying the probability of coordinating on a crisis
ρe = 0 ρe = 0.005 ρe = 0.01 ρe = 0.02 ρe = 0.05 ρe = 0.1
TTC ∞ 1301 904 629 428 357
gy 0.38% 0.35% 0.32% 0.27% 0.21% 0.19%
σy 0.0174 0.0174 0.0175 0.0176 0.0178 0.0180
σI/K 0.0756 0.0804 0.1071 0.1079 0.1492 0.1711
TTC is the expected time time until the economy experi-
ences a crisis. gy refers to the average growth rate of quar-
terly GDP, σY its standard deviation, and σI/K the stan-
dard deviation of the quarterly investment ratio, It/Kt.
These results also suggest an interesting behavioural interpretation of the model.
If agents’ fears of a future crisis exogenously increase after experiencing a crisis (mod-
elled by increasing ρe) then the economy will grow slowly, but will be less susceptible
to crises in the immediate aftermath. If these fears then decrease if the economy
doesn’t experience a crisis, growth will gradually recover, and the economy will start
becoming more volatile and more susceptible to crises again as time goes on.
1.6 Policy
I now turn to the policy implications of my model. I focus first on prudential (ex
ante) policies which aim to reduce crisis risk by limiting expert leverage. I then discuss
bailouts, which aim to reduce the ex ante perception of crisis risk by signalling the
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government’s commitment to maintaining asset prices, and a potential market-based
solution.
1.6.1 Prudential policy: leverage constraints
Minimally active leverage constraint
Since crises in my model are only possible for high enough expert leverage, policies
which limit leverage ex ante are natural candidates for ruling out, or reducing the
probability of, financial crises. Remember that a crisis is only possible at time t if
equilibrium leverage (φt) and asset prices (qt) satisfy
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
< 0 (1.39)
Thus if the government imposes the following regulatory leverage constraint it can
completely rule out the possibility of financial crises:
φt ≤ φ¯mat ≡
1(
1− ¯q
qt
) (1.40)
I call this constraint the “minimally active” leverage constraint. It is active in the
sense that it requires active monitoring and adjustment by the regulator: the leverage
constraint depends on today’s capital price and the capital price during a crisis. It
is minimal in the sense that this is the loosest leverage constraint which completely
rules out crises. Quantitatively, this constraint says that if asset prices are known to
drop by a fraction 1/x during a crisis, leverage cannot be higher than x. So if asset
prices are thought to drop by a quarter, leverage would be restricted to be no higher
than 4. Note that this constraint is state dependent, via qt.
How does the minimally active leverage constraint affect equilibrium? Trivially,
it rules out financial crises. The question that remains is how does it affect the
other features of equilibrium? This will be crucial in determining whether or not the
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policy is welfare improving. I will focus on two key aspects of equilibrium: volatility
and growth. As discussed in the introduction, the prevailing view of the effects of
prudential leverage constraints is that they would reduce volatility, but at the expense
of reducing growth. I show that this is not true in my model.
The details of the model solution with a leverage constraint are relegated to the
appendix, and I present only the results here. Given the typical discourse surrounding
prudential policies, the results are surprising: the average growth rate of quarterly
output rises to 0.38% after the introduction of the policy. This rise, from the original
0.19% of the model with crisis, brings the growth rate of the economy all of the way
back up to the growth rate of the economy with no crisis risk. Hence ruling out crisis
comes with the benefit of higher growth, not the cost of lower growth.
We can understand why by inspecting Figure 1.6. The top left panel plots the
price of capital across the three models. For high levels of expert capitalisation, η, the
minimally active leverage constraint increases the price of capital almost all the way
from the its original price (dashed red line) to the price in the model without crisis
risk (thin blue line). For lower values of η the benefits of the policy on asset prices
are smaller. However, the economy spends very little time in this region under the
stationary distribution. The intuition for the increase in prices is simple: by ruling
out crises the policy removes the possibility of of prices jumping down in the future
to
¯
q, which increases prices today. Combined with the shifting right of the stationary
distribution past even the distribution of the model without crises this leads to the
increase in average prices.
The top right panel plots leverage across the three models, showing that the
leverage constraint, by construction, only has large effects on equilibrium leverage in
the central region where crises were originally possible. General equilibrium effects
lead to small changes outside of this region. Of course, this raises the question of how
experts are able to fund increased investment while having their leverage reduced.
Consider a region of the state space where experts hold all of the capital stock. Then
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Figure 1.6: Effects of the minimally active leverage constraint
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Model solution in models with (dashed red) and without
(thin blue) crises, as well as model with minimally active
leverage constraint (thick green). Stationary density in the
model with crises is calculated ignoring crisis realisatons.
the definition of expert leverage implies that qtKt = φtNt. For a given capital stock,
this shows us that higher asset prices can only be supported following a reduction in
leverage if expert net worth increases more than the fall in leverage. The investment
first order condition implies that investment is fully tied down by the price of capital,
and hence that investment and growth can also only increase if equity rises sufficiently.
Thus an increase in equity, compensating for lower debt, is key to generating
increased growth following the implementation of a regulatory borrowing constraint.
Is this a reasonable thing to expect? In the model, experts cannot raise equity, and the
increase in equity is thus funded by experts paying out net worth (as consumption) less
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often. This implies that the policy actually raises the value to experts of retaining
earnings. This is an intuitive idea: if experts know a crisis is coming they have
incentive to consume now in order to consume their net worth before it is lost in a
crisis. Hence leverage policy could encourage equity by making the financial sector
safer, reducing the incentive to withdraw equity as dividends instead of investing it.
This can be seen in the bottom right panel, which shows that expert capitalisation is
higher under the policy than without it, since the stationary density is shifted to the
right.
Finally, the bottom left panel plots the volatility of the aggregate state, η across
the three models. In the central region, the leverage constraint reduces volatility
relative to both the models with and without crises. From the discussion in Section
1.5.4, this decrease is a direct consequence of the decrease in leverage, which reduces
the financial accelerator in that region. However, this reduction is not across the
whole state space, and outside of this region there is actually a small increase in
volatility. This is due to the increased slope of the price function in certain regions,
which leads to a slight exacerbation of the financial accelerator.
Putting all of these effects together makes a strong case for the minimally active
leverage constraint in this model: it rules out financial crises, increases growth, and
reduces volatility in most regions of the state space. With this in mind, I now turn to
looking at the effects on welfare of the policy. The total welfare of experts at a given
time is W et ≡ ηtθtqtKt and that of households is W ht ≡ (1−ηt)qtKt.14 Since the model
features two classes of agents there is no single welfare criterion that we can use, so I
first examine the impact of the policy on the welfare of each group individually. As
a total welfare criterion I select total welfare Wt ≡ W et +W ht .
Proposition 2. Any policy which increases the price of capital, qt, on impact in-
creases household welfare if households are holding capital (ψt < 1) and leaves house-
14To see this for experts note that an individual expert’s maximised value is θtnt, and that the
total net worth of the expert sector is ηtqtKt. Since households are risk neutral their welfare is just
their net worth, which totals (1− ηt)qtKt.
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hold welfare constant otherwise. Holding the other constant, policies which increase
qt or θt on impact increase expert welfare, and expert welfare increases iff
θ′t (1− φt (1− q′t/qt)) > θt
where primed variables are post policy. Following the unanticipated implementation
of a policy, qt and ηt immediately jump to the values which solve:
q′t = qpol(η
′
t) (1.41)
η′t =
(
1− φt
(
1− q
′
t
qt
))
qt
q′t
ηt (1.42)
The proofs are simple algebra and are omitted. The last part of the proof points
out that the implementation of any policy will have an immediate impact on prices,
and hence on expert capitalisation. Thus when we evaluate the welfare impact of
a policy, we need to take into account two things: Firstly, equilibrium welfare as a
function of the state ηt in the new policy regime. Secondly, today’s state ηt and how
that translates into our state η′t after the policy is implemented. Welfare varies across
the state space, and so whether or not implementing the leverage policy improves
welfare looking forward could in principle depend on the state of the economy today.
To address this, in Figure 1.7 I plotWt, W
e
t andW
h
t across the state space in the model
with crises and the model with the minimally active leverage constraint, normalising
Kt to one. Thus it is important to note that these are welfare changes on impact
given the current state of the world, and take into account agents expectations of the
future evolution of the economy under the equilibrium distribution of the state.
The figure reveals that, regardless of the state today, the policy both increases
total welfare and weakly increases the welfare of both sets of agents. It is hence Pareto
improving across the whole state space, as well as being a policy that both sets of
agents would support. This is because crises hurt both agents, and they are both
happy to see them removed. Crises mean that experts will eventually go bankrupt,
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Figure 1.7: Welfare: minimally active leverage constraint
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
η
W
φ t ≤ φ¯
m a
t
ρ e > 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
η
W
e
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.68
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
η
W
h
The left panel plots W (η) across the state space in the model with crisis
risk, and the associated welfare on impact if we are in state η today and
the policy is implemented. Hence the thick green line plots Wpol(η
′(η))
where η′ is calculated for every η as in Proposition 2. If the solid green
line is above the dashed red line the policy improves welfare on impact.
The centre and right panels plot the same for We and Wh respectively.
losing their ability to generate net worth. They also mean that households, who will
eventually have to intermediate capital, will suffer as the economy operates at lower
productivity. Notice that towards the right of the state space, where households don’t
hold capital, they are indifferent about the implementation of the policy on impact.
This is because in this region they do not hold any capital, and hence do not realise
any increase in their net worth on impact. Since their welfare is simply their net
worth, they also do not realise any increase in their welfare.15
15Of course, their welfare could change over time as the economy evolves, and will indeed evolve
differently with and without policy. However, this is taken into account when computing their
current welfare, since it is a forward looking measure.
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This result, that the minimally active leverage constraint increases welfare for both
agents, is a direct consequence of thinking about the costs arising from financial crises.
To see this, note that the same policy actually reduces welfare if it is implemented
in an economy without financial crises (ρe = 0). Of course, this suggests an intuitive
condition for the minimally active leverage constraint to increase welfare: crises must
be sufficiently likely. In particular, there is a threshold likelihood of financial crises
above which the policy increases welfare, and below which it does not.
Implementation issues
One issue with the minimally active leverage constraint is that while it improves
welfare, it requires a lot of information for the government to implement it correctly. It
requires knowledge of current asset prices and how far asset prices would fall in a crisis.
To address these issues, in this section I investigate how deviations from this policy
affect its effects. In particular, I consider a government who attempts to implement
the minimally active leverage constraint, but instead accidentally implements:
φt ≤ φ¯xt ≡
x(
1− ¯q
qt
) (1.43)
For some x > 0. This policy is essentially a slightly tighter (x < 1) or looser (x > 1)
version of the minimally active leverage constraint. The policies which are tighter
deliver no extra benefit in reducing the probability of there being a crisis, since this
has already been driven to zero. I plot the effect on policy of selected variables across
a range of values of x in Figure 1.8. Since I am now comparing across many model
solutions, I restrict myself to focusing on the effect of policy for a specific starting
value of the state today, which I take to be the ergodic mean under the model with
crisis and without policy.
The top left panel shows that the improvement in total welfare is maximised
(within this class of policies) by choosing the minimally active leverage constraint:
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Figure 1.8: Effects of badly implemented policy, selected variables
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All variables computed from the same value of η, which I take as the
ergodic mean of the model without policy. Variables denoted “impact,
%” are impact changes, computed in fractional deviations from the value
without policy. Variables denoted “mean” are main values from simu-
lations of the model with the corresponding policy (ignoring crisis real-
isations). P (c) denotes the fraction of time spent in the crisis region.
x = 1. Note that at the value of η at which I am making these comparisons, house-
holds do not hold any capital, and hence see no welfare gains. Thus the entire welfare
gain is driven by an increase in the welfare of experts. Policies which are slightly
too tight (x less than but close to 1) still improve welfare, but by less. This reflects
the additional distortions that are introduced by leverage constraints which are too
tight. However, for these parameter values the policymaker has room for error before
policy becomes actually harmful, and policies can be up to 20% too tight and still
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deliver welfare benefits. In the other direction, policies which are looser than the
minimally active constraint still deliver welfare benefits, but they are again smaller.16
If the policy is so loose that it does not bind at all then the policy trivially delivers
no welfare benefits.
The bottom left and centre panels decompose the welfare gain into its qt and θt
components. This reveals that the welfare cost of overly tight policies derives from an
instantaneous lower asset prices (which are a reflection of the lower present value of
output). This is partially offset by increases in the value of net worth to experts, which
reflects the gain in instantaneous profits they can make as arbitrage is restricted.
The remaining three panels show how the various policies affect the moments of
the economy. The top centre panel shows that tighter policies reduce the fraction
of time the economy spends in the crisis region, which eventually falls to zero when
x ≤ 1. The top right panel shows that tighter policies reduce the volatility of output.
The bottom right panel shows that, starting from a high x > 1, tighter constraints
increase average output growth. But average growth is maximised for x = 1, and
further tightening of the constraint starts to erode the gains to growth.
Overall, these results highlight an interesting inverse-U shape in the welfare gains
from prudential leverage constraints. Policies which are too loose trivially deliver
little or no welfare gains. Intermediate policies deliver welfare gains by ruling out
crises, and this benefit is maximised once the probability of having a crisis is reduced
to zero. Beyond this point, extra tightness is welfare reducing since it distorts the
intermediation of capital without delivering any extra crisis-reduction benefits. The
model thus emphasises a role for leverage policy, but also stresses caution in its use.
16Note that there is a discontinuous jump up in welfare as x approaches one from above. This is
due to the nature of the exercise. Any value of x which is an ε above one has a positive probability
of experiencing a crisis, which converges to a number other than zero as ε→ 0. x = 1 then delivers
a probability of crises of exactly zero.
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1.6.2 Ex-post policy: bailouts
Another commonly discussed and contentious policy instrument is ex-post bailouts.
The idea behind bailouts is that the fundamental problem during crises is a lack of
net worth in the financial system, and bailouts aim to fix this by directly injecting
net worth (either for free or at a discounted rate). Bailouts are criticised mainly on
ex ante incentive grounds, with the argument being that they incentive risk taking
by reducing the punishment banks face when everything goes wrong. In my baseline
model this trade off does not exist, and bailouts can be effective at completely ruling
out crises without imposing any incentive distortions. The result is summarised in
the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that in the event of a crisis each expert is recapitalised to
their original level of net worth, nt. Then crises are not possible, and the model
equilibrium is identical to the solution without crises (i.e. with ρe,t = 0).
Proof. The recapitalisation policy rules out crises because it rules out jumps in net
worth, and hence ηt: if it were to jump the recapitalisation policy simply jumps us
right back to where we started. Since jumps don’t happen in equilibrium, experts
never receive any bailouts, and the model equations are identical to those with ρe,t =
0.
This result is very similar in spirit to the original Diamond & Dybvig (1983)
result that (in their baseline model) deposit insurance can improve allocations. In
my model, bailouts promise to restore asset prices and net worth to their original level
in the event of a crisis, completely removing the possibility of a crisis even happening
because now agents have no reason to coordinate on the bad equilibrium. Since crises
now never happen in equilibrium, experts can never receive any bailouts, which means
that their incentives cannot be distorted by the possibility of receiving bailouts.
Of course, as in Diamond & Dybvig (1983), the result that this policy does not
induce any distortions is special and due to the simplicity of the setup. Specifically,
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since bailouts are never needed in equilibrium (just as deposit insurance is never
used in their model) there is no incentive to change behaviour to try and receive this
bailout. Thus we would expect less successful or well targeted bailout policies, which
actually led to bailouts being given in equilibrium (as they are in the real world) to
induce ex ante distortions. For this reason we should remain sceptical of bailouts, and
future work explicitly assessing the pros and cons is necessary. Indeed, my aggregate-
capital externality could be viewed as a stand-in for other frictions, such as bailouts,
which encourage banks to allow themselves to get in to trouble during a crisis.
1.6.3 Market based solutions
One possibility which the literature has started to address is that instead of govern-
ment policies placing limits on the behaviour of the financial sector, the government
could encourage the formation of markets to deal with the specific externalities in-
volved.
The typical financial accelerator paper, including this one, assumes that lending
is not contingent on aggregate state variables. This is what gives the accelerator
power, since following aggregate shocks the value of assets can change dramatically,
while the value of debt is fixed. If debt was allowed to be state contingent then the
value of debt can also adjust to offset the change in the value of assets, protecting
net worth and blunting the accelerator. Dmitriev & Hoddenbagh (2013) show that
under the optimal (state contingent) contract, the financial accelerator disappears in
the standard Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999) model. In my third chapter I show
that this is also true in the context of a model with a Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) style
borrowing constraint. Carlstrom, Fuerst, Ortiz & Paustian (2014) take an agnostic
view on the degree of indexation of debt, and perform a structural estimation to pin
down the value in the context of their model, again finding that higher indexation
reduces the financial accelerator. Finally, Kilenthong & Townsend (2014) argue for
market based solutions to price externalities in a general theoretical framework.
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The takeaway from this literature is that if we are to believe in the power of finan-
cial frictions, we need to be confident that markets are sufficiently less than complete.
While this may ultimately be an empirical question, I provide some additional the-
oretical insights here in the context of my model. The model solved above features
only defaultable debt, which gives a less than fully state contingent set of assets to
trade on. I show in this section that if we add a second “insurance” asset, which pays
off during a crisis, then the same frictions which make anticipated crises possible also
mean that no individual expert would be willing to take out insurance against the
possibility of a crisis. This result this stands in contrast to the results above, and
highlights a limit on the power of market based solutions.
In particular, consider the following insurance asset. If the asset is held from t
to t + dt and there is no financial crisis, the holder pays a premium rIt dt. If there is
a crisis then the asset pays out one unit of the consumption good. This is a classic
insurance contract over the event of a financial crisis happening. The household
provides this insurance contract to the experts, who may choose any non-negative
amount of insurance.
Proposition 4. In the baseline model, an expert will never choose to hold positive
amounts of the insurance asset, and the equilibrium with insurance is identical to the
equilibrium with only defaultable debt.
The proof is relegated to the appendix, and I discuss the intuition here. This
insurance contract allows an expert to transfer wealth between future states of the
world: do I want money tomorrow if things work out, or if there is a crisis? However,
if anticipated crises are to exist in equilibrium, we require frictions which make the
value of wealth to an expert during a crisis,
¯
θ, low. In fact,
¯
θ = 1 in the baseline
model, its lowest possible value, because the aggregate capital externality reduces an
expert’s ability to produce if all other experts are bankrupt. This ensures that experts
are willing to take on high enough leverage to allow themselves to go bankrupt during
a crisis. What Proposition 4 establishes is that under the frictions which allow crises
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to happen in the baseline model, the addition of an additional insurance market is
unable to provide any extra protection. The intuition is simple: a crisis is not a good
time to have net worth, so experts have no incentive to use insurance to transfer
wealth to that state of the world.
Of course, the above result relies as crucially on the assumption of the aggregate-
capital externality as does the very existence of crises in my model. The point is
that the conditions that make anticipated crises possible in my model are the very
conditions which make the above market based solution infeasible.
1.7 Conclusion
In conclusion, I study the ex ante effects of the fear of future financial crises. I
show theoretically that this “crisis fear” has both negative growth and business cycle
effects. Financial crises push capital away from experts and towards less productive
households, worsening the allocation of capital. Thus the possibility of future crises
lowers the expected return on capital. This lowers asset prices, investment and growth
today, even if experts are currently well enough capitalised to survive a crisis. The
model features endogenous growth, leading to permanent effects of crises on growth.
The externality that generates endogenous growth is also crucial for generating crises,
by reducing the productivity of surviving experts in crises and hence encouraging
them to overleverage and allow crises to happen in equilibrium. The possibility
of future crises also creates a state-dependent “financial crisis accelerator” in which
shocks which push the economy closer to crisis lead to more severe financial accelerator
effects than those that push the economy away from crisis.
The model has implications for policy, and shows that explicitly taking into ac-
count agents’ understanding that there could be future crises can overturn the re-
ceived wisdom about the tradeoffs of prudential policy. In particular, in my model,
restrictions on expert leverage can remove the possibility of financial crises and si-
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multaneously increase growth. This is in contrast to the standard view that leverage
constraints should reduce growth by restricting the ability of the financial sector to
intermediate funds. While this effect still operates in my model, leverage constraints
also encourage growth by making the system safer and promoting the retention of net
worth by financial institutions. This strengthens the case for prudential policy, and
future quantitative work should address the importance of this effect relative to the
traditional growth-harming effects of prudential policy in richer model structures.
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Appendices
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1.A Endogenous growth
We can consider the linear production functions as the reduced form of a simple
endogenous growth model. In particular, consider the experts’ production function
yt = akt. Suppose instead that experts produce according to yt = zKˆ
1−α
t k
α
t l
1−α
t , where
lt is their labour choice, and Kˆt is aggregate expert capital, which an individual takes
as given. There is thus a capital externality: experts don’t take into account that
their capital choice affects the productivity of other experts. Experts hire labour at
wage wt. Assume that households inelastically supply one unit of labour to experts,
and one unit to households.
An expert chooses labour to maximise static profit: pit = zKˆ
1−α
t k
α
t l
1−α
t −wtlt. This
yields the first order condition wt = (1−α)zKˆ1−αt kαt l−αt . After optimising labour, an
expert’s profit function becomes linear in individual capital:
pit =
(
(1− α) 1−αα − (1− α) 1α
)
w
α−1
α
t z
1
α Kˆt
1−α
α kt (1.44)
Imposing market clearing (lt = 1) and Kˆt = kt this profit becomes pit = αzkt. Given
the linearity of both the individual and equilibrium profit function in kt, we see that
this model is isomorphic to the baseline BrS model with a = αz, and where output (yt)
is replaced with profit (pit). Doing the same with the household production function
yields the same result, with
¯
a = α
¯
z. Thus we are able to reinterpret BrS’ model
as an endogenous growth model based on Romer (1986) under certain parameter
restrictions.17
17The main restriction is setting the exponent on Kˆt equal to the labour share. As discussed in
Ennis & Keister (2003) this restriction yields linear production, which means that aggregate capital
does not have to be considered a state variable and removes transitional dynamics from the capital
stock. Additionally, my assumption that labour is supplied inelastically to each class of agents is a
simplification. The assumption removes interactions between the two groups through the wage, and
can be removed at the expense of making the reduced form productivities effectively dependent on
the aggregate state.
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1.B Derivations
1.B.1 Household derivations
Risky debt
I derive the required interest rate in discrete time and take the limit. One unit is lent
today, and next period 1 + rtdt is repaid unless there is default. If there is default the
expert’s assets are seized and split amongst the lenders. The expert will have assets
worth (1−χ)qt+dtkt+dt where χ is destroyed. The expert borrowed dt+dt = qtkt+dt−nt,
so the assets which can be seized per unit lent is
(1− χ) qt+dtkt+dt
qtkt+dt − nt = (1− χ)
qt+dt
qt
φt
φt − 1
Where φt ≡ qtkt+dt/nt. Suppose we are in a region where crises are possible. Then the
expert defaults if the bad sunspot is drawn. A good sunspot is drawn with probability
Pg = e
−ρe,tdt ' 1 − ρe,tdt, and a bad with probability Pb = 1 − e−ρe,tdt ' ρe,tdt. The
household discounts the future between t and t+dt with factor β = e−ρhdt ' 1−ρhdt.
The expected return on risky debt must equal:
1 = βPg(1 + rtdt) + βPbEt
[
(1− χ)
¯
qt+dt
qt
φt
φt − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ft+dt = 1
]
(1.45)
Where the expectation term is the expectation conditional on there being a crisis at
t + dt. This expectation is for the different values of qt+dt we might have depending
on the value of the other shocks to the economy, and I denote the price by
¯
qt+dt to
make it clear that this is the crisis price. Taking the limit as dt → 0, using the
approximations above and noting that dt2 = 0:
1 = 1− ρhdt− ρe,tdt+ rtdt+ ρe,tdt(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φt
φt − 1 (1.46)
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Where I have also used that
¯
qt+dt =
¯
qt + d
¯
qt and d
¯
qt is of order dt. Rearranging and
dividing by dt:
rt = ρh + ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ)¯qt
qt
φt
φt − 1
)
(1.47)
Note in the special case of full destruction, χ = 1, we have simply rt = ρh + ρe,t. Also
runs are only possible if:
N¯ = Nt − qtkt+dt +
¯
qtkt+dt < 0⇒ φt > 1
1− ¯qt
qt
(1.48)
and in this region rt > ρh, i.e. the expert pays a premium for default risk. As leverage
increases the interest rate increases, reaching a maximum of ρh+ρe,t
(
1− (1− χ)¯qt
qt
)
.
1.B.2 Expert derivations
Conjecture that marginal value follows:
dθt = µ
θ
tθtdt+ σ
θ
t θtdZt + dft (¯
θt − θt) (1.49)
Where
¯
θt is an expert’s marginal value following a crash, which is to be determined.
Experts’ value can be expressed as:
ρbθtnt = max
dCt≥0,φt≥0
{dCt + Etd(θtnt)} (1.50)
Using Ito’s lemma the last term becomes:
Etd(θtnt) = Et [dθtnt + θtdnt + dntdθt + dft (
¯
θt
¯
nt − θtnt)] (1.51)
Giving:
(ρb + ρe,t)θtnt = max
dCt≥0,φt≥0
{dCt + Et [dθtnt + θtdnt + dntdθt] + ρe,t
¯
θt
¯
nt} (1.52)
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Where it is understood that the jump terms are excluded from dθt and dnt in the
above equation. dnt follows:
dnt =
(
drkt φt + (1− φt) rt − dct
)
nt (1.53)
Remember that there is implicitly a jump here contained in drkt . Also define dct =
dCt/nt. Excluding the jump term from dr
k
t and using (1.4) and (1.11) we can write
dnt as
dnt
nt
=
((
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
dt+ (σ + σqt ) dZt
)
φt + ...
...+ (ρh + ρe,t) (1− φt) dt+ ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φtdt− dct (1.54)
Note here that the interest rate rt is calculated assuming that the expert has taken
on enough leverage to go bankrupt during a crisis. If the expert takes on low enough
leverage she can survive a crisis, in which case she only pays interest rt = ρh and the
equation above is the same just setting ρe,t = 0. Let’s calculate expectations of the
moments conditional on dft = 0:
Etdnt =
[(
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
φt+
(ρh + ρe,t) (1− φt) + ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φt − dct
dt
]
ntdt (1.55)
Etdθt = µ
θ
tθtdt (1.56)
Etdn
2
t = (σ + σ
q
t )
2 φ2tn
2
tdt (1.57)
Etdndθ = σ
θ
t (σ + σ
q
t )φtntθtdt (1.58)
Etdθ
2
t =
(
σθt
)2
θ2t dt (1.59)
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Plugging these in, and dividing by nt:
(ρb + ρe,t)θt = max
dct≥0,φt≥0
dct + ...
µθtθtdt+ ...[(
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
φt + (ρh + ρe,t) (1− φt) + ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φt − dct
dt
]
θtdt+...
σθt (σ + σ
q
t )φtθtdt+ ...
ρe,t
¯
θt¯
nt
nt
(1.60)
Let’s assume for now that ¯
nt
nt
= 0, i.e. that the expert allows herself to go bankrupt
during a crisis. In general, it actually depends on φt. I discuss this in the next
section, where we consider the conditions under which experts will allow themselves
to go bankrupt during a crisis. The leverage first order condition gives:
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt − (ρh + ρe,t) + ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
= −σθt (σ + σqt ) (1.61)
And the first order condition for consumption gives:
θt ≥ 1 (1.62)
with equality if dct > 0. At the optimum, and when dct = 0, evaluating the value
function gives:
ρbθt = µ
θ
tθtdt+ ρhθtdt+ ρe,t¯
θt¯
nt
nt
(1.63)
And since
¯
nt = 0 this becomes:
µθt = ρb − ρh (1.64)
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1.B.3 Will an expert optimally allow herself the risk of going
bankrupt?
In this section I discuss under what conditions an expert will allow herself to take
on enough leverage such that she would go bankrupt during a crisis. Indeed, this
is necessary for anticipated crises to be possible in equilibrium. To do this we need
to delve a bit deeper into the crisis value term
¯
θt ¯
nt
nt
. There is a kink here since the
expert has limited liability. If the expert goes bankrupt this value must drop to
zero because the expert’s total net worth is wiped out, but if the expert chooses low
enough leverage she will survive, and this value will be positive:
¯
θt¯
nt
nt
=
 ¯θt
(
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
))
: 1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
≥ 0
¯
θt · 0 = 0 : 1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
< 0
(1.65)
If she takes on low enough leverage she also only pays the risk free rate on her
borrowing, so her net worth evolves according to:
dnt
nt
=
((
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
dt+ (σ + σqt ) dZt
)
φt + ...
...+ ρh (1− φt) dt− dct (1.66)
There is a clear cost-benefit decision here: you can take on high leverage, in which
case you make large profit as long as there is no crisis, but large losses during a crisis,
or you can take on low leverage and make low profit in normal times and less losses in
a crisis. A key variable is how much a unit of net worth is worth to an expert during
a crisis:
¯
θt. If a unit of net worth is worth a lot during a crisis (as we might expect,
since returns are high) then this will push experts towards caution. If the expert is
happy with a level of leverage in the region where she doesn’t go bankrupt during a
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crisis then we can show that the following FOC holds:
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt − ρh − ρe,t
(
1− ¯qt
qt
)
¯
θt + σ
θ
t (σ + σ
q
t ) = 0 (1.67)
Compare this to the leverage FOC in the region where she does go bankrupt:
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ+µqt + σσqt − ρh− ρe,t
(
1− ¯qt
qt
)
− ρe,tχ¯
qt
qt
+ σθt (σ + σ
q
t ) = 0 (1.68)
This shows us the differences between the costs of increasing leverage on the margin
in the two regions. If the expert has low enough leverage to survive a crisis (first
equation), increasing leverage hurts because it increases the losses in a crisis, which
are valued at the marginal value of net worth during a crisis. If the expert has already
chosen high enough leverage to go bankrupt, then increasing leverage by an extra unit
hurts in a different way: it increases borrowing costs.
Proposition 5. If (
¯
θt − 1)
(
1− ¯qt
qt
)
≤ χ ¯q
qt
then experts find it optimal to choose high
enough leverage to go bankrupt during a crisis.
Proof. Suppose that a crisis is possible in equilibrium. Then in equilibrium we know
that (1.68) holds because this is the required optimality condition for the other experts
to be willing to accept a crisis. We need to verify that an individual expert is willing
to choose leverage that leads her to go bankrupt during a crisis. To verify this it
is sufficient to check that lowering leverage does not increase today’s value. Small
changes in leverage lead to no change in value, because remember that experts are
locally indifferent about their leverage choices in equilibrium. But what about a
change large enough to avoid bankruptcy? This is not profitable as long as (1.67)
holds either with equality, or instead has the terms on the left hand side greater than
zero. This means that in this region increasing leverage weakly increases value, and
given the linearity this means the expert increases leverage all the way in to the region
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where she does go bankrupt. Mathematically, we require:
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt − ρh − ρe,t
(
1− ¯qt
qt
)
¯
θt + σ
θ
t (σ + σ
q
t ) ≥ 0 (1.69)
Substituting in (1.68) and cancelling terms leaves:
(
¯
θt − 1)
(
1− ¯qt
qt
)
≤ χ ¯q
qt
(1.70)
The intuition behind the result is quite simple. Recall that
¯
θt is the marginal
value of net worth during a crisis. (1.70) says that this value cannot be too high,
otherwise experts would want to deleverage (all the way to zero leverage, in fact) to
take advantage of this. This benefit of reducing leverage must be weighed against
the cost, which is the lost expected revenue from lending. In equilibrium this can be
derived from the optimality of the other experts, giving the above expression. In the
baseline model, with χ = 0, this condition requires that
¯
θt = 1. This is a very strong
requirement, which follows from the way the model is constructed. In particular,
recall that since experts don’t face leverage constraints in equilibrium they must be
indifferent about their leverage choices. Given their risk neutrality, this means that
they derive no utility from any of their lending, which is why
¯
θt has to be so low
in order to convince them to lend even in the face of a potential crisis. This would
not be true in a richer model, in which experts derived more explicit benefits from
lending, where
¯
θt would be allowed to be higher.
The capital externality which creates endogenous growth actually also ensures
that
¯
θt = 1 in the baseline model, making crises possible in equilibrium. This is
summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. In the basline model with endogenous growth (as described in Ap-
pendix 1.A) and with permanent financial crises (ρr = 0),
¯
θt = 1.
80
Proof. From an individual expert’s point of view all of the other experts go bankrupt
in a crisis, and therefore are unable to hold any capital. Since an individual expert
has zero mass this means that the total capital held by experts, Kˆt is zero. Due to
the production externality, this means that the productivity of a surviving expert is
zero in a crisis: yt = zKˆ
1−α
t k
α
t l
1−α
t = 0. Since the expert is unable to produce, now or
for the rest of time, she might as well consume her net worth, leading to
¯
θt = 1.
The idea behind this admittedly stylised assumption is that the disruption in
financial markets during a crisis would make it hard for a surviving bank to function
efficiently. It also matches the empirical fact that the value of being a surviving bank
(as measured by the market value of bank equity) appears to be very low: In the
US bank equity values fell by an average of 80% during the crisis and have remained
persistently low. It is also worth noting that this result does not hold exactly for
non-permanent crises, because then experts’ net worth can have higher value, even
if they cannot produce today. This is because they might want to hold on to their
wealth in order to benefit from positive returns when the other experts are bailed
out, and Kˆt becomes positive again. It is easy to show that, for any ηˆ,
¯
θt is falling in
the expected length of the crisis, so there is always a long enough crisis (small enough
ρr) to ensure that (1.70) holds.
To see the importance of the aggregate-capital externality in allowing crises, it
is instructive to think about the case where the reduced form production functions
(yt = akt and
¯
yt =
¯
a
¯
kt) are the true production functions, and there is thus no
feedback from aggregate expert capital to individual expert productivity:
Proposition 7. Consider a model without the aggregate-capital externality, meaning
that yt = akt and
¯
yt =
¯
a
¯
kt are the true individual expert and household production
functions respectively. Then
¯
θt =∞.
Proof. To see this, note that while the economy is in the crisis capital is priced by
the household, at
¯
q, which is constant (until the exogenous recapitalisation restores
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the economy to positive η). Since
¯
q and
¯
θ are constant there is also effectively no
risk to the surviving expert from investing (the expert only cares about covariance
risk of net worth with θt). There also cannot be another financial crisis while we are
in a crisis, by construction, so the expert can borrow risk free at rt = ρh. Since the
household is investing, we know that Etd
¯
rkt = ρh, and using the definitions of d¯
rkt and
drkt we can show that
Etdr
k
t = ρh +
(
a−
¯
a
¯
q
+
¯
δ − δ
)
dt > rt = ρh
I.e. the expected profit from increasing leverage is positive (Etdr
k
t − rt > 0). Without
any risk there is no force that creates a cost of leverage to experts, and a suviving ex-
pert would thus choose infinite leverage, making infinite instantaneous profit, leading
to
¯
θt =∞.
This proposition highlights the fundamental issue making it hard to generate
expected financial crises in this model: without any other frictions, it is great to be the
only surviving expert in a financial crisis. With asset prices so low you can make huge
amounts of profit. The aggregate-capital externality powering endogenous growth is a
way to shut this down, by making it bad to be the only surviving expert. Other more
realistic assumptions could replace this, but the general idea is that disruptions in
financial markets during a crisis should reduce the value of being a surviving expert.
For example, imposing a borrowing constraint during crises would reduce the ability of
experts to take advantage of the temporarily high returns. Another possibility is that
the expectation of bailouts is what leads experts to allow themselves to get in trouble
during a crisis. Indeed, this is the focus of several theoretical papers, for example
Farhi & Tirole (2012), Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007), and Mailath & Mester (1994).
Indeed, this concern is empirically validated, as shown by Duchin & Sosyura (2014)
who use the TARP program to show that individual banks increase the riskiness of
their portfolios in response to signals that they might receive government aid in the
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future. Future work could incorporate this mechanism as a potential rationalisation
of crises in my model.
1.B.4 Equilibrium derivations
Derivation of µqt , σ
q
t , µ
θ
t , and σ
θ
t
Using Ito’s lemma on qt = q(ηt):
dqt = q
′(ηt)dηt +
1
2
q′′(ηt)dη2t +
(¯
q − qt
)
dft (1.71)
Using the conjectured law of motion for ηt, (1.19), gives:
dqt =
(
q′(ηt)µ
η
t ηt +
1
2
q′′(ηt) (σ
η
t )
2 η2t
)
dt+ q′(ηt)σ
η
t ηtdZt +
(¯
q − qt
)
dft (1.72)
Equation coefficients from the above equation with the conjectured law of motion for
qt, (1.3), gives:
µqt =
q′(ηt)µ
η
t ηt +
1
2
q′′(ηt) (σ
η
t )
2 η2t
qt
σqt =
q′(ηt)σ
η
t ηt
qt
We can do the same exercise for θt to calculate µ
θ
t and σ
θ
t as:
µθt =
θ′(ηt)µ
η
t ηt +
1
2
θ′′(ηt) (σ
η
t )
2 η2t
θt
σθt =
θ′(ηt)σ
η
t ηt
θt
Derivation of µηt and σ
η
t
Now I need to use Ito’s lemma multiple times to work out the evolution of ηt using
the definition ηt ≡ Nt/(qtKt). I first need the individual evolutions of Nt, qt and Kt.
qt is already given by (1.3). Kt is total capital (Kt ≡ Kbt + Kht ) which it is easy to
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show evolves via:
dKt
Kt
= (Φ(ιt)− δψt −
¯
δ(1− ψt)) dt+ σdZt (1.73)
This comes from aggregating (1.1) and (1.2). The evolution of Nt, total bank capital,
is just the aggregate version of (1.53):
dNt
Nt
= drkt φt + (ρh + ρe,t) (1− φt) dt+ ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φtdt− dct (1.74)
We need to use Ito’s Lemma including jumps to deal with the jump dft in the net
worth and price evolution. Remember that if dft = 1, Nt jumps to zero, and qt jumps
to
¯
q. Ito’s lemma gives:
dηt =
dNt
qtKt
− d(qtKt)Nt
(qtKt)2
− dNtd(qtKt)
(qtKt)2
+
Ntd(qtKt)
2
(qtKt)3
+
(
0
¯
qKt
− Nt
qtKt
)
dft (1.75)
Where it is understood that the jumps have been removed from dNt and dqt. Rear-
ranging gives:
dηt
ηt
=
dNt
Nt
− d(qtKt)
qtKt
− dNt
Nt
d(qtKt)
qtKt
+
d(qtKt)
2
(qtKt)2
− dft (1.76)
Using Ito’s Lemma on d(qtKt) and d(qtKt)
2gives:
d(qtKt)
qtKt
=
dqt
qt
+
dKt
Kt
+
dqt
qt
dKt
Kt
(1.77)
d(qtKt)
2
(qtKt)2
=
dq2t
q2t
+
dK2t
K2t
+ 2
dqt
qt
dKt
Kt
(1.78)
Plugging this and the assumed dqt equation into the d(qtKt) terms gives:
d(qtKt)
qtKt
= (Φ(ιt)− δψt −
¯
δ(1− ψt) + µqt + σσqt ) dt+ (σ + σqt ) dZt (1.79)
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d(qtKt)
2
(qtKt)2
= (σqt )
2dt+ σ2dt+ 2σσqt dt = (σ + σ
q
t )
2dt (1.80)
Now using definition of drkt to simplify a bit:
d(qtKt)
qtKt
= drkt −
a− ιt
qt
dt− (1− ψt)(
¯
δ − δ)dt (1.81)
Calculating the cross term:
dNt
Nt
d(qtKt)
qtKt
= φt(σ + σ
q
t )
2dt (1.82)
Putting all this together:
dηt
ηt
= (φt − 1)(drkt − ρhdt− ρe,tdt) + ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φtdt+
a− ιt
qt
dt+ (1− ψt)(
¯
δ − δ)dt
− (φt − 1)(σ + σqt )2dt− dct − dft (1.83)
Which is exactly BrS’ equation for the evolution of ηt, plus the extra ρe,t terms.
Equating terms with the guessed form for dηt in (1.19):
σηt = (φt − 1)(σ + σqt ) (1.84)
µηt = (φt−1)(Edrkt−ρh−ρe,t−(σ+σqt )2)+ρe,t(1−χ)¯
qt
qt
φt+
a− ιt
qt
+(1−ψt)(
¯
δ−δ) (1.85)
Now if banks are holding positive leverage we can use their leverage FOC to simplify
µηt to:
µηt = −σηt (σ + σqt + σθt ) + ρe,t(1− χ) ¯
q
qt
+
a− ιt
qt
+ (1− ψt)(
¯
δ − δ) (1.86)
1.B.5 Boundary conditions
The boundary conditions are identical to those in the baseline model of BrS’ paper,
and the interested reader is referred to their Proof of Proposition II.4.
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1.C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Firstly note that ∂(σ
ηη)
∂φ
> 0, and thus ∂σ
q
∂φ
> 0 and ∂σ
θ
∂φ
<
0 since q′ > 0 and θ′ < 0 respectively. Now implicitly differentiate (1.26) with respect
to ρe:
φ′(ρe)
[
(σθ)′(σ + σq) + (σq)′σθ −
(
1− ¯q
q
)
ρeχ¯
q
q
]
= χ¯
q
q
[
1− φ
(
1− ¯q
q
)]
(1.87)
The term in square brackets on the right hand side is negative whenever crises are
possible. The term in square brackets on the left hand side is negative because σθ
and (σθ)′ are negative, and 1−
¯
q/q is positive whenever
¯
q < q.
Proof of Proposition 4. Since the household provides the insurance and is risk
neutral, the premium for the insurance contract must satisfy rIt = ρe,t so that the
household breaks even.18 Note that if the expert has an optimal plan that involves
her going bankrupt during a crisis, then limited liability implies that she will never
hold any of the insurance asset – it costs her in normal times and provides no benefits
during a crisis. Thus the only way she might hold any is if it gives benefit in a
plan where she will remain solvent during a crisis. In this region, and including the
insurance asset, the expert’s optimisation problem is now:
(ρb + ρe,t)θt = max
dct≥0,φt≥0,φIt≥0
dct + ...
µθtθtdt+ ...[(
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
φt + ρh (1− φt)− rItφIt −
dct
dt
]
θtdt+ ...
σθt (σ + σ
q
t )φtθtdt+ ...
18To see this, note that from t to t + dt the household earns the expected insurance premium
(1 − ρe,tdt)rIt dt = rIt dt, and has expected payout ρe,tdt. Setting expected profit to zero gives
rIt dt− ρe,tdt = 0⇒ rIt = ρe,t.
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ρe,t
¯
θt
(
1− φt
(
1− ¯q
qt
)
+ φIt
)
(1.88)
Where kIt is the units of the insurance asset held, and φ
I
t = k
I
t /nt. Imposing that
rIt = ρe,t, we see that the expert will optimally choose to hold zero insurance (φ
I
t = 0)
as long as
¯
θt ≤ θt, which is always satisfied if
¯
θt = 1 which is true in the baseline model
(see Proposition 6). In this case insurance also doesn’t affect the expert’s choice of
leverage or consumption relative to the case without insurance.
1.D Model solution with regulatory leverage con-
straint
This section outlines the solution of the model when experts face an exogenous bor-
rowing constraint of the form φt ≤ φ¯t. In the model this is interpreted as a regulatory
leverage constraint, but the solution also applies to leverage constraints derived from
limited commitment problems. We still conjecture that marginal value follows:
dθt = µ
θ
tθtdt+ σ
θ
t θtdZt + dft (¯
θt − θt) (1.89)
Experts’ value can be expressed as:
ρbθtnt = max
dCt≥0,0≤φt≤φ¯t
{dCt + Etd(θtnt)} (1.90)
Using previous arguments we can show that:
(ρb + ρe,t)θt = max
dct≥0,0≤φt≤φ¯t
dct + ...
µθtθtdt+ ...[(
a− ιt
qt
+ Φ(ιt)− δ + µqt + σσqt
)
φt + (ρh + ρe,t) (1− φt) + ρe,t(1− χ)¯
qt
qt
φt − dct
dt
]
θtdt+...
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σθt (σ + σ
q
t )φtθtdt
Where I have imposed that ¯
nt
nt
= 0, i.e. that the expert allows herself to go bankrupt
during a crisis. The leverage first order condition gives:
a− ιt
qt
+Φ(ιt)−δ+µqt +σσqt −(ρh + ρe,t)+ρe,t(1−χ)¯
qt
qt
+σθt (σ + σ
q
t ) = λt ≥ 0 (1.91)
Where λt is the lagrange multiplier on the leverage constraint. As before, the first
order condition for consumption gives:
θt ≥ 1 (1.92)
with equality if dct > 0. At the optimum, and when dct = 0, evaluating the value
function now gives:
µθt = ρb − ρh − λtφ¯t (1.93)
The rest of the model is the same, except we must be careful in the derivation of µηt
to use the new leverage first order condition.
1.E Numerical solution and simulation
The algorithm to solve the model is based on BrS’ original algorithm, which is de-
tailed after their statement of Proposition II.4. The only difference is that I have
additional terms in some of my equations relating to the crisis price
¯
q. In the baseline
parameterisation with permanent crises this can be solved for at the beginning of the
code, and passed as a parameter to the rest of the algorithm. Following BrS, the
algorithm searches over values of q′(0) to find the value which satisfies the required
boundary conditions. Another difference from BrS is that I use a Newton-based al-
gorithm to update my guesses for q′(0) until I reach convergence, whereas they use a
bisection algorithm.
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The model is simulated by discretising time. For example, I simulate ηt using its
transition:
dηt = µ
η
t ηtdt+ σ
η
t ηtdZt − ηtdft
I choose a small value for dt, and draw values of dZt from a normal distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation
√
dt. Given ηt, the value at the next interval of time
is found by the approximation ηt+dt ' ηt+dηt. The jump process is approximated by a
random variable which takes value one in every period with probability 1−e−ρe,tdt and
zero otherwise. The model moments (average growth and standard deviations) are
calculated from simulations of 5000 years, with dt = 1/120 (the results are unchanged
by picking smaller values of dt). The expected time to experience a crisis is calculated
by repeatedly simulating the economy, starting from η∗, and calculating how long it
takes for the economy to experience a crisis, and averaging this over the trials.
1.F Model solution with χ > 0
If I choose χ > 0 then we can no longer use a constant value for the probability
of coordinating on a crisis, as I did when χ = 0. This is because this leads to
discontinuous changes in leverage at the point where crises become possible. To deal
with this, in this case I instead parameterise ρe,t as:
ρe,t =
 ρe| ¯
Nt
Nt
| :
¯
Nt < 0
0 :
¯
Nt ≥ 0
(1.94)
This parameterisation has appealing economic features, as well as being mathemat-
ically useful. Economically, it says that agents are more likely to coordinate on a
crisis equilibrium the less well capitalised the banking sector is. Mathematically, this
removes a discontinuity from the model around the point where a crisis just becomes
possible. Conditional on this functional form, I have one free variable to choose which
is the slope term ρe. The larger this parameter is the more likely we are to coordinate
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on the crisis equilibrium. Figure 1.9 plots the solution to the model in this case. The
results are qualitatively similar to the results of the baseline model, except for lever-
age: leverage is now lower in some regions due to the experts’ desire to deleverage to
avoid paying the exogenous default costs.
Figure 1.9: Model solution with χ = 0.25. Key variables
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Model solution with χ = 0.25. Solid blue line plots
the solution without crises (ρe = 0) and dashed
red line plots the solution with crises (ρe = 0.1).
1.G Model solution with non-permanent crises
In this section I solve the model with non permanent crisis. I keep the same param-
eters as the baseline model, including setting ρe = 0.1. I set the level of recapitali-
90
sation of the experts to ηˆ = 0.00005η∗, and the flow intensity of recapitalisation to
ρr = 1.2427. With these numbers, the chance of being recapitalised within one year
is 71%, two years is 92%, and essentially 100% within around five years. Recapi-
talisation to that value of ηˆ implies that it takes roughly 15 years for the economy
to naturally recover from ηˆ back to η∗, giving a total time from crisis to complete
recovery of something around 20 years.
This generates a value of the crisis price of
¯
q = 0.783, which is higher than the
crisis price when crises are permanent (0.725). Since the crisis price is now slightly
higher, crises are less likely, and the economies with and without crises spend 5% and
2.1% of their time in the crisis region under the stationary density (ignoring crisis
realisations). Figure 1.10 plots key variables from the model solution. By comparison
with Figure 1.3 it can be seen that the model solutions are qualitatively very similar.
91
Figure 1.10: Model solution non permanent crises
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The dashed red line gives the solution to the model with the
baseline positive value of ρe, meaning the economy occasion-
ally experiences crises. The solid blue line gives the solu-
tion where ρe = 0 and agents never coordinate on a crisis.
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1.H Miscellaneous Graphs and figures
Figure 1.11: Parameter sensitivity: crisis net worth, q and φ across changes in three
parameters
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The top row plots the crisis region across parameter changes
for three parameters. The middle and lower rows de-
compose this into changes in asset prices and leverage.
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Chapter 2
Real Wages and the Manifestation
of Financial Crises
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis caused a highly synchronised recession across much of the
developed world. However, beneath the surface there are differences in how countries
experienced this decline. In this paper I document a new stylised fact: countries
which experienced larger declines in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) during the
crisis experienced less severe falls in hours worked. In other words, some countries
experienced the recession mostly as a collapse in employment, and others mostly
as a collapse in measured productivity. How can we rationalise this heterogeneous
behaviour in response to a common global shock?
I present differential wage adjustment in response to the crisis as a potential
explanation for this fact. I show that countries with larger falls in real wages during
the crisis tend to be those with TFP, and not labour market, problems. Motivated
by this second fact, I offer a parsimonious explanation of the negative TFP-hours
correlation using a model of firm heterogeneity and differential wage adjustment in
response to a financial shock.
94
The intuition is relatively simple. For a given level of wages, a financial crisis
reduces the ability of firms to borrow to fund investment, reducing the capital stock,
marginal product of labour, and hence demand for labour. If wages adjust relatively
little, this will lead to large falls in hours worked in equilibrium. On the other hand,
if wages adjust downwards by a lot this offsets the fall in demand for labour, leading
to smaller falls in hours. However, lower wages also shield firms from having to
shut down or downsize in response to the financial crisis, which leads to a worsening
allocation of resources and hence lower measured TFP.
My model thus features endogenous TFP movements in response to a finan-
cial shock. This comes from a composition effect, based on the model of Buera
& Moll (forthcoming). In particular, the model features firms who are heterogeneous
in their productivities, and who decide whether or not to produce based on their prof-
itability. Firms with the lowest productivity levels choose not to produce, leading to
measured TFP being endogenously determined by the set of firms who are producing.
In the model, a fall in the real wage increases profitability for all firms, leading unpro-
ductive firms to start producing and reducing measured TFP. The extent to which
this happens depends on the extent of wage adjustment during the crisis, with larger
falls in wages leading to larger falls in measured TFP. Differential wage adjustment
thus generates a negative TFP-hours correlation in my model following a financial
crisis, consistent with the data.
I present cross-country correlations consistent with this story, as well as a more
detailed case-study look at the US and UK. For the cross-section analysis, I use data
from the OECD over the crisis period. I first present four simple correlations over the
whole period: a) TFP and hours are negatively correlated, b) TFP and real wages are
positively correlated, c) hours and real wages are negatively correlated, d) real wages
and the (nominal) price level are negatively correlated. Of these, (a) is the main
correlation to be explained, and (b) and (c) support my focus on differential wage
adjustment as a potential explanation. (d) suggests an explanation for why different
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countries experienced differential wage adjustment, which I had up to now taken
as exogenous. In an environment with downwards nominal wage rigidity, countries
which run higher inflation will have their real wages reduced, which I find evidence
for in the cross section. I also construct a short country-year panel using the cross-
country data, which I use to control for country and time fixed effects. This shows
that the correlations are not driven by preexisting country-specific factors, and gives
me enough power to show that the correlations are statistically significant.
After establishing these correlations in the cross section, I focus in particular on
two countries: the United States and the United Kingdom. Both of these countries
have come under scrutiny in recent years because of the nature of their experiences of
the Great Recession, and they lie at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their
labour market and TFP experiences making them useful examples. The US has seen
an unusually large fall in employment and hours. Between 2008 and 2011 total hours
fell by roughly 10%. On the other hand, over that period TFP remained robust, and
even increased slightly relative to trend.
In the UK the labour market performed relatively better, with hours only falling
by just over 5% over the same period, but the TFP performance has been dismal.
TFP has fallen by over 5% relative to trend, in what has been deemed the UK’s
“productivity puzzle”. At the same time period, the real wage behaviour of the two
countries has been very different, with the US seeing wages grow in line with their
trend over the period, and the UK seeing wages fall by 6% relative to trend, consistent
with my proposed explanation.
For these two countries I construct business cycle wedges following Chari, Kehoe &
McGratten’s (2007) accounting procedure. This exercise shows that the US’ recession
can be explained mostly through the labour wedge, and the UK’s recession mostly
through the efficiency wedge. My model is also consistent with this evidence: I show
that following a financial shock, the model generates only a labour wedge and no
efficiency wedge if wages are fully rigid, and only an efficiency wedge and no labour
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wedge if wages are fully flexible. The model is thus also able to jointly rationalise the
behaviour of the efficiency and labour wedges in the US and UK during the crisis by
again appealing to differential wage adjustment.
Focusing on these two countries also allows me to look closer at various aspects
of the data. Firstly, I decompose the labour wedge into distortions on the firm
and household side, following the procedure of Karabarbounis (2014), and show that
the labour wedge is driven primarily by households being off of their labour supply
curves, which is consistent with the mechanism in my model, which relies on sticky
wages leading to households’ labour supply being rationed. Secondly, I take a closer
look at the role of inflation and nominal wages in determining the evolution of real
wages, and discuss institutional changes in the two countries that could contribute to
their patterns of wage adjustment. Finally, I discuss the robustness of my results to
composition effects driven by the firing of low productivity workers during recessions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. I review related literature in sec-
tion 2.2. In section 2.3 I present the international cross-sectional evidence. In section
2.4 I present further results for the US and UK, including the wedges decomposition.
Section 2.5 contains the model and results, and in section 2.6 I conclude.
2.2 Related literature
This paper is related to many theoretical and empirical papers that relate financial
crises to labour markets and productivity. One main contribution of the paper is to
clarify the role of wages in the transmission of financial shocks to productivity. In
some papers, such as Buera & Moll (forthcoming), a financial crisis manifests itself as
a fall in productivity. In others, such as Petrosky-Nadeau (2013), a crisis manifests
itself as a rise in productivity. How can different models give such different predictions
for productivity, and what other data can we use to discipline what kind of response
of productivity is appropriate? My model and empirics highlight the role of wage
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adjustment as a driver of misallocation and productivity.
On the theoretical side, the paper is related to papers such as Khan & Thomas (2013)
which emphasise endogenous productivity from misallocation across heterogeneous
firms in response to financial shocks. They consider a flexible wage economy, whereas
I also consider sticky wages, allowing me to compare economies with differing de-
grees of wage adjustment. Arellano, Bai & Kehoe (2012) also consider a model with
heterogeneous firms, and consider both flexible and sticky wages. Their focus is on
matching labour market outcomes, and they do not compare endogenous productivity
across their flexible and sticky-wage variants. Buera, Fattal-Jaef & Shin (2014) also
generate a fall in TFP following a financial shock. In an extension to their model,
they add sticky wages and show that unemployment increases further in their model
when wages are sticky. TFP in their model appears to fall slightly less when wages
are sticky, consistent with my results, although they do not discuss nor attempt to
explain this. Other papers discuss the empirics and theory behind the effect of fi-
nancial shocks on the composition of firms and workers. For example, Siemer (2014)
finds that young, small firms suffer disproportionately more during the recent crisis,
and builds a model to explain this.
I perform Chari, Kehoe, & McGratten’s (2007) business cycle accounting exercise
over the Great Recession period for the US and the UK. This exercise has been
performed by other authors (Ohanian, 2010, and Chadha & Warren, 2013), and my
results are consistent with their findings. Other papers have investigated the UK’s
productivity puzzle. Pessoa & Van Reenen (2014) argue that the fall in output
per worker in the UK is related to the UK’s large fall in wages, which encouraged
substitution away from capital towards labour, but they do not discuss the potential
for wages to affect TFP.
My paper also builds on several components which have theoretical and empirical
grounding in other papers. Firstly, the transmission of the financial crisis to the firm
sector has been documented in numerous studies. Using German data, Dwenger,
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Fossen, & Simmler (2015) show that firms who banked with banks hit harder by
losses to proprietary trading activities reduced their investment significantly more
than other firms. Focusing instead on the heterogeneity in firms’ financing decisions,
Giroud & Mueller (2015) show that the majority of job losses associated with falling
house prices during the Great Recession are concentrated among firms with high
leverage, who are feasibly more at risk during financial tightenings.
Secondly, I utilise sticky wages. Olivei & Tenreyro (2007, 2010) find indirect
evidence for wage stickiness by exploiting known timing conventions for wage setting.
Countries, such as the US and Japan, in which wages are known to be reset around
the same time at all firms, experience larger responses to monetary policy shocks
immediately following the wage reset than in other quarters. Countries without such
a known convention experience no such pattern. Kaur (2014) studies nominal wage
setting in informal agricultural markets in India, and finds that nominal wages tend
to rise following positive rain shocks, but not fall in response to negative shocks. In
a cross section of US counties, Mian & Sufi (2014) show that counties which were
harder hit by the collapse of the housing bubble had no larger wage adjustment
than other counties, and larger unemployment increases, suggesting a role for sticky
wages. Other papers study downwards nominal wage rigidity by looking for a spike
at zero nominal wage changes, and an associated missing mass below zero. Daly
& Hobijn (2014) document an increase in this spike during the Great Recession in
the US. Finally, Druant et al. (2009) provide survey evidence on the wage setting
practices of a sample of European firms. They find that 29.7% of firms have a policy
of adjusting wages for inflation, and that only half of these use automatic indexation.
Additionally, most firms who use indexation index to historical inflation numbers.
Overall, this suggests a sizable fraction of firms for whom inflation could have effects
on real wages.
Sticky wages, both nominal and real, have also been used in many theoretical mod-
els to amplify employment fluctuations. Gal´ı (2011) embeds staggered wage setting
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into the standard New Keynesian framework. Den Haan, Rendahl, & Riegler (2015)
build a model where precautionary money demand rises during recessions, pushing
down the price level and increasing real wages if nominal wages are sticky, leading to
further increases in unemployment. Schmitt-Grohe´ & Uribe (2015) show that nomi-
nal wage rigidity causes overborrowing in small open economies when combined with
a currency peg.
Finally, my paper is related to the literature on directed technical change. This
literature emphasises the role of factor prices in determining where investment in
factor-augmenting technical change is directed. For example, if real wages are low
(relative to the prices of other inputs) this would lead to firms using relatively more
labour for production, increasing the demand for innovations which improve the ef-
ficiency of labour. Acemoglu (2002) lays the theoretical foundation for the modern
literature. Hanlon (2015) provides an empirical test of the theory using the impact
of the U.S. Civil War on the British cotton textile industry. My paper is similar in
spirit, in that I also emphasise the role of a factor price (the real wage), but I focus
on efficiency effects via the allocation of existing resources, instead of via directed
technical change.
2.3 International evidence
In this section, I present the international evidence at the core of the paper, including
the negative TFP-hours correlation and the supporting evidence leading to my pro-
posed explanation. I first present simple correlations, then partial correlations which
allow me to control for country and time fixed effects, and finally perform robustness
checks.
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2.3.1 Data
The data are from the OECD dataset “Growth in GDP per capita, productivity
and ULC”. I use data on TFP, hours worked, real wages, population and prices.
For some countries I use wage data from different sources to increase the sample
length, and these changes as well as other details are contained in the appendix.
TFP is not utilisation adjusted, and is calculated allowing different weights in the
production function for different sub-types of capital. From the total of 20 countries
in the database I drop Switzerland due to missing wage data, and Korea due to
irregularities in the wage data. Ireland is initially left in the sample, but is dropped
as an outlier.1 This leaves a total of 17 countries in the baseline comparison.
I study a cross section of countries during the Great Recession. The OECD data
is annual, and runs up to 2011, starting at different dates for different countries, the
earliest being 1970. I take the Great Recession to be the period from 2008 to 2011,
and study correlations between various log-changes over this period.
I detrend TFP using a constant growth rate estimated for each country using all
available pre-crisis data. The motivation for this is twofold: Firstly to control for the
pre-crisis growth rate of each country. Secondly, I am interested in how a financial
crisis affects TFP, and hence want to study deviations from longer term productivity
trends. Consistent with standard macroeconomic models where the wage grows at
the same rate as productivity in the long run, I also detrend the real wage rate using
the same deterministic time trend. Hours worked is expressed in per capita terms,
and not detrended. The price level is expressed in levels and is not detrended.
1Ireland has been dropped as an outlier because its experience has been extreme relative to the
rest of the sample. Ireland experienced the worst fall in hours (over 20%) in the sample, and third
worst fall in TFP (over 10%). While the negative TFP-hours correlation holds robustly across the
rest of the sample, Ireland is clearly a counterexample of a country which experienced both very
bad TFP and very bad labour market performance and is worthy of further independent study. The
exercises with Ireland included are presented in the appendix.
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2.3.2 Simple correlations
I perform two exercises with this data. The first is a simple cross-country comparison.
For each country, I construct the log change in variable x over the Great Recession
as x˜i = log(xi,2011/xi,2007). I plot selected relationships between my four variables
(detrended TFP, z, hours per capita, l, detrended real wages, w, and the price level,
P ) in Figure 2.1. It is worth noting at this point that I am focusing purely on
correlations, and am not making causal statements. I also am not controlling for
any other covariates. Additionally, given the small sample size it is hard to show
significance of the correlations. I thus hold off reporting coefficients and significance
levels until the next exercise in which I use a panel structure to exploit more variation
and control for country and time fixed effects.
The top left panel gives the key correlation: countries which experienced larger
falls in hours over the recession tended to experience less severe declines in TFP.
Interestingly, the UK and Finland appear as slight outliers, experiencing worse TFP
growth than other countries for a given fall in hours. This suggests that perhaps part
of the UK productivity puzzle may lie in factors very specific to the UK.
The top right and bottom left panels give the correlations between wages and TFP
and hours respectively. Countries which experienced higher wage growth experienced
higher TFP growth. On the other hand, countries which experienced higher wage
growth experienced larger falls in hours. Notice that these three panels all speak
against a simple TFP shock interpretation of the data: in that case we would expect
a positive correlation between hours, wages and TFP. Indeed, the downward slope of
the relationship between hours and wages suggests that movements along the labour
demand curve dominate the evolution of labour markets over the period. These corre-
lations motivate my choice of differential wage adjustment as a potential explanation
of the negative TFP-hours correlation.
Finally, the bottom right panel plots the correlation between price changes and
real wage changes over the period. Countries with higher inflation experienced lower
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real wage growth. This suggests a role for sticky nominal wages combined with
differential inflation outcomes in determining real wages. These four figures trace
out all of the elements of my story: countries with higher real wage growth in the
crisis experienced worse falls in hours but better TFP growth, with variation in wages
partly driven by inflation.
Figure 2.1: Relationships between selected variables across countries.
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Lines are OLS lines of best fit between the two variables. The
country names refer to: AUS = Australia, AU = Austria, BG
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SW = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
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2.3.3 Partial correlations
While I am not looking to uncover causal relationships, there are obviously problems
with taking such a simplistic cut of the data. For example, the correlations above
could be driven not by differential wage behaviour during the recession (as my story
claims), but simply by preexisting differences across countries. I would thus like to
construct evidence that the above correlations hold within a hypothetical country
over the recession. I do this by creating a short panel structure from my data.
Instead of just looking across countries, I now look across both countries and time.
Specifically, for each variable x I construct the log change from 2007 to year t in
country i: x˜i,t = log(xi,t/xi,2007). I do this for t = {2008, 2009, 2010, 2011} giving me
four years of data across 17 countries, and a total of 68 data points. Intuitively, this
lets me look at the relationship between variables both across and within countries.
Partial correlations capture the relationships between variables after controlling
for their relationships with other variables. For example, the relationship between
TFP and hours after controlling for the fact that some of their correlation derives from
the fact that they both depend on country characteristics. I control for country, fi,
and time, qt, fixed effects, allowing me to focus on variation in the variables unrelated
to country characteristics, and the year of the recession. The first step is to regress
each of the variables of interest on the (common) control variables and calculate the
residual:
xˆi,t = x˜i,t − β′xXit, (2.1)
xˆi,t is the residual for variable x˜. Xi,t is the set of controls which contains only the
country and time fixed effects. β′x is the OLS estimator of x˜ on X. The residual is thus
the component of x˜ not explained by the control variables. The partial correlation
between variables x˜1 and x˜2 is then the correlation between their residuals, xˆ1 and
xˆ2, which is the correlation between the components of x˜1 and x˜2 not explained by
X.
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In Figure 2.2 I repeat Figure 2.1, replacing the values of the variables with the
residuals used in the partial correlations (each country now has four datapoints in
each plot, one per year). The relationship between the variables are still apparent in
this exercise, highlighting that the correlations appear to be driven by events during
the Great Recession, and not driven by preexisting country characteristics.
Figure 2.2: Relationships between selected variables: Panel structure
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Lines are OLS lines of best fit between the two variables. The
country names refer to: AUS = Australia, AU = Austria, BG
= Belgium, CN = Canada, DM = Denmark, FL = Finland, FR
= France, GR = Germany, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, NL =
Netherlands, NZ = New Zealand, PG = Portugal, SP = Spain,
SW = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
The panel structure, by giving me more power, also allows me to more precisely
measure the sizes of the partial correlations, and test their precision. Table 2.1 gives
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the estimated correlations between all four variables. All of the correlations are
significant at at least the 5% level.2 The strong negative correlation between TFP
growth and hours growth is apparent in the correlation coefficient of -0.2963. TFP
and wages are positively and negatively related to real wages respectively, with partial
correlations of 0.5304 and -0.3307. Finally, the correlation between real wages and
prices is -0.4265.
Table 2.1: Partial correlations
TFP l w P
TFP 1 -0.2963** 0.5304*** -0.3616**
l 1 -0.3307** 0.3405**
w 1 -0.4265***
P 1
*, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
2.3.4 Robustness
To check the robustness of my results I perform several checks. Firstly, I drop several
countries and groups of countries in turn to check if the results are driven by outliers.
For example, in Figure 2.2 Spain, the US, Finland and the UK all appear towards the
extremes of the plots. The signs and magnitudes are unaffected by dropping these
countries individually or as a group. There might also be concern with the reliability
of wage data. I also perform the exercise comparing TFP and hours to prices instead
of real wages. If nominal wages are sticky then higher prices should lead to lower real
wages, identifying a similar effect. This gives a negative relation between TFP and
prices, and positive between hours and prices, which supports the original result.
Table 2.2 gives the results of two additional robustness exercises. One concern
2The panel structure could introduce serial correlation into the errors, which could be be a
problem for the significance tests. However, given the relatively small sample size, clustering the
standard errors is problematic.
106
with the partial correlations I have presented is that, even after controlling for time
and country fixed effects, I am comparing countries who have suffered different-sized
financial crises. Perhaps a more ideal comparison would be to control for the size of the
financial crisis and see if, conditional on this, the same negative relationship between
TFP and hours emerges. To this end, I collect data on the “credit intermediation
ratio” from the OECD National Accounts.3 This is the ratio of loans from the financial
sector to the non-financial sector to the total liabilities of the non-financial sector.
In other words, it is a measure of the ability of non-financial firms to raise funds
from the financial sector. This ratio has strong predictive power for output: in the
sample of countries used the correlation between the growth rates of output and the
credit ratio is 0.4685, significant above the 0.1% level. Panel A of Table 2.2 gives
the four main partial correlations, where I now control for both fixed effects and the
credit intermediation ratio. The correlation between TFP and hours is now stronger
and more statistically significant, and the other correlations are at least as large and
significant as before.
I next perform an exercise designed to see if my proposed mechanism for the cor-
relation between TFP and hours fits the data. Specifically, my proposed mechanism
links both TFP and hours to movements in wages: lower wages lead to higher hours
and misallocation which reduces TFP. Thus I should see that the partial correlation
between TFP and hours is reduced towards zero if I also control for wages, since
I claim that their negative relationship derives from wage movements. Panel B of
Table 2.2 gives values of this partial correlation where I variously control for wages
and prices, in addition to the fixed effects.4 The partial correlation is halved once
3The item can be found under Financial Dashboard, Financial Indicators - Stocks, Private Sector
Debt. The data is not available for New Zealand, so I drop it for this exercise. Additionally, there
are concerns with the data for Finland. Specifically, a casual plot of output and the credit ratio
during the crisis reveals a strong, positive relationship for all countries, except for Finland who
experienced a severe recession while the credit ratio increased making it a severe outlier. Finland is
thus dropped, but the results are unaffected by including it.
4Note that while wages and prices are both endogenous objects, controlling for them in this
manner is allowable since I am still only computing partial correlations. This exercise measures the
correlation between TFP and hours which is unrelated to their mutual correlation with wages.
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Table 2.2: Robustness
2.A: Controlling for financial variables
corr(z, l) corr(z, w) corr(l, w) corr(w,P )
-0.4574*** 0.5286*** -0.5192*** -0.4286***
2.B: Controlling for wages and prices
Baseline w P [w,P ]
corr(z, l) -0.2963** -0.1511 -0.1975 -0.1147
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% lev-
els respectively. Panel 2.A gives partial correlations after con-
trolling for country and time fixed effects, and for the “credit in-
termediation ratio” in country i at time t. New Zealand and
Finland are dropped, the former due to missing data and the
latter due to concerns with the credit data. Panel 2.B gives
the partial correlation between TFP and hours after controlling
for fixed effects, and the variables given in the column headers.
wages are controlled for and becomes statistically insignificant, thus supporting that
the relationship between TFP and hours is related to a large extent with wage move-
ments. I also control for prices, since prices should be related to real wages if nominal
wages are sticky, and again find that the relationship is smaller and insignificant.
Controlling for both prices and wages together leads to the largest reduction in the
partial correlation between TFP and hours.
Finally, all results are robust to changing the detrending assumptions for hours,
wages and prices. The results are weakened is TFP is not detrended, however de-
trended TFP appears to be the appropriate measure as discussed above. I want to
investigate how the financial crisis caused TFP to change, and hence want to study
deviations from existing long-term trends in TFP.
Overall, the international evidence paints an interesting picture. During the crisis
TFP and hours are negatively related, and this seems to have a lot to do with real
wages. This is true in simple cross sections, and also in a country-year panel structure
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after controlling for both fixed effects and a credit variable. Finally, real wages are
negatively related to prices, consistent with nominal wage stickiness.
2.4 Case study: US vs UK
In this section, I take the US and the UK as two case studies with which to take
a closer look at the results of the previous section. I first perform a business cycle
accounting exercise, and show that business cycle “wedges” are correlated with wages
in a way we would expect given the cross-sectional evidence from the previous section.
I then decompose the real wage changes into nominal wage and inflation components,
and discuss institutional factors behind wage stickiness in the two countries. In the
appendix I perform other exercises: a) a decomposition of the labour wedge, b) a
discussion of the robustness of my results to composition effects in the real wage data,
and c) a discussion of why wages, and not real unit labour costs, are the appropriate
measure for my exercise.
Here I do not use the OECD data from the previous section, and instead use
national accounts data from the US and the UK. This has the advantage of giving
longer time series, including data later into the Great Recession than the OECD data,
which allows me to examine both the initial phase of the crisis and the following
“recovery”.
2.4.1 Business cycle accounting
In this section, I perform Chari, Kehoe & McGratten’s (2007) business cycle ac-
counting procedure on the US and the UK over the Great Recession. This procedure
specifies a “prototype economy”, which is a standard real business cycle model aug-
mented with hypothetical wage and capital income taxes. These two taxes, along
with the level of TFP and government spending, give four “wedges”. The idea is
then to select four time series from the data, and back out the values of these four
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wedges such that the equilibrium of the prototype economy exactly matches the data
on these time series. I provide a brief description of the procedure here, and provide
a more detailed derivation and discuss data sources in the appendix.
Prototype economy
The prototype economy features a standard Cobb-Douglas production function in
capital and labour:
yt = e
τet kαt−1
(
(1 + gz)
tlt
)1−α
(2.2)
Here a lowercase refers to per-capita variables, and yt, kt−1, and lt refer to per-capita
output, capital, and labour respectively. gz is the (estimated) long run trend growth
rate of TFP, and the Solow residual at time t is given by eτ
e
t (1 + gz)
t. The efficiency
wedge, τ et , is thus defined as the (log) deviation of TFP from its long term trend,
and can be backed out directly from the production function given data on output,
capital, and labour.
The labour wedge is a hypothetical percentage tax on labour income, τ lt . The
prototype economy has period utility function U(c, l) = log(c)− v(l), which leads to
a standard labour optimality condition augmented with the labour wedge:
v′(lt)ct = (1− τ lt )(1− α)
yt
lt
(2.3)
This equation equates the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consump-
tion to the marginal product of labour, adjusted for the labour wedge. The labour
wedge can then be measured from the data using this equation and data on output,
hours, and consumption. The full wedges procedure also requires computing an in-
vestment wedge and government spending wedge.5 Once the wedges are computed,
the final procedure is to solve and simulate the prototype economy subject to the
5The full procedure requires estimating a law of motion for the wedges and solving for the policy
functions of the prototype economy, which depend on this law of motion.
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measured wedges. Trivially, simulating the economy with the realised sequence of
all four wedges will lead to paths for output, consumption, capital, and hours which
exactly replicate the data. The importance of each individual wedge can be evaluated
by simulating the prototype economy over a given period subject only to movements
in any one wedge, a procedure which I detail in the appendix along with the parameter
and functional form assumptions.
Wedges
As is commonly found in these exercises,6 the investment and government wedges
account for very little movement in output, and hence I focus on the efficiency and
labour wedges. Figure 2.3 summarises the results, with the top row showing graphs
for the US, and the bottom the UK. The first column summarises the exercise from
the beginning of the financial crisis up to the most recently available data. My data
is quarterly, so I start in the first quarter of 2008.7 The top left panel shows the
dramatic fall in US output over this period relative to trend: a rapid fall of nearly
7% over the first year, followed by a further gradual decline. We see that the labour
wedge is able to account very well for the fall in output, even slightly over-predicting
it initially, and continuing to provide a reasonable account over the whole period.
The efficiency wedge, on the other hand, is not able to account for the dynamics of
output at all, and predicts that output should be slightly above trend over the whole
period.
The UK shows the opposite pattern, with the efficiency wedge doing a better
job at explaining output than the labour wedge. The bottom left panel documents
the dramatic fall in output relative to trend, which is around 9% within the first
6See, for example, the original Chari, Kehoe, & McGratten (2007) paper.
7The NBER dates the US recession as starting in December 2007, and the results are robust
to moving the start point by a few quarters in either direction. Interestingly, the data actually
suggests that, relative to the long term trend, the US (but not UK) economy started slowing down
in early 2006, and that this slowdown is associated with the efficiency wedge. Since I want to focus
on financial crises , and this period precedes the events of 2008, I will not focus on it in this paper.
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year, and consistently two percentage points worse than the US over the period. The
efficiency wedge explains the initial fall well, and continues to explain the bulk of the
fall in output over the period. The labour wedge, while getting the sign of the output
movements right, cannot match the magnitude of the fall, and additionally predicts
that output should have returned to trend by 2014.
The remaining two columns provide additional information. The middle column
plots the data on hours worked. A reflection of the more important labour wedge
in the US is the worse performance of hours during the recession: it fell by nearly
11% in the US, whereas it fell by just over 5% in the UK. As is to be expected, the
labour wedge is important for explaining the movements in hours in both the US and
the UK: it is well known that the benchmark RBC model is unable to generate the
required movements in hours worked, which explains why the labour wedge still plays
a role.
The final column plots the wedges themselves. For the efficiency wedge, I plot
the exponential of the wedge, which gives the deviation of TFP from trend. For the
US, we see a peak increase of over 2% in detrended TFP during the crisis, which is
eventually reversed, but still leaves detrended TFP less than 1% below trend by the
end of the sample period. The UK, on the other hand, has TFP fall by 5% from trend
within the first year, and continue falling to around 7% below trend by the end of the
sample period. The labour wedge increases in both countries, but by roughly twice
as much in the US. Additionally, the US labour wedge remains severely elevated at
the end of the sample period, whereas the UK labour wedge actually ends the sample
less severe than at the beginning.
To summarise, as in the OECD data the key empirical observation I want to
explain is the negative TFP-hours correlation: Why did the US experience a much
larger fall in hours than the UK, while experiencing a much less severe response of
measured TFP? The accounting exercise above allows me to also express this question
in terms of wedges: Why did the financial crisis manifest itself more in the labour
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Figure 2.3: Business cycle accounting results
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All variables are expressed as a fractional deviation from the value in the ini-
tial period. The first two columns plot output and hours, and their simulated
paths subject only to one wedge. The final column plots the exponential of the
efficiency wedge (giving the deviation of TFP from trend), and the value of the
labour wedge. Output is expressed as the deviation from the estimated trend.
wedge for the US, and the efficiency wedge for the UK?
Wages & wedges
Using national accounts data, I construct a measure of average real wages for the two
countries, and plot this against the wedge and output data in Figure 2.4. All of the
variables, including real wages, are detrended using the average trend growth in TFP.
The first column covers the whole sample period, repeating the first column of
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Figure 2.3 with the added real wage data. The data is surprising: despite the US
having nearly double the fall in hours of the UK, detrended real wages only fell by
6% over the whole sample period, whereas they fell by 10% in the UK. Additionally,
in the first two years of the crisis, during which the US saw its dramatic decline in
hours, real wages (detrended and in levels) actually increased by over 2% in the US.
The UK, on the other hand, has seen a nearly secular decline in detrended real wages
over the whole period.8
This provides the complementary result to my wage correlations in the OECD
data. There I showed that wages were positively correlated with TFP and negatively
correlated with hours over the crisis. Here I show that high wages are associated with
the recession manifesting itself in the labour wedge, and falling wages are associated
with the recession manifesting itself in the efficiency wedge.
Given that the behaviour of wages in the US changes over the sample period
– initially rising, and then starting a decline – it is interesting to check if these
correlations hold over time within the US too. That is, does the role of the labour
and efficiency wedges change in the US when detrended real wages start to fall? The
last two columns of Figure 2.4 demonstrate that this is the case, by splitting the
sample in half. For the US, we see that in the first three years, when detrended real
wages remained elevated, the labour wedge explains the behaviour of output, while
the efficiency wedge cannot. For the last three years, where detrended real wages are
falling, the labour wedge is actually improving and now it is the efficiency wedge that
better explains the fall in output. This time-series relationship between the wages and
the role of the two wedges exactly matches the cross-country relationship I described
earlier between the US and the UK.
8One concern with aggregate wage data is that it contains composition bias if workers on the
lowest wages are fired first. In the appendix, I summarise the evidence on composition effects during
the crisis for the US and UK. Adjusting for estimates of composition effects leads instead to US
wages remaining roughly constant for the first two years of the crisis, and does not affect the UK
estimates. Thus there still appears to be a large difference in wage behaviour after controlling for
composition.
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Figure 2.4: Real wage behaviour and the output decomposition
2008 2010 2012 2014
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
U
S
2008 2009 2010 2011
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
2011 2012 2013 2014
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
2008 2010 2012 2014
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
U
K
2008 2009 2010 2011
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
2011 2012 2013 2014
−0.12
−0.1
−0.08
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
y (data) y (j u st τ e) y (j u st τ l) w (data)
All variables are deviations from the estimated constant trend growth rate,
expressed as a fractional deviation from the value in the initial period.
Finally, in the appendix I provide a decomposition of the labour wedge following
Karabarbounis (2014). This exercise uses wage data to decompose the labour wedge
into two wedges, one reflecting distortions to the household’s labour supply first order
condition, and the other distortions to the firm’s labour demand first order condition.
This exercise shows that the measured labour wedge is explained almost entirely by
distortions to labour supply, and not demand, during the Great Recession for both
countries. This is consistent with unemployment caused by rationing due to wage
stickiness, which is precisely the form of unemployment I will have in my model.
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2.4.2 Inflation, institutional factors, and real wage determi-
nation
In my model I will be using the idea of wage stickiness, and it is thus important to
try and understand what drives wages, if it is not market clearing. In this section
I decompose real wage growth in both countries into components driven by nominal
wage growth and inflation. This allows me to look for patterns hinting at what kind
of frictions in wage adjustment are relevant, for example nominal or real. I measure
prices using the GDP deflator, with the source listed in the appendix. Using the
definition of real wages, wt = Wt/Pt, in any interval [t0, t1] I calculate the following
decomposition of real wage growth between t0 and t:
log
(
wt
wt0
)
1
t1 − t0 = log
(
Wt
Wt0
)
1
t1 − t0 − log
(
Pt
Pt0
)
1
t1 − t0 (2.4)
I plot the results of this decomposition over three time periods in Figure 2.5. Note
that by plotting the negative of the inflation component the graphs are constructed
so that adding up the nominal wage and inflation components at any time recovers
the real wage. Whenever nominal wage growth is larger than inflation we have real
wage growth, and the real wage line thus lies above zero, and vice versa.
For t = t1, this equation decomposes the average yearly real wage growth in [t0, t1]
into average nominal wage growth and average inflation. This decomposition is given
by the final values on each graph: for example, the top left panel shows that between
2002 and 2008 the US experienced average annual real wage growth of roughly 1.5%,
nominal wage growth of 4% and inflation of 2.5%. For t0 < t < t1 the equation also
decomposes real wage growth into the same two components, however since we are
dividing by (t1− t0) and not (t− t0) the numbers should not be interpreted as yearly
averages. Yearly averages can be recovered by multiplying by (t1 − t0)/(t− t0), and
the graphs are instead meant to provide an illustration of each variable’s path during
the sample period.
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Figure 2.5: Decomposing the real wage
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All variables are expressed as a fractional deviation from the value in
the initial period. Variables are not detrended. Instead of inflation
I plot the negative of inflation, such that adding up the nominal wage
and inflation lines will give you the real wage at any point in time.
The first column provides a decomposition of real wage growth pre-crisis. I take
the period 2002-2008 since this corresponds to the period between the NBER’s dating
of the end of the 2001 recession and start of the 2008 recession.9 The second and
third columns decompose real wage growth for the two halves of the Great Recession
sample period.
One fact that emerges from these graphs is that the US and the UK experienced
9The UK did not experience an equivalent recession in 2001, and the date range is taken to be
the same for comparability.
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similar paths for nominal wages pre and post-crisis despite their different labour
market outcomes. Specifically, nominal wage growth was running at around 4% a year
in both countries in the six years preceding the crisis, and dropped to roughly 2%-3%
a year over the next three years. It then dropped to around 1.5% a year over the
final three years of the sample. Given the differences in inflation and unemployment
between the two countries over the crisis, this similarity is somewhat surprising.
Given the similarities in the behaviour of nominal wages, inflation explains a
significant portion of the differences in real wages across the two countries over this
period. While inflation ran at similar levels pre-crisis, inflation between 2008 and
2011 ran at over 2.6% per year in the UK, and only 1.3% in the US. Coupled with
slightly lower nominal wage growth in the UK, this translates to real wage growth
roughly 2% higher per year in the US over this period. If we calculate the fraction of
the difference in the two countries’ real wage growths during this period explained by
each component, 63% is explained by the difference in inflation rates. An alternative
calculation is to calculate a hypothetical real wage growth gap during this period if
nominal wages in each country continued to grow at their 2002-2008 rates. In this
case, the hypothetical wage growth gap is 1.1%, whereas the true gap is 2.2%. Doing
the same but holding inflation fixed instead generates a hypothetical wage gap of 1%.
Thus there remains a significant role for nominal wage differences in explaining the
real wage differences, but with inflation playing an equal if not slightly larger role.
Overall, the similarity of the nominal wage paths of the two countries despite
their vast differences in unemployment suggests a role for nominal wage stickiness.
Decomposing real wage growth into nominal wage and inflation components reveals
that both components do play a role in accounting for the differences between the
two countries, but that inflation plays a slightly larger role.
It is actually not important for my story whether the (lack of) wage adjustment
is driven by nominal wage stickiness and inflation, or other causes. This leaves open
the interesting possibility that institutional factors might play a role in explaining
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the portion of the real wage difference between the US and the UK explained by
nominal wage changes. In particular, there are several factors that could potentially
explain why wages in the US could have recently become more (downwardly) rigid,
while wages in the UK have become less rigid.
In the UK, there has been a trend towards increasing labour market flexibility
since the 1980s, which has been relatively untested since the last recession before
the Great Recession was the 1990-91 recession. Blundell, Crawford & Jin (2014)
summarise these changes, which include “the increasing number of welfare-to-work
programmes available to jobseekers, the more stringent job search conditions attached
to benefits claimed by the unemployed, those with disabilities and lone parents, and,
more recently, the increase in the state pension age for women”. More formally,
Gregg, Machin, & Fernandez-Salgado (2014) show that unemployment has become
more of a moderating force on real wages in the UK, and even identify a structural
break in the unemployment-wage relationship around 2003. They argue that part of
the reason that wages have become more responsive to unemployment is declining
union membership, which has been falling steadily since the 1980s. They show that
union wages are less responsive to unemployment than non-union wages, and hence
that declining union membership can partly explain why overall wages have become
more flexible.
In the US, on the other hand, some papers have argued that the extension of
unemployment benefits during the Great Recession could have put upwards pressure
on wages. Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, & Mitman (2015) use an identification
strategy that exploits a policy discontinuity at state borders to estimate that unem-
ployment in the US could have been as much as 2.5pp higher in 2011 due to the
extension of benefits. Using the same methodology, Hagedorn, Manovskii & Mitman
(2015) argue that 61% of the increase in employment in 2014 can be attributed to
the expiration of the benefit extension. They claim that this is due to a “macro
effect” whereby more generous unemployment benefits increase the outside option of
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workers, increasing their bargaining power and hence pushing up wages. Consistent
with this, they find a statistically significant, positive relationship between wages and
benefits using their identification strategy.
In a recent paper, Mulligan (2015) analyses the effects of taxes and fiscal policies
on the incentives of firms to hire and workers to provide labour in the US and UK. He
finds that during the first three years of the crisis, changes in taxes and subsidies in the
US reduced employees’ reward to work, whereas changes in the UK actually increased
employees’ reward to work. These policies, by relatively improving the outside option
of not working in the US and worsening it in the UK, could explain why real wages
behaved so differently in the first three years of the crisis. Interestingly, much of these
changes were reversed in both countries during the second half of the crisis, which
could explain why I find that the the two countries are more similar in the second
half of the crisis.
Of course, the above policy changes only say that wages in the US could have
become more rigid, while those in the UK have become less so. They do not say
that wages in the US have become more rigid than those in the UK. However, com-
bined with the differential inflation experiences of the two countries, they paint an
interesting picture of the forces that could have pushed us in that direction.
2.5 Model
In the remainder of the paper I build a model to explain the above correlations.
The model is an adaptation of Buera & Moll (forthcoming). They set up a model
with heterogeneity across firms which they use to show how a credit crunch can be
transmitted into the efficiency wedge by disrupting the allocation of resources across
firms. The main difference between my model and theirs is that I consider flexible
vs. sticky wages, and thus show how the transmission in their model is dependent
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on assumptions on wage setting, which I exploit for my main result.10 In particular,
I will consider two extreme assumptions on wage setting, completely flexible and
completely fixed wages, and study how the transmission of the credit crunch differs in
these two cases. These results provide benchmarks between which different countries
fall, depending on their level of wage adjustment during the crisis. Time is discrete
and the horizon infinite, and I consider only perfect foresight economies in which
there is no aggregate uncertainty. There is idiosyncratic uncertainty at the firm level,
but this will not lead to aggregate uncertainty due to the law of large numbers and
my assumption of a continuum of firms. The model is set up as a real model, and
nominal concerns will only enter via the effect of inflation on the real wage.
2.5.1 Household
Since the focus of the model is on the firm side, the household structure is left stylised.
There is a representative household with discount factor β, period utility function
U(ct, L
s
t) = log(ct) − v(Lst) where ct is consumption and Lst hours worked. Labour
disutility satisfies v′(Ls) > 0 and v′′(Ls) ≥ 0, as is standard.11 The household receives
labour income and any profit paid out by firms, and can borrow or save using a risk
free bond, which is traded with firms. It can also choose consumption, and must give
some income as equity injections for firms. The household’s budget constraint is thus:
ct + bt = wtL
s
t + rt−1bt−1 +Dt (2.5)
10I also model the firms as firms owned by households, whereas they model them as a seperate
species. I also allow households to lend to firms, while they do not.
11The assumption of log utility is only for consistency with the use of log utility in the empirical
wedges exercise. All of the results below go through for an arbitrary consumption utility function
satisfying the usual conditions.
121
Where bt is savings, rt the real interest rate, and Dt the net income received from
firms. The first order condition for bonds yields the familiar Euler equation:
u′(ct) = βu′(ct+1)rt (2.6)
The household takes wages as given, and chooses how much labour to supply. Since I
assume sticky wages in some cases, and given the simple labour market structure, we
might end up with labour market rationing in some states of the world. The household
understands this and takes it into account in its optimisation. If the household is not
rationed in its labour supply in equilibrium in period t, then its labour supply first
order condition must hold:
wt = v
′(Lst)ct (2.7)
However, if in equilibrium the market doesn’t clear the household understands that it
will only be able to work Lst ≤ Ldt hours, where Ldt is aggregate labour demand from
firms, and the labour supply condition will not hold at time t.
2.5.2 Firms
There is a continuum of mass one of firms, all owned by the household. They each
operate a constant returns to scale production function in capital and labour, and have
heterogeneous productivities. Firm i has production function yt = ztk
α
t−1l
1−α
t where I
suppress i subscripts for clarity. zt is firm level TFP, kt−1 capital operational at time
t, and lt labour hours. They can raise funds by issuing risk-free debt, but face stylised
borrowing and equity constraints. Specifically, firms cannot raise any equity, and can
only borrow up to a multiple λt of net worth, nt. Note that net worth is defined as
the marked-to-market book value of firms assets less their liabilities. Additionally,
I assume that they cannot short capital, so that kt ≥ 0.12 As is standard in the
12This restriction follows naturally from the production function, if we assume it does not admit
negative capital. Alternatively, this can be viewed as a restriction on the firms to trade claims which
short their future output.
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literature, I assume that firms exogenously exit with probability 1 − σ each period,
at which point they pay out all their net worth as dividends. Given that firms may
always be financially constrained in the future they will never pay out dividends until
they exit,13 so their balance sheet constraint is simply:
kt = nt + dt (2.8)
Where dt is borrowing, and capital is funded by net worth and borrowing. To derive
the evolution of net worth, it is first helpful to study the firm’s labour demand choices.
Firms can hire and fire workers without frictions, and take the (common) real wage,
wt, as given. Static profit is maximised, for a given level of zt and kt, by choosing
labour to satisfy:
pit = max
lt
ztk
α
t−1l
1−α
t − wtlt (2.9)
Solving this problem gives:
pit = pi(zt, wt)kt−1 (2.10)
Where
pi(zt, wt) =
(
(1− α) 1α−1 − (1− α) 1α
)
z
1
α
t w
1− 1
α
t (2.11)
Profit per unit of capital is increasing in productivity (pi1(zt, wt) > 0) and decreasing
in wages (pi2(zt, wt) < 0). The key thing to note here is that profit is linear in capital,
which will be useful later. Optimised labour and output are also given by:
yt = (1− α) 1α−1z
1
α
t w
1− 1
α
t kt−1 (2.12)
lt = (1− α) 1α z
1
α
t w
− 1
α
t kt−1 (2.13)
Following Buera & Moll, I make the following assumptions on the timing of firms’
capital choices and productivity realisations. I assume that firms choose capital one
13A formal proof of this statement and the conditions under which it holds is given in the appendix.
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period in advance of production. Less standardly, I assume that firms know their
idiosyncratic productivity one period in advance, and hence know their productivity
at t + 1 when choosing capital to be used in t + 1.14 This assumption means that
firms know at time t their return on capital between t and t+ 1:
rkt+1 = pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ (2.14)
Notice that, due to labour optimisation and the constant returns to scale assumption,
an individual firm’s return on capital is independent of its capital choice. We can
now state the evolution of firm net worth as:
nt+1 = (pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ)kt − rtdt (2.15)
Which, combined with the balance sheet constraint, yields:
nt+1 = ((pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ − rt)φt + rt)nt (2.16)
Where I have defined leverage as φt = kt/nt. The no-shorting and borrowing con-
straints can be expressed in terms of a constraint on leverage: 0 ≤ φt ≤ (1 + λt).This
allows me to define the firm’s problem. Let firm value at time t for a given net worth
and next-period productivity be Vt(nt, zt+1), where the time subscript for the overall
function allows for the possibility of a non-recursive path for the aggregate variables.
It is easy to show that value in this framework is linear in net worth, and so I will
impose this from the start, letting Vt(nt, zt+1) = vt(zt+1)nt, where vt(zt+1) can be
interpreted as value per unit of net worth. A full derivation can be found in the
14This assumption is useful for the analytical results. Relaxing it in versions of the model which
are solved numerically does not qualitatively change the results.
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appendix. vt(zt+1) can be expressed recursively as:
vt(zt+1) = max
0≤φt≤1+λt
{
Et
[
β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(1− σ + σvt+1(zt+2))
]
×
((pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ − rt)φt + rt)
}
(2.17)
The expression inside the expectation gives the expected value of a unit of net worth
next period. Firms exit with probability (1− σ), in which case a unit of net worth is
paid out as dividends and is worth one. With probability σ the firm remains active,
and a unit of net worth is worth vt+1(zt+2). The term afterwards is your return on
net worth, conditional on a choice of φt. Importantly, this is known at time t and
hence out of the expectation. This allows for a very simple solution to the firm’s
problem. As long as the value of being a firm is positive, the optimal leverage policy
is “bang-bang”:
φt =
 1 + λt : pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ ≥ rt0 : pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ < rt (2.18)
Intuitively, if a firm is sufficiently productive tomorrow it will want to invest. Due
to the linearity of profits, it will want to invest as much as possible, and will hit
its borrowing constraint, leading to leverage of 1 + λt. If the firm is not productive
enough it won’t want to invest, and will invest zero in capital and simply carry its
net worth over using bonds. This defines a threshold productivity
¯
zt+1 =
¯
z(wt+1, rt)
above which firms invest and below which they don’t, given by:
pi(
¯
z(wt+1, rt), wt+1) + 1− δ = rt (2.19)
Importantly for my result, this threshold productivity is increasing in the wage
(
¯
z1(wt+1, rt) > 0), which follows from the definition of the profit function. This is
intuitive: a higher wage increases the wage bill, reducing the profit per unit of capital.
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This increases the minimum productivity required to make investment profitable.
2.5.3 Aggregating the firm sector
To be able to easily aggregate the firm sector it is necessary to assume that firms’
productivities are i.i.d. over time. I hence assume that productivities are distributed
according to a CFD F (z). I also restrict myself to looking at cases where the wage
is either at or above the market-clearing wage, and do not consider parameters or
shocks which would lead to a wage stuck below the market-clearing level. This means
that firms are always on their labour demand curves. In other words, I assume that
in the model with sticky wages it is always the household who is rationed, and never
firms. Thus I do not distinguish between equilibrium hours, Lt, and labour demand,
Ldt . With these assumptions I can express the evolution of total firm net worth, Nt,
as:
Nt+1 = (1−σ)
[
(1− F (
¯
z(wt+1, rt)))
(
(1+λt)
(
aw
1− 1
α
t+1 Et
[
z
1
α
t+1|zt+1 ≥ ¯z(wt+1, rt)
]
+ 1− δ
)
− λtrt
)
+ F (
¯
z(wt+1, rt))rt
]
Nt + we (2.20)
The term proceeded by (1−σ) is the net worth carried over by surviving firms. we is
the total exogenous equity injection given to new firms. I assume that a mass (1−σ)
of new firms are created each period to keep the total mass constant, each receiving
equity we/(1− σ). The constant a is defined by:
a ≡
(
(1− α) 1α−1 − (1− α) 1α
)
In the appendix, I show that it is possible to aggregate the firm sector up to a
representative firm. Defining Yt, Lt and Kt as total firm output, labour demand and
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capital demand respectively, we get an aggregate production function:
Yt = e
τetKαt−1L
1−α
t (2.21)
τ et is the efficiency wedge, which is endogenous in the model. I discuss the precise
formula for τ et in the next section. The labour demand decisions also aggregate up to
a representative firm’s first order condition:
(1− α)Yt = wtLt (2.22)
Finally, total capital demand is given by:
Kt = (1 + λt)(1− F (
¯
z(wt+1, rt)))Nt (2.23)
This is the leverage of investing firms, (1 + λt), multiplied by their total net worth,
which is a fraction (1− F (
¯
z(wt+1, rt))) of total net worth, Nt.
2.5.4 Wedges
The wedges are defined in an analogous way to the empirical definitions in Section
2.4. The efficiency wedge is defined by the production function, (2.21). By combining
the individual firm policy functions I show in the appendix that the efficiency wedge
is given by:
τ et = log E
[
z
1
α
t |zt ≥ ¯z(wt, rt−1)
]α
(2.24)
Quite intuitively, TFP (the exponential of the efficiency wedge) is approximately the
average productivity of firms who decided to invest and produce, up to a Jensen’s
inequality term. Hence the model is able to generate endogenous movements in the
efficiency wedge in response to a financial shock, as long as this affects the distribution
of firms who are producing. (2.24) defines a relationship τ et = τ
e(
¯
zt), which it is easy
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to show satisfies τ e′(
¯
z) > 0. Intuitively, the higher the productivity threshold, the
higher the average productivity of producing firms. The threshold for deciding to
invest,
¯
z(wt, rt−1) depends on the wage and real interest rate, and so it is via changes
in these prices that the model is able to generate movements in TFP. As in the
empirical exercise, the labour wedge is defined by:
v′(Lt)ct = (1− τ lt )(1− α)
Yt
Lt
(2.25)
Note that I have implicitly assumed that the labour wedge is measured using the same
utility function as that of the model. This, of course, means that if we impose flexible
wages and labour market clearing the labour wedge will trivially be zero. With sticky
wages, however, we have a chance to generate a labour wedge.
2.5.5 Market clearing
Goods market clearing requires that output is either invested or consumed:
ct +Kt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt−1 (2.26)
Intuitively, we can think of this equation as determining consumption and hence
pinning down the real interest rate. The labour market market may or may not clear,
depending on the whether I assume flexible or sticky wages. If I assume flexible wages,
then labour market clearing requires that:
Lst = Lt (2.27)
We can then roughly think of the household’s labour first order condition pinning
down wages. If instead I assume sticky wages, then I simply impose an exogenous
sequence of wages, {wt}∞t=0. Since I restrict myself to cases of rationing on the side of
unemployment, I thus dispense with the household’s labour first order condition in
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this case, and define unemployment as:
Ut = L
s∗
t − Lt (2.28)
Where Ls∗t is the hypothetical amount of labour that the household would like to
supply if it could, which is backed out from the household labour first order condition,
(2.7), using equilibrium consumption and the wage.
2.5.6 Results
To gain intuition, I turn to analytical results from the model’s steady state. My
goal is to show how a financial shock is translated into wedges and unemployment,
depending on whether wages are flexible or sticky. Variables with a time subscript
denote steady state values.
It is helpful to define steady state labour supply and demand at this point. The
steady state labour demand curve is defined for a given wage as Ld(w;λ). The depen-
dence on λ is also made explicit as this is what I will be varying in my comparative
statics. Labour demand is found by combining the aggregated firm equations (2.20),
(2.21), (2.22), and (2.23), using the steady state interest rate r = 1/β from (2.6). The
steady state labour supply curve is defined as Ls(w;λ). This is given by the house-
hold’s labour supply equation, (2.7). This equation contains consumption, which
found from the resource constraint, (2.26) using the values for output and capital
solved for during the derivation of labour demand. The following lemma establishes
properties of steady state labour demand and supply:
Lemma 1. Labour demand is downwards sloping in the wage (Ld1(w;λ) < 0) and
increasing in the borrowing limit (Ld2(w;λ) > 0). Labour supply is decreasing in the
borrowing limit (Ls2(w;λ) < 0).
The proofs are relagated to the appendix, and I discuss the intuition here. Labour
demand is downwards sloping in the wage because high wages encourage substitution
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towards capital. Labour demand increases as the borrowing constraint is relaxed
because this increases firms’ net worth, increasing their steady state capital, and hence
marginal product of labour and labour demand. On the other hand, labour supply
is decreasing as the borrowing limit is relaxed because a looser borrowing constraint
leads to higher output and consumption in equilibrium. Higher consumption leads
to lower labour supply, at a given wage, via (2.7). This can be interpreted as an
income effect: the looser borrowing constraint raises household income, so households
demand more leisure and hence supply less labour. It is harder to prove that steady
state labour supply is upwards sloping in the wage (Ls1(w;λ) > 0), and I impose this as
a weak regularity assumption, which should be considered a maintained assumption
in the following propositions.15
Two other objects are useful. Firstly, define
¯
zss(w) ≡
¯
z(w, 1/β). This is the
productivity threshold in steady state, which now depends only on the wage since
the real interest rate is fixed at 1/β. It is simple to prove that the productivity
threshold is increasing in the wage (
¯
z′ss(w) > 0). Higher wages lead to lower profit
per unit of investment, increasing the productivity required to break even. The
second object is the relationship between TFP and threshold productivity, τ e = τ e(
¯
z),
defined by (2.24). It is worth noting at this point that neither relationship,
¯
zss(w) or
τ e(
¯
z), depend directly on λ, so tightening the borrowing constraint will only affect
productivity indirectly through changes to the real wage. These relationships, along
with the labour demand and supply curves, are plotted in Figure 2.6.
I present my results in three propositions. The first two consider the effect of a
tightening of the borrowing constraint in steady state in the extreme cases of fully
flexible and fully rigid wages. The third then considers intermediate wage adjustment.
I provide formal proofs in the appendix, and more informal discussions below. I start
15Labour supply could be downwards sloping in the wage if consumption increased enough in
response to an increase in the wage. This could be possible, since increasing the wage reduces firm
profits, net worth, and hence ability to invest. From the resource constraint, c = Y − δK, so if
δK decreases by more than Y consumption could increase. This does not happen in reasonable
calibrations of the model.
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with the case of fully flexible wages:
Proposition 8. If wages are fully flexible, then in steady state a credit crunch (a
reduction in λ from λ0 to λ1) leads to:
1. A fall in the efficiency wedge, τ e
2. No change in the labour wedge, τ l, which remains at zero
3. No change in unemployment, U , which remains at zero
Proposition 8 is the counterpart to Buera & Moll’s result in my model: a credit
crunch manifests itself as a fall in TFP. Due to the assumed flexibility of the wage
rate, the labour wedge and unemployment remain at zero because the labour market
clears. The intuition behind the fall in TFP deserves some explanation, especially as
it will highlight the differences between the flexible and sticky wage cases. Figure 2.6
gives a graphical proof of the fall in TFP. The left hand panel plots the inverse of
labour supply and demand, with solid lines corresponding to the original λ0, and the
dashed lines the credit crunch (λ1 < λ0). The credit crunch reduces labour demand
and increases labour supply, leading to an unambiguous fall in the real wage from w0
to w1.
The remaining panels trace the transmission from the real wage to TFP. The
top right panel plots the relationship between the wage and threshold productivity,
¯
zss(w). The fall in wages from w0 to w1 increases profits, reducing the productivity
threshold from
¯
z0 to
¯
z1 and encouraging less productive firms to start investing. This
leads to a composition effect which endogenously reduces TFP, as detailed in the
bottom right panel which plots τ e(
¯
z). The reduction in the productivity threshold
for investment leads to a fall in the average quality of producing firms, and hence a
fall in measured TFP from τ e0 to τ
e
1 .
I now turn to the case of fully rigid wages. For simplicity, I assume that the
wage is fixed at a level which leads to full employment before the credit crunch in
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Figure 2.6: Credit crunch in steady state
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Model steady state for two values of the borrowing con-
straint, λ. Tightening the borrowing constraint leads to
lower wages (top left panel), lower threshold productivity (top
right panel), and lower measured TFP (bottom right panel).
the graphical presentation, but this is not important for the results. I can prove the
following proposition:
Proposition 9. If wages are fully rigid at w0, then in steady state a credit crunch
(a reduction in λ from λ0 to λ1) leads to:
1. No change in the efficiency wedge, τ e
2. An increase in the labour wedge, τ l
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3. An increase in unemployment, U
With the wage fully rigid at w0, we get no change in the efficiency wedge, i.e.
no fall in TFP. This follows directly from the fixed wage: since the wage does not
move, there is no change in profitability (per unit invested) and hence no change
in the productivity threshold, which remains at
¯
z0, or TFP, which remains at τ
e
0 .
Intuitively, the credit crunch was transmitted to TFP via the wage fall encouraging
less productive firms to start investing, and this channel is shut off if wages are rigid.
With sticky wages the credit crunch now manifests itself as problems with labour
markets. First, it increases unemployment. This is demonstrated graphically by not-
ing that the shifts in the labour demand and supply curves induced by the reduction
in λ lead to a wage which is now above market clearing level. This leads to unemploy-
ment, equal to the horizontal distance between Ls(w0;λ1) and L
d(w0;λ1). Intuitively,
the reduction in firms’ borrowing capacity reduces their investment in capital, which
reduces the marginal product of labour, reducing their demand for labour. At the
same time, the reduction in consumption caused by the reduction in output leads to
an increase in labour supply. At the fixed wage we are rationed, with equilibrium
hours falling by the fall in labour demand.
This manifests itself as an increase in the labour wedge, as defined by (2.25). To
see this, note that since firms remain on their labour demand curves, w = (1−α)Y/L
giving:
τ l = 1− v
′(L)c
w0
The reductions in c and L (which reduces v′(L)) lead to an increase in τ l. Intuitively,
since households are rationed from working and would like to work more, we need
an increase in the hypothetical labour tax to justify why hours are so low given the
higher marginal product of labour.
Having established the response of the economy individually under the two ex-
treme wage assumptions, I now make a comparative statement, which can be used to
interpret the international data I presented.
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Proposition 10. Following a credit crunch (a reduction in λ from λ0 to λ1) in steady
state which leads to rationing unemployment, the larger the fall in real wages:
• The larger the fall in TFP, τ e
• The smaller the fall in hours worked, L
Since I only consider economies with full employment or rationing unemployment,
we will always be on the labour demand curve. Since this curve is downwards sloping,
any fall in real wages will increase hours relative to the initial fall caused by the
reduction in λ, reducing the total fall in hours. Additionally, any fall in wages reduces
TFP by reducing
¯
z and hence τ e, as discussed above.
These results together give us a useful lens with which to make sense of the data
I presented at the beginning of the paper. The first two propositions consider the
extreme cases of completely flexible and rigid wages. I show through these examples
the importance of wage adjustment in determining how a credit crunch manifests
itself in the real economy. If wages are fully flexible then we see a fall in the efficiency
wedge (TFP) and no distortions in the labour market, meaning no labour wedge or
unemployment. On the other hand, if wages are fully rigid then we see no change in
the efficiency wedge, and an increase in the labour wedge and unemployment. These
results thus help explain the behaviour of wedges in my two prototype examples, the
US and the UK during the Great Recession, and set the stage for the larger cross
country comparison.
The third proposition says that, for a given size of financial crisis, an economy
whose wages adjust (downwards) more will experience a less severe fall in hours,
and a more severe fall in TFP. This proposition is thus consistent with the cross
country evidence I presented for the Great Recession. The model predicts the correct
correlations between TFP, hours, and real wages, and I am thus able to explain
jointly the behaviour of productivity and labour markets during the Great Recession
by exploiting only differences in wage adjustment.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I document a new stylised fact: countries which experienced larger
declines in Total Factor Productivity during the Great Recession experienced less
severe falls in hours worked. I also show that countries with larger falls in real
wages during the crisis tend to be those with TFP, and not labour market, problems.
Motivated by this second fact, I offer a parsimonious explanation of the negative TFP-
hours correlation using a model of firm heterogeneity and differential wage adjustment
in response to a financial shock. My model is motivated by cross-country data during
the recent crisis from the OECD, and a more detailed case-study analysis of the US
and UK. My motivating evidence can be summarised as four correlations: During
the crisis: a) TFP and hours are negatively correlated, b) TFP and real wages are
positively correlated, c) hours and real wages are negatively correlated, and d) real
wages and the price level are negatively correlated.
I present a model which can explain the negative TFP-hours correlation by ap-
pealing to the other three correlations. For a given level of wages, a financial crisis
reduces the ability of firms to borrow to fund investment, reducing the marginal prod-
uct of labour, and hence labour demand. If wages adjust relatively little, this will
lead to large falls in hours worked in equilibrium. If wages adjust downwards by a
lot this offsets the fall in labour demand, leading to smaller falls in hours. However,
lower wages also shield firms from having to shut down or downsize in response to
the financial crisis, which leads to a worsening allocation of resources and hence lower
measured TFP. In the model, this comes from a composition effect, based on Buera &
Moll (forthcoming). In particular, the model features firms who are heterogeneous in
their productivities, and who decide whether or not to produce based on their prof-
itability. Firms with the lowest productivity levels choose not to produce, leading to
measured TFP being endogenously determined by the set of firms who are producing.
In the model, a fall in the real wage increases profitability for all firms, leading unpro-
ductive firms to start producing and reducing measured TFP. The extent to which
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this happens depends on the extent of wage adjustment during the crisis, with larger
falls in wages leading to larger falls in measured TFP. Differential wage adjustment
thus generates a negative TFP-hours correlation in my model following a financial
crisis, consistent with the data.
For the US and UK, I construct business cycle wedges following Chari, Kehoe &
McGratten’s (2007) accounting procedure. This exercise shows that the US’ recession
can be explained mostly through the labour wedge, and the UK’s recession through
the efficiency wedge. I show that my model is also consistent with this evidence:
following a financial shock, the model generates only a labour wedge and no efficiency
wedge if wages are fully rigid, and only an efficiency wedge and no labour wedge if
wages are fully flexible. The model is thus also able to jointly rationalise the behaviour
of the efficiency and labour wedges in the US and UK during the crisis by again
appealing to differential wage adjustment.
While financial crises may seem quite different, Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) taught
us to look for commonalities under the surface. This paper attempts to make a small
contribution in this direction, by identifying a new pattern to how financial crises
manifest themselves in the real economy across countries. While the focus here has
been on explaining events during the Great Recession, future work should investigate
whether this pattern holds in other historical episodes. Additionally, the results of
this paper suggest a new tradeoff of monetary policy following a crisis. Attempts
to stimulate employment by increasing inflation may come at the expense of lower
productivity.
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2.A Data sources
2.A.1 OECD
Most of the cross-country data are from the OECD dataset “Growth in GDP per
capital, productivity and ULC”, which I denote OECD1, and is available at https://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_GR at the time of writing. Selected
variables for certain countries have been replaced with supplementary series in order
to fill in missing data, and I document any changes below. All data are yearly.
• TFP: “Multifactor productivity” series from OECD1.
• Hours: Hours per capita is calculated as “Total hours worked” from OECD1
divided by “Total population; persons; thousands” from the OECD dataset
“Level of GDP per capita and productivity”, which is available at https://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV at the time of writing.
• Wages: The nominal wage is taken as “Labour compensation per hour worked”
from OECD1.
– The wage series for New Zealand is replaced by the wage calculated from
preliminary quarterly estimates to extend the series. Specifically, I take
Labour Compensation per Employed Person from the OECD dataset “Unit
Labout Costs and labour productivity (employment based), total econ-
omy” (available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=
ULC_EEQ at the time of writing) which is then converted to an hourly wage
using data on employment and hours from OECD1.
– The wage series for Australia is replaced using Australian national accounts
data. Specifically, I take Compensation of Employees from the national
accounts (available at http://www.abs.gov.au/ at the time of writing)
and divide by hours from OECD1 to create a wage series.
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• Prices: The price level is taken as the GDP deflator, which is calculated from
OECD1 as real GDP (“GDP, constant prices”) over nominal GDP (“Gross
Domestic Product (GDP); millions”).
• Credit intermediation ratio: Taken from the OECD dataset “Financial Indica-
tors – Stocks”, which is available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=FIN_IND_FBS at the time of writing.
2.A.2 US
Notes: All data are seasonally adjusted. The quarterly national accounts data are
presented in yearly rates, and are thus divided by 4 to get quarterly values. The
labour series is normalised to have average 1/3 over the sample. Consumption and
investment are deflated by the GDP deflator and not their individual deflators. This
is standard in the RBC model, since the model does not allow for movements in the
relative prices of output, consumption or investment.
• GDP (Yt): Chained value taken from line 1 of NIPA table 1.1.6. Deflator taken
from line 1 of NIPA table 1.1.4.
• Consumption (Ct): non-durables plus services. Nominal, then deflated by gdp
deflator. Taken from line 5 and 6 of NIPA table 1.1.6.
• Investment (Xt): Gross domestic private investment (NIPA 1.1.6 line 7) +
durable consumption (NIPA 1.1.6 line 4). Both nominal, deflated by GDP
deflator. Note that I treat investment from date t in the table as not operational
until t+ 1.
• Initial capital stock (K0): Year end capital stock constructed from BEA Fixed
Asset table 1.1 (yearly data). To match investment data, use Private Fixed
Assets (line 3) + Consumer Durables (line 15). These are current cost measures,
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and I deflate by the yearly GDP deflator. My initial capital stock is the year
end value the year before my investment data begins.
• Depreciation (δ): Current cost depreciation data from Fixed Asset table 1.3.
Computed for private fixed assets (line 3) + consumer durables (line 15) and
again deflated by the GDP deflator. Yearly depreciation rates are computed
as δy,t = Dept/Kt−1. Implied quarterly depreciation rates are computed as the
solution to δq,t + δq,t(1 − δq,t) + δq,t(1 − δq,t)2 + δq,t(1 − δq,t)3 = δy,t. I compute
the depreciation rate as the average of these quarterly depreciation rates.
• Capital stock (Kt): Constructed using the perpetual inventory method starting
with the initial capital stock and using Kt = Xt + (1− δ)Kt−1.
• Hours worked (Lt): Hours worked is the series “Nonfarm Business Sector:
Hours of All Persons, Index 2009=100, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted”, se-
ries HOANBS downloaded from FRED.
• Population (Nt): “Civilian Noninstitutional Population, Thousands of Persons,
Monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted” available from the Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data (FRED). I take every third datapoint to construct quarterly data,
and then take a one year moving average to deseasonalise.
• Labour share (LSt): The data for the labour share come from Gross Domes-
tic Income data, since income breakdowns are not available for the GDP data.
Since there are small discrepancies between the GDI and GDP data, instead
of taking the wage directly from the GDI data, I simply compute the labour
share from this data. I can then use the labour share (under the assumption
that it is equal in the GDI and GDP data) to back out the implied wage consis-
tent with the GDP data. The nominal GDI data is from NIPA table 1.10 and
are constructed along the lines of Karabarbounis (2014). I first construct the
unadjusted labour share, LSut as the share of unambiguous labour income to
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GDI. This is compensation of employees paid (line 2) divided by GDI (line 1). I
then attribute the fraction LSut of ambiguous income to labour. Ambiguous in-
come is “Proprietors’ income with inventory valuation and capital consumption
adjustments” (line 13) + “Taxes on production and imports” (line 7) - “Less:
Subsidies” (line 8). The final labour share is then computed as unambiguous
labour income plus the fraction LSut of ambiguous income all divided by GDI.
• Real Wages (wt): The real wage is calculated as wt = LStyt/lt
2.A.3 UK
The available UK data which is comparable to the US data is limited, and starts from
1997Q1. In particular, a longer time series for capital is available for the UK, but it
does not distinguish between government capital and private capital. In the wedges
exercise for the US, following Chari, Kehoe & McGratten (2007), capital is defined
as only private capital. For this reason I am restricted to data for the UK from 1997,
when a breakdown of the capital stock was first released. Most data are from the UK
quarterly national accounts, unless otherwise stated.
• GDP (Yt): The GDP deflator is series “Implied Deflators: Gross domestic prod-
uct at market prices” (series YBHA) from table “A1: National Accounts Aggre-
gates”. Nominal GDP is the series “Current prices: Gross domestic product at
market prices” (series YBGB) from table “A2: National Accounts Aggregates”.
Real GDP is calculated as nominal deflated by the price deflator.
• Consumption (Ct): non-durables, semi-durables and services. Nominal, then
deflated by GDP deflator. Taken from series UTIR, UTIJ and UTIN of table
“E2: Household final consumption expenditure (goods and serives) at current
prices”.
• Investment (Xt): Business investment + Private Sector: Dwellings + Private
Sector: Costs of Ownership + Durable Consumption. Investment data from
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table “G9: Gross Fixed Capital Formation by sector and type of asset”. Series:
NPEK, L62T and L62U. Durable consumption data from table E2, series UTIB.
Nominal, then deflated by GDP deflator.
• Initial capital stock (K0): Unfortunately, data on the stock of the specific sub-
types of investment which I use for my capital series are not available for 1996Q4.
I thus experiment with various initial stocks, and the results for the Great
Recession episode are not sensitive to the initial choice. The initial choice
I settle on is the one that leads to a path for the Solow residual which looks
closest to being one with stationary fluctuations around a constant growth rate.
• Depreciation (δ): Again, individual depreciation rates are not available for the
sub-types of capital. Since the sub types were chosen to be similar to those for
the US, I take the same depreciation rate as the US.
• Capital stock (Kt): Constructed using the perpetual inventory method starting
with the initial capital stock and using Kt = Xt + (1− δ)Kt−1.
• Hours worked (Lt): Hours worked is the series “HOUR01 Actual weekly hours
of work”, seasonally adjusted, available from the ONS.
• Population (Nt): Annual “Mid-year population estimates and annual change for
the UK mid-1964 onwards” data are interpolated to quarterly data by assuming
a constant within-year quarterly growth rate. Data available from the ONS.
• Labour share (LSt): Data are constructed as for the US, using the table “D:
Gross Domestic Product: by category of income”. Unambiguous labour income
is taken as “UK Total compensation of employees” (DTWM). Ambiguous in-
come is taken as “Other income” (CGBX). Total income is “Income based GVA
at factor cost” (CGCB).
• Real Wages (wt): The real wage is calculated as wt = LStyt/lt
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2.B Cross-country robustness: Outliers
In this section I repeat my cross-country exercise including Ireland, which had been
dropped as an outlier. Figure 2.7 repeats the simple cross-section plot (Figure 2.1)
with this extra data point. Ireland appears very clearly as an outlier in the top
left panel, which plots the TFP-hours relationship. Using the other panels we can
ascertain whether Ireland being an outlier in the TFP-hours space is more to do with
it having extreme TFP or hours behaviour. The top right panel reveals that Ireland
does not appear to be too much of an outlier in the TFP-wage space, compared to
the variation of other countries. However, the bottom left panel reveals that Ireland’s
hours appear unusually low compared to the line of best fit given its wages. Hence
perhaps it is something unusual about Ireland’s labour market experience during the
recession that leads it to be an outlier here.
I also repeat the results of the partial correlations, including Ireland, in Table 2.3.
The TFP-hours relationship is still negative, but is now smaller and insignificant. As
suggested by the simple correlations above, the TFP-wage relationship is unaffected
by the inclusion of Ireland, while the hours-wage correlation is now insignificant.
Table 2.3: Partial correlations
TFP l w P
TFP 1 -0.0653 0.5316*** -0.1964
l 1 0.1440 0.5833***
w 1 -0.0671
P 1
*, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Figure 2.7: Relationships between selected variables across countries.
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Lines are OLS lines of best fit between the two variables. The
country names refer to: AUS = Australia, AU = Austria, BG
= Belgium, CN = Canada, DM = Denmark, FL = Finland, FR
= France, GR = Germany, IT = Italy, JP = Japan, NL =
Netherlands, NZ = New Zealand, PG = Portugal, SP = Spain,
SW = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States.
2.C Business Cycle Accounting procedure
The prototype economy is relatively simple. There is a representative household with
growing population Nt. It has log utility over per-capita consumption, ct, and convex
disutility over hours worked per capita, lt:
U(ct, lt) = log(ct)− v(lt) (2.29)
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The household discounts the future with the discount factor β. The household’s
budget constraint is:
ct + (1 + gN,t)kt − (1− δ)kt−1 = (1− τ lt )wtlt + (1− τxt−1)rtkt−1 (2.30)
Where kt−1 ≡ Kt−1/Nt is per-capita capital which is productive at time t. wt is
the hourly wage, and capital depreciates at rate δ. gN,t is the population growth
rate between t and t + 1. τ lt and τ
x
t are percentage taxes on labour and capital
income respectively. I assume that the tax on capital income is known at the time
the relevant investment decision is made, namely one period in advance. There is a
representative firm with Cobb-Douglas production function, Yt = ZtK
α
t−1L
1−α
t , whose
static optimality conditions equate prices with marginal products. The equilibrium
of the economy can be summarised by the following four equations:
y˜t = e
τet k˜αt−1l
1−α
t (2.31)
v′(lt)c˜t = (1− τ lt )(1− α)
y˜t
lt
(2.32)
1 =
β
1 + gz
Et
[
c˜t
c˜t+1
(
(1− τxt )α
y˜t+1
k˜t
+ 1− δ
)]
(2.33)
c˜t + (1 + gN,t)(1 + gz)k˜t − (1− δ)k˜t−1 + τ gt y˜t = y˜t (2.34)
Lowercase variables with a tilde refer to per-capital variables which have been de-
trended by the average growth rate of TFP, gz.
16 Each of these equations corresponds
to a different wedge, which we can measure using data on output, capital, hours
and consumption. The first equation, the aggregate production function, identifies
the “efficiency wedge”, τ et . This is the log deviation of measured TFP from trend.
The second equation, the labour market optimality condition, identifies the “labour
wedge”, τ lt . This is our labour income tax from the model, and the data measures it as
16Zt is measured TFP, and e
τet is thus the deviation of measured TFP from trend. For any variable
xt, x˜t ≡ xt/(1 + gz)t except for capital, for which k˜t−1 ≡ kt−1/(1 + gz)t.
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the required labour tax in order to rationalise the observed level of hours. The third
equation, the Euler equation, identifies the “investment wedge”. This is our capital
income tax, and the data measures it as the tax required to rationalise the level of
investment. The final equation, the resource constraint, identifies the “government
wedge”, τ gt . This is measured from the data as the residual in the national accounts
after subtracting consumption and investment from output, and hence actually con-
tains both government spending and net exports. It is expressed for convenience as
a fraction of output. Define the set of time t wedges as τt = {τ et , τ lt , τxt , τ gt }.
2.C.1 Measuring the wedges
The wedges are measured using time series data on output, consumption, capital
and hours and the four model equations. The efficiency, labour, and government
wedge can all be backed out from the three static model equations (2.31), (2.32) and
(2.34). The investment wedge is measured from the Euler equation, which contains
an expectation term. Measuring it thus requires a model of how agents form their
expectations. This is achieved by solving the model economy under the assumption
of rational expectations. I assume that the wedges follow a VAR(1) process:
τt+1 = Φ0 + Φ1τt +Qεt+1 (2.35)
Where εt+1 ∼ N(0, I4). Denote the whole set of parameters by Φ = {Φ0,Φ1, Q}. I
give this process to the agents of the economy, and solve for equilibrium. The state
variables for the economy are st = {k˜t−1, τt}. This leads to a decision rule for capital
of the form:
k˜t = g(k˜t−1, τ et , τ
l
t , τ
x
t , τ
g
t ; Φ) (2.36)
This allows us to back out the investment wedge from (2.36) given data on k˜t and k˜t−1
and the other wedges, which we previously calculated. The only complication here
is that the capital policy function, and hence the measured value of the investment
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wedge, will depend on the assumed process for wedges, Φ. I thus use an iterative pro-
cedure to jointly estimate the investment wedge and Φ.17 I use a linear approximation
to the capital decision rule, which is solved for using Dynare.
2.C.2 Procedure to calculate the wedges
The process for wedges is estimated, while some other parameter values are calibrated
to standard values. The model is quarterly, so I choose β = 0.99, and set α = 1/3.
Depreciation is estimated from the data, as detailed above. For the labour disutility
function I choose v(l) = l1+η/(1 + η), and set η = 1. The results are robust to a large
range of values for η. My procedure to calculate the wedges differs from CKM’s in a
few ways, which I will discuss after outlining the procedure.
1. Back out the labour and government wedges from the data directly using the
nonlinear equations (2.32) and (2.34). I also back out the average population
growth rate gN as the sample average of the quarterly growth rates nt+1/nt.
2. As an initial guess for the investment wedge series, I calculate it assuming per-
fect foresight. This is backed out from equation (2.33) ignoring the expectations
operator.
3. Calculate the log Solow residual, zt ≡ log yt − α log kt−1 − (1 − α) log lt. The
efficiency wedge is the deviation from the trend growth in the Solow residual,
and both are estimated jointly below.
4. Run a VAR(1) on the four estimated wedge series of the form:
τt+1 = c+ Φτt +Qεt+1 (2.37)
17This amounts to guessing a Φ, using this to calculate a series for τxt , estimating a new Φ,
calculating a new series for τxt and so on until convergence. CKM instead use a likelihood procedure
to jointly estimate the two.
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where τt = [τ
e
t , τ
l
t , τ
x
t , τ
g
t ]
′, εt+1 is a four by one vector of independent errors
with mean zero and unit variance. The elements of c and Φ are estimated by
OLS on each equation, and Q as the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition
of the estimated covarience matrix of the OLS errors. The regression for the
efficiency wedge is run replacing the efficiency wedge with the Solow residual
and including a time trend. This allows me to estimate the growth rate of TFP,
and the efficiency wedge is then calculated as the deviation from this trend.18
5. Calculate the detrended variables y˜t etc by detrending by the estimated pro-
ductivity growth rate: y˜t ≡ yt/(1 + gz)t and equivalently for all other variables
except for k˜t−1 ≡ kt−1/(1 + gz)t.
6. Solve the detrended model using Dynare. There are eight equations to the
model: the four detrended model equations, (2.33), (2.32), (2.31) and (2.34),
and the four equations of the estimated VAR, (2.37).19 This gives us the linear
capital policy function:
k˜t = c0 + c1k˜t−1 + c′2τt (2.38)
7. Using the estimated policy function, (2.38), back out the implied investment
wedge at time t as the value of τxt which leads to the observed choice of k˜t given
k˜t−1 and the other three wedges.
8. Return to step 4, now running the VAR using the newly calculated investment
wedge. Repeat until the calculated investment wedge series has converged.
Note that in this procedure the labour and government wedges are calculated only
once in the beginning. During the iteration only the efficiency wedge (if I estimate
18I do this for the US. Unfortunately, given the shorter dataset this procedure is unstable for the
UK, and there I estimate the productivity trend as the average growth rate during the sample.
19Note that in the solution the population growth rate in equation (2.34) is replaced with its
sample average. An alternative would be to treat the actual population growth rate as a state
variable and estimate a stochastic process for it as we do with the wedges.
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the trend jointly with the model), investment wedge, estimated VAR coefficients and
the capital policy function change.
2.C.3 Procedure to calculate counterfactual simulations
The counterfactual simulations all start with some initial capital stock, k˜0, and a
sequence of wedges {τt}T1 . In the case of the simulations with only one wedge active,
I first pick a date range t = t0, ..., t1. I then take the initial detrended capital stock
from the data, and the sequence of wedges also from the data. I switch off all of the
wedges except one by setting all of their values to their first period values. The rest
of the procedure is then to:
1. At time t, calculate k˜t using the linear policy function from Dynare, given the
current state {k˜t−1, τt}.
2. Calculate the other three variables, c˜t, y˜t, and lt, by solving equations (2.32),
(2.31), and (2.34) given k˜t and the state. In practice, this is done by combining
the three equations into one and solving numerically over lt.
Notice that, by construction, this procedure will return the data for y˜t, k˜t, c˜t and lt
if the all of the original wedges are plugged in.
2.D Further discussion of the US vs UK
2.D.1 Decomposing the labour wedge
In this section I perform a decomposition of the labour wedge along the lines of
Karabarbounis (2014), which is used to ask whether the labour wedge is caused mostly
by distortions on the firm or consumer side. The idea is as follows. Suppose that
instead of just considering a prototype economy where the consumer pays a labour
income tax, we consider an economy where the consumer pays a labour income tax,
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τ lct , and the firm also pays a payroll tax, τ
lf
t . These are the decomposed labour
wedges, which I’ll refer to as the “consumer side” and “firm side” labour wedges,
respectively. Then if we have data on real wages, the consumer and firm’s labour
optimality conditions can be rearranged to solve for these two wedges:
τ lct = 1−
v′(lt)
wtu′(ct)
(2.39)
τ lft = (1− α)
yt
wtlt
− 1 (2.40)
And it follows trivially from the definition of these wedges that they decompose the
overall labour wedge in the following sense: (1 − τ lt ) = (1 − τ lct )/(1 + τ lft ). This can
be rearranged to construct the overall labour wedge from our two sub wedges:
τ lt = 1−
1− τ lct
1 + τ lft
(2.41)
The consumer-side labour wedge measures the wedge between the wage and the con-
sumer’s marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption. It hence
measures whether the representative consumer’s labour supply is being distorted
away from its optimal value. The firm-side labour wedge measures the wedge be-
tween the wage and the marginal product of labour. It hence measures whether the
representative firm’s labour demand is being distorted.
This decomposition thus allows us to see whether the labour wedge we see, espe-
cially the wedge in the US during the crisis, arises more from distortions on the firm
or consumer side. To do this, I reconstruct a hypothetical labour wedge for the crisis
for each country and each sub-wedge using (2.41), and allowing one sub-wedge to
vary at a time while holding the other at its initial value. The results of this exercise
are presented in the first column of Figure 2.8. For both the US and the UK we see
that the cyclical movements in the labour wedge over the crisis are driven almost
entirely by the consumer side labour wedge. This is also true of the simulated paths
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for output and labour: if I use these hypothetical wedges in the simulation exercise
it is the consumer-side wedges which deliver movements closest to the data.
Figure 2.8: Decomposing the labour wedge
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All variables are expressed as a fractional deviation from the value in the initial
period. In the first column, “data” refers to the measured value of the over-
all labour wedge, τ lt , and the other two lines compute the value of the labour
wedge would take using (2.41) if we allow one of the sub-wedges to vary, and
hold the other at its first period value. In the other two columns, the counter-
factuals for output and labour are computed using these counterfactual labour
wedges. Output is detrended by the estimated trend growth rate for TFP.
In other words, we can think of firms as being roughly on their labour demand
curves, and it is consumers whose labour supply decisions are being distorted. Given
the sign of the labour wedge, this means that during the crisis we can think of
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consumers as wanting to work more given the current wage, and firms being happy
with their employment levels given the current wage. This evidence is consistent
with a model of rationing unemployment, where the wage is stuck above the market
clearing level. In this scenario, firms are on their demand curves, and hire little.
Consumers are rationed and work less than the desired amount, taking them off their
supply curves and causing the large consumer-side labour wedge. In my model I
assume sticky wages, leading to rationing unemployment of the type discussed above.
This evidence is supportive of this assumption, and further implies that my model is
able to match not only movements in the labour wedge, but also movements in the
two sub wedges.
2.D.2 Controlling for composition effects
We should be concerned that changes in my wage data reflect composition changes,
and not within-job wage changes. This could, for example, overemphasise the extent
of the wage difference between the US and UK. If people with the lowest wages are
fired first, this could put an upwards bias in US aggregate wages, making it look
like they didn’t fall when they actually did. To address this concern, I review the
literature on composition effects in the US and UK during the Great Recession, and
apply their corrections to my wage data.
In the UK, Blundell, Crawford & Jin (2014) find that, perhaps surprisingly, com-
position effects do not play a major role in the change in aggregate wages during the
crisis. In particular, while composition effects always affect real wages, there was no
change in the size of this effect pre vs post crisis. Hence the decline in real wages
over the crisis period is almost entirely driven by falls in wages within jobs. In the
US, Daly, Hobijn, & Wiles (2012) find that the size of the composition effect did
change during the crisis. In particular, once controlling for composition effects they
find average real wage growth of around 2% per year during the 2000s, before the
crisis, and growth of around 1% from 2008-2011.
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This data is not available from 2011 onwards, so I will restrict myself to looking
at the 2008-2011 period. Over this period we need to adjust my detrended real wage
growth estimates for the US downwards by around 1% per year. So the first two years
of the crisis, where I report that US real wages increased by 2%, now have flat real
wages. Over the whole 2008-2011 period, where I report that real wages increased
by around 0.5%, corrected real wages now fall by around 2.5%. Overall, while this
obviously reduces the gap between wages in the US and the UK, there still remains
a sizable difference in the wage responses of the two countries, with the UK’s wage
response now being around double that of the US, despite the US’ hours response
being around twice as large.
2.D.3 Real unit labour costs
One might be concerned that wages are not the right measure of labour costs for my
exercise. In particular, it is also common to look at “real unit labour cost” (RULC),
which is defined as the wage bill divided by output: wL/Y . The argument for this
measure is that it measures the labour cost of producing one unit of output, and
hence measures labour costs better than the wage. In this section I argue that this
is not the right measure for my exercise, and that wages are appropriate.
Firstly, in a simplified setting without composition effects from the labour side,
wages are clearly the correct measure of labour costs for my model. Theoretically,
the composition of firms is determined by wages, not RULC, as per the productivity
threshold defined in (2.19). Additionally, RULC is a very endogenous object, even
if wages are fully exogenous. To see this, note that in models with Cobb-Douglas
production functions and competitively-priced inputs, RULC is always equal to 1−α
by firm optimisation. This is because, regardless of the wage, firms adjust hours until
MPL = w, which leads to RULC equaling 1 − α in the Cobb-Douglas case. As I
showed above, this is also true in my model where we have firm-side composition
effects, as per (2.22). It is hard to think about how to interpret movements in a
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variable which should be constant at 1−α in the baseline macroeconomic production
function. Of course, RULC does move in the data. However, recent work has shown
that these movements are relatively small compared to the size of fluctuations in the
labour market. This is the message of the labour wedge decomposition of Karabar-
bounis (2014). The firm-side labour wedge actually measures movements in RULC,
and its movements can explain essentially none of the movements in output or hours
at business cycle frequencies. I confirm this result for the Great Recession in the US
and UK in Appendix 2.D.1.
Secondly, even if we add labour-side composition effects it is not clear that RULC
controls for these. This is the supposed benefit of RULC, since by measuring the
total cost of labour per unit of output it controls for workforce composition. Before
demonstrating that this claim may not be true, it is worth noting that there are
other ways to control for composition effects more directly. This is what I do in my
robustness for the US and UK in Appendix 2.D.2 using empirical estimates of the
size of the relevant composition effects from worker-level data.
Theoretically, I demonstrate below that, in a simple model, we still recover that
result that RULC is constant at 1 − α even with worker-side composition effects.
Suppose there is only a single representative firm who has production function:
Y = zKα
(∫
i
zilidi
)1−α
(2.42)
This is a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, with heterogeneous labour
inputs indexed by i. Labour type i can be thought of as labour of a certain skill level,
which has productivity zi. The firm can choose the number of hours of each skill
type to hire, and I assume perfect substitutability between types. Suppose that the
firm takes wages of each type, wi, as given. The firm’s FOC for choosing demand for
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labour from type i is:
wi = (1− α)zizKα
(∫
i
zilidi
)−α
(2.43)
Where this FOC holds for any labour type which the firm chooses to hire. Note
that the perfect substitutes structure places a strong restriction on the relationship
between wages of different types. Any labour types which are hired in equilibrium
must satisfy wi/wj = zi/zj. In this simple setting I can generate composition effects
by assuming that some labour types have wages which are too high relative to their
productivity, leading to them not being hired. Define the measured average wage as:
w ≡
∫
li>0
wilidi
L
(2.44)
Where total labour is L ≡ ∫
li>0
lidi. Multiplying both sides of the labour FOC by li
and integrating over all types which are hired yields:
wL
Y
= (1− α) (2.45)
Which says precisely that RULC are always equal to 1 − α, regardless of which
labour types are hired. The intuition for this result is exactly the same as that for
the standard Cobb-Douglas case with one labour type: RULC are constant because
the firm hires each type of labour up to the point where MPLi = wi. Of course, this
model has the very restrictive assumption that labour types are perfect substitutes,
and it remains to be seen to what degree RULC would vary in a model with more
general substitutability between labour types.
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2.E Model appendix
2.E.1 Derivation of Bellman
In this section I prove that the value function is linear in net worth. First, the Bellman
for Vt(nt, zt+1) can be expressed as:
Vt(nt, zt+1) = max
0≤φt≤1+λt
{
Et
[
β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
((1− σ)nt+1 + σVt+1(nt+1, zt+2))
]}
(2.46)
Such that:
nt+1 = ((pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ − rt)φt + rt)nt (2.47)
Taking the first order condition with respect to φt yields:
Et
[
β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(
1− σ + σ∂Vt+1(nt+1, zt+2)
∂nt+1
)
(pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ − rt)
]
= λt − µt
(2.48)
Where λt and µt are multipliers on the no shorting and borrowing constraints, scaled
by nt. Guessing that Vt(nt, zt+1) = vt(zt+1)nt satisfies the Bellman and FOC above
along with the policy function in (2.18).
2.E.2 Proof that firms never pay voluntary dividends
Proposition 11. In the model, for parameters such that aggregate capital is positive
in all periods, firms will never pay dividends until they exogenously exit.
Proof. The proof imposes the linearity of the value function from the start, for sim-
plicity of exposition. If I allow firms to pay dividends, the balance sheet becomes:
kt + etnt = nt + dt (2.49)
Where etnt is total dividends, and et is thus dividends paid per unit of net worth.
The assumption that firms cannot raise equity imposes the constraint that dividends
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must be positive: et ≥ 0. Combining the balance sheet with the transition for net
worth, (2.15), gives:
nt+1
nt
= (pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ − rt)φt + rt(1− et) (2.50)
The firm’s value function is now given by:
vt(zt+1) = max
0≤φt≤1+λt,et≥0
{
et + Et
[
β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(1− σ + σvt+1(zt+2))
]
((pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1− δ − rt)φt + rt(1− et))
}
(2.51)
Taking the first order condition with respect to et and using the equilibrium value of
rt from (2.6) reveals that et = 0 unless:
E [vt+1(zt+2)] ≤ 1 (2.52)
Note that the ability to pay dividends places a lower bound of one on vt+1(zt+2), which
only occurs if the firm never makes profit on its investment (i.e. (pi(zt+1, wt+1) + 1−
δ − rt) ≤ 0 ∀t) and hence never invests in capital. However, since firm productivity
is i.i.d. this cannot be the case in an equilibrium with positive aggregate capital:
positive aggregate capital and i.i.d. shocks imply that any firm can expect to be
profitable enough to be one of the investing firms at some point in the future. Hence
we must have that vt(zt+1) > 1 for all t and zt+1, implying that E [vt+1(zt+2)] > 1 and
et = 0.
2.E.3 Aggregating the firm sector
Using firms’ individual policy functions and aggregating the firms that produce gives:
Yt+1 =
∫
nt
∫
zt+1≥
¯
z(wt+1,rt)
yt+1f(zt+1)f(nt)dzt+1dnt = (1−α) 1α−1w1−
1
α
t+1 (1+λt)Z(wt+1)Nt
(2.53)
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Where:
Nt ≡
∫
nt
ntf(nt)dnt (2.54)
Z(wt+1) =
∫
zt+1≥
¯
z(wt+1,rt)
z
1
α
t+1f(zt+1)dzt+1 (2.55)
And I have used that productivity being i.i.d. over time makes nt and zt+1 indepen-
dent for any firm. Note that Z ′(w) < 0. Aggregating capital and labour gives:
Kt =
∫
nt
∫
zt+1≥
¯
z(wt+1,rt)
ktf(zt+1)f(nt)dzt+1dnt = (1 + λt)(1− F (
¯
z(wt+1, rt)))Nt
(2.56)
Lt+1 =
∫
nt
∫
zt+1≥
¯
z(wt+1,rt)
lt+1f(zt+1)f(nt)dzt+1dnt = (1− α) 1αw−
1
α
t+1(1 + λt)Z(wt+1)Nt
(2.57)
Combining these expressions implies the various aggregated expressions used in the
main text. For example, the efficiency wedge can be derived as follows. Start with
the definition of the aggregate production function:
Yt = e
τetKαt−1L
1−α
t (2.58)
Replacing Yt, Kt−1, and Lt using (2.53), (2.56), and (2.57) yields:
τ et = log E
[
z
1
α
t |zt ≥ ¯z(wt, rt−1)
]α
(2.59)
The aggregated labour supply equation can be derived by taking the ratio wtLt/Yt and
again replacing Yt and Lt with the above values. Doing so reveals that wtLt/Yt = 1−α.
2.E.4 Steady state proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Labour demand is downwards sloping in the wage (Ld1(w;λ) <
0): Taking (2.20) in steady state shows that ∂N/∂w < 0. Combined with Z ′(w) < 0,
this gives us ∂L/∂w < 0 from (2.57) taken in steady state.
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Labour demand is increasing in the borrowing limit (Ld2(w;λ) > 0): Taking (2.20)
in steady state shows that, for a given w, ∂N/∂λ > 0. (2.57) in steady state reveals
that, for a given wage, ∂L/∂N > 0, which together implies that ∂L/∂λ > 0.
Labour supply is decreasing in the borrowing limit (Ls2(w;λ) < 0): (2.53) and
(2.56) in steady state reveal that, for a given wage, Y and K are proportional to N
in steady state. The resource constraint, (2.26), in steady state then gives that c is
also proportional to N , and ∂c/∂N > 0 as long as c > 0. Combined with ∂N/∂λ > 0
this implies that ∂c/∂λ > 0. (2.7) gives that ∂Ls/∂c < 0 for a given wage, which
overall gives ∂Ls/∂λ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Fall in τ e: Since Ld2(w;λ) > 0 and L
s
2(w;λ) < 0 the
market clearing wage unambiguously falls following a reduction in λ. Since
¯
z′ss(w) > 0
and τ e′(
¯
z) > 0 this leads to a fall in τ e. τ l constant at zero: market clearing means
that we are on both the labour demand and supply FOCs, so both w = (1− α)Y/L
and w = v′(L)c, which gives τ l = 0 from the definition of τ l. U constant at zero: by
definition of market clearing Ls∗ = Ls = L, so U ≡ Ls∗ − L = 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. No change in τ e: Since τ e = τ e(
¯
z) and
¯
z =
¯
zss(w), with
a fully fixed wage there can be no change in τ e. Increase in τ l: Since Ld2(w;λ) > 0
and Ls2(w;λ) < 0, we get a fall in equilibrium L (due to rationing) following a fall in
λ. As discussed in the proof of Lemma 1, for a fixed wage we also have ∂c/∂λ > 0
so c falls. The definition of τ l and the fact that firms remain on their labour demand
curves (giving w = (1 − α)Y/L) means that the labour wedge can be expressed as:
τ l = 1 − v′(L)c/w. Since v′′(L) > 0, reducing L and c leads to an increase in τ l.
Increase in U : Since Ld2(w;λ) > 0 and L
s
2(w;λ) < 0, for a fixed wage U ≡ Ls∗ − Ld
rises following the fall in λ.
Proof of Proposition 10. Consider a decrease in λ such that we have rationing
unemployment. Larger fall in w leads to smaller fall in L: Since we are on the labour
demand curve, any decrease in w will increase L = Ld since Ld1(w;λ) < 0, leading to
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a smaller fall in L. Larger fall in w leads to larger fall in τ e: Since
¯
z′ss(w) > 0 and
τ e′(
¯
z) > 0, ∂τ e/∂w > 0, so a larger fall in w must lead to a larger fall in τ e.
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Chapter 3
Labour Market Matching, Stock
Prices & the Financial Accelerator
3.1 Introduction
It has long been understood that financial frictions can amplify business cycle models
when they interact with asset prices. A shock which raises the net worth of productive
agents will increase their asset demand if they are financially constrained, pushing
up asset prices and again increasing net worth, in a cycle known as the financial
accelerator. In this paper I show that this accelerator naturally emerges when we add
financially constrained agents to the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labour search
and matching model.
Any theory of the financial accelerator requires a theory of how the economy’s
assets are priced. In the original Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) model the asset is land,
which is in fixed supply. The asset price is used to clear the market, by ensuring
demand equals this fixed supply. In a model where assets are not in fixed supply it
is harder to price assets. If production of the asset in question is competitive then
the asset price must equal the marginal cost of producing the asset. Thus simple
RBC models where consumption is convertible one-for-one into capital generate an
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always unit price of capital, and no accelerator if capital is used as collateral. Adding
adjustment costs to the model allows the marginal cost of producing, and hence the
price of, capital to vary over the cycle, and hence reintroduces a financial accelerator.
I show that labour market frictions introduce an accelerator in an analogous way.
The asset in my model is filled vacancies, or “matches” between a vacancies and
workers. These can be thought of as equity in firms, and are traded by “experts”,
who also provide the funding for vacancy posting. In equilibrium the price of existing
matches must equal the marginal cost of producing new matches, which depends on
labour market tightness (the ratio of job vacancies to unemployment, θ ≡ v/u) in an
intuitive way: When many firms are posting vacancies the probability of filling your
vacancy is low, meaning the marginal cost of producing a filled match is high. As
an example, consider a positive productivity shock. This raises the value of a filled
vacancy, increasing vacancy posting, and hence increasing labour market tightness.
This increases the marginal cost of producing new matches, and hence pushes up the
price of existing matches. This increases the net worth of experts, allowing them to
fund more vacancies, and the cycle continues.
In other words, I use the assumption of a frictional labour market to create an
upwards sloping supply curve for the economy’s assets. This means that increases in
demand for assets must lead to asset price increases, creating the financial accelerator.
The most natural interpretation of the accelerator is as a feedback between the stock
market and the labour market. In one direction, changes in stock prices affect expert
net worth and hence the funds available for vacancy posting. In the other, changes in
vacancy posting feed back into stock prices by changing the marginal cost of producing
new firms, via labour market tightness.
I present a model where the experts are firms owned by the representative house-
hold, which could be thought of as banks. However, it is not crucial that they are
banks to understand the story. The crucial requirement for my story is that whoever
it is who benefits from increases in stock prices is financially constrained, and is the
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same person who provides funds for new vacancies. This sets the scene for the accel-
erator because increases in stock prices benefit agents who then reinvest that money
in creating new vacancies, which further pushes up stock prices. One could instead
model the experts as a separate species and get similar results.
My main result is thus demonstrating the existence of a financial accelerator in
the search and matching model, which operates through labour market tightness.
Secondly, I derive an arbitrage equation in my model between existing matches and
vacancies which is identical to the standard free entry condition, with match value
replaced with match price. The free entry condition, equating the value of a filled
vacancy with the cost of producing one, holds in the standard matching model for
both match value and price, since they are identical.
I show that it also holds in my model even after the introduction of financial
frictions, for match prices but not value. This equation links market tightness and
the price of a filled match through the marginal cost arguments made above, and
implies a tight link in the model between the volatility of tightness and asset prices:
for the standard matching elasticity of one half it implies that the volatility of market
tightness must be twice the volatility of asset prices in the model. I construct measures
of these volatilities, and show that this implies that if my model is calibrated to match
the volatility of asset prices, it can explain 82% of the volatility of market tightness
in the data.
Furthermore, this holds for any model which shares this arbitrage equation (in-
cluding the standard matching model) and thus implies that, regardless of the source,
any model which can match the volatility in asset prices will do equally well at
matching the volatility of tightness. This suggests a potential avenue for work in the
matching literature, focusing on improving the asset pricing abilities of these models.
This result is inspired by the recent work of Winkler (2015), who argues that the
key to generating sufficient amplification from financial frictions models is generating
sufficient asset price volatility.
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I show that wage stickiness interacts with the financial accelerator. Increasing the
degree of wage stickiness in the model increases the gap between the volatilities of the
models with and without financial frictions, showing that wage stickiness boosts the
amplification given by the financial accelerator. Sticky wages make the stock market
more volatile, which boosts the financial accelerator since stock prices feed back into
expert net worth and hence vacancy posting.
Finally, I examine the role played by market incompleteness in my model. My
baseline model assumes, as is common in the financial frictions literature, that agents
can trade only in a bond which is not contingent on aggregate shocks. I also solve a
version of the model which still contains financial frictions caused by a moral-hazard
problem, but where agents trade a contingent bond, and show that this version does
not deliver any amplification relative to the model without financial frictions. This
highlights the key role that market incompleteness plays in generating the financial
accelerator. The combination of asset values which are state dependent due to price
movements and fixed liabilities generates the volatility of net worth required to deliver
volatility in the real side of the economy. With complete markets expert liabilities
also become state contingent, and I show that this can completely undo the financial
accelerator. To avoid confusion, in the rest of the paper reference to a model “with
financial frictions” refers to the model with financial frictions and incomplete markets,
unless otherwise noted.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 I review related
literature. In section 3.3 I set up the baseline model with incomplete markets, and in
section 3.4 I set up the models without financial frictions and with complete markets.
In section 3.5 I analyse the differences between the models via their key equations,
and in section 3.6 I present both steady state and dynamic analytical results. Section
3.7 contains numerical results and robustness checks, and section 3.8 concludes.
164
3.2 Related literature
My paper is related to several broad strands of literature. It builds on the labour mar-
ket matching models of Diamond, Mortensen & Pissarides, summarised for example
in Pissarides (2000). Within this literature it is also related to papers on the ability
of the matching model to quantitatively replicate the data, such as Shimer (2005)
and Hagedorn & Manovskii (2008). I contribute to this literature by showing that
financial frictions can help resolve the Shimer critique, and by demonstrating the key
relationship between asset-price volatility and volatility in market tightness.
I also build on the large financial frictions literature. Within this literature my
work is closest to those papers which emphasise the interplay between asset prices
and net worth, such as the early contribution by Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). My con-
tribution is to show that a financial accelerator naturally arises in my model because
of the matching market, even without assumptions on varying marginal products of
agents, or adjustment costs on capital. Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999) provide
a model where adjustment costs on capital provide the movements in the price of
capital, as well as an extensive review of the early literature.
My paper is not the first to investigate the intersection between financial and
labour market frictions. My contribution here is that my paper is the first, to my
knowledge, to use the asset price implications of labour market frictions to generate
a financial accelerator. By putting financial frictions on the people who own firms,
rather than within the firms themselves, firms’ stock market prices affect expert net
worth, and hence the funds that experts have to reinvest in their firms for vacancy
creation. This feature is absent from the existing literature. Christiano, Trabandt &
Walentin (2011) combine matching unemployment and financial frictions in a small
open economy framework. Mumtaz & Zanetti (2013) add labour market frictions to
the Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999) framework and discuss how labor market
frictions amplify or dampen the response of the model to different shocks. Petrosky-
Nadeau (2013) introduces financial frictions into the search and matching framework
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and notes changes in amplification and propagation as well as effects on wage bargain-
ing positions. Quadrini & Sun (2015) argue that firms can improve their bargaining
position versus workers by taking on more debt, and estimate the effect this has on
hiring in a structural model. Schoefer (2015) argues that wage stickiness affects hiring
by making the net worth of firms more volatile, impacting the resources they can put
towards paying hiring costs.
Other papers study the interaction of labour and finance along other dimensions.
Favilukis & Lin (2015) show how sticky wages help explain the equity premium (by
making profits more volatile and hence equity riskier) and several other asset pricing
facts. Petrosky-Nadeau, Kuehn & Zhang (2013) show how an appropriately calibrated
matching model endogenously generates rare disasters, and hence again helps explain
the equity premium. Caggese & Cunat (2008) study how financially constrained
firms choose between hiring workers on fixed-term and permanent contracts. The
result that the financial accelerator relies on incomplete markets has been explored
in the existing literature, for example by Carlstrom, Fuerst, Ortiz & Paustian (2014)
and Dmitriev & Hoddenbagh (2014). Finally, I exploit the tight link in my model
between labour market tightness and stock prices. This feature is present in existing
matching models with a free entry condition on vacancy creation. Farmer (2012a) and
Hall (2014) present evidence on the tight link between unemployment and the stock
market, and Farmer (2012b) exploits this link theoretically in a model of multiple
equilibria.
3.3 Model
The model combines elements of Getler & Karadi’s (2011) financial frictions model
with the standard search and matching model. As in the standard matching model,
I abstract from capital, and instead have experts trade in the equity of firms. Firms
and workers must match according to a matching technology, and vacancy posting
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costs must be paid in order to maintain vacancies. Gertler & Karadi (2011) choose to
model experts as a separate species from households, but I instead choose to model
them as intermediary firms owned by the households. The name “experts” is retained
for consistency with the literature. The model features a representative household,
which supplies labour and saves using a risk free bond. Experts post vacancies, trade
existing matches in a spot market, and borrow using the risk free bond.
Firms in the model are simply matches between vacancies and workers, and do
not face any significant optimisation problem. Note that experts own the equity of all
the firms in the economy, which enables me to combine the expert and firm sectors
and consider experts directly posting vacancies. My financial structure is thus quite
stylised. In particular, all firms are funded with equity from experts, and all experts
are funded with risk free debt from the household. The household is unable to directly
invest in the equity of firms. Time is discrete and the horizon infinite.
3.3.1 Individual expert’s problem
Experts are owned by the representative households. They are restricted severely
in their equity issuance: they cannot raise money via equity, and must purchase
assets using retained earnings or debt. Experts exit exogenously each period with
probability (1 − σ) and new experts are created each period so that the mass of
experts is constant. New experts receive an exogenous equity injection from the
representative consumer. If the value of being an expert exceeds one (as it does in
a neighbourhood of the steady state) experts will not pay out dividends until they
exogenously shut down. In this case, an expert’s balance sheet gives us:
Q(s)k′o + κzv = d
′ + n (3.1)
n is beginning of period net worth, which is a state variable from the expert’s point
of view, and s is the aggregate state. d′ is borrowing, which is combined with net
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worth to purchase assets. All aggregate variables are indexed by the aggregate state,
s. Individual level variables, such as d′, will be denoted without reference to state
variables before they are optimised, and d′ = d(s, n) will refer to their optimised,
equilibrium values. On the left hand (asset) side, the expert has two choices. Firstly,
she can buy an existing match on the spot market for price Q(s). The number of
existing matches she wishes to purchase is denoted by k′o. These matches produce
next period, and then a fraction ρx exogenously separate. Those that don’t separate
can be resold tomorrow for price Q(s′). Alternatively, the expert can decide to set
up some new matches herself by issuing vacancies, v. She pays a flow vacancy cost
κz per vacancy, where z is aggregate productivity, and a fraction q(θ(s)) are success-
ful. q denotes the vacancy filling probability and θ market tightness, both of which
individuals take as given. If a vacancy is successful today then it produces for sure
tomorrow, and then a fraction ρx exogenously separate. Hence notice that buying a
existing match today or setting up a match yourself yield the same payoff tomorrow.
I assume away the idiosyncratic risk that an expert’s vacancies don’t match by
assuming that the expert issues a continuum of vacancies. Thus if an expert posts v
vacancies today then it gets for sure q(θ(s))v successful matches, and we can think of
the expert as directly choosing the number of successful matches, k′n, as opposed to
the number of vacancies. So if we define k′n ≡ q(θ)v we can rewrite the balance sheet
as:
Q(s)k′o +
κz
q(θ(s))
k′n = d
′ + n (3.2)
Note that experts can only post non-negative vacancies, so v ≥ 0 is a constraint for
the expert. This implies the equivalent constraint k′n ≥ 0 as long as the probability
of a successful match is non zero (q > 0). Expert net worth next period is the return
on assets less the repayment of debt:
n′ = (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)) (k′o + k′n)− r(s)d′ (3.3)
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Where w(s) is the wage, which depends on the aggregate state, and r(s) is the interest
rate on debt. Combining this with the balance sheet equation gives:
n′ = (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)− r(s)Q(s)) k′o+(
z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)− r(s) κz
q(θ)
)
k′n + r(s)n (3.4)
I derive a constraint on borrowing using Gertler & Karadi’s (2011) limited commit-
ment problem. Within this period but after raising funds, experts can abscond with
an amount of resources equal to a fraction Λ of the value of the assets they invested
in. The remaining fraction 1 − Λ is exogenously destroyed, leaving nothing for the
lender to recover. If experts abscond they lose the franchise value of being an expert,
but gain the stolen resources. Since this is a within-period problem, lenders can antic-
ipate exactly when an expert will abscond with their resources and they will restrict
the amount they lend to make sure this doesn’t happen. Define the value function
conditional on a choice of (k′o, k
′
o) as V
∗(n, s; k′o, k
′
n). Then this limited commitment
problem gives the constraint:
Λ
(
Q(s)k′o +
κz
q(θ(s))
k′n
)
≤ V ∗(n, s; k′o, k′n) (3.5)
This requires that the value of the expert must exceed the value of the assets she
has the potential to steal, in order to guarantee that the expert does not have an
incentive to abscond with them. The conditional value function is given by:
V ∗(n, s; k′o, k
′
n) = E [Ω(s
′, s) ((1− σ)n′ + σV (n′, s′))| s] (3.6)
Where Ω(s′, s) ≡ βu′(c(s′))/u′(c(s)) is the consumer’s stochastic discount factor
(SDF), and where n′ is replaced with the value implied by (3.4). V (n′, s′) is the
169
overall maximised value next period, and today’s value is given by the maximisation:
V (n, s) = max
(k′o,k′n)
V ∗(n, s; k′o, k
′
n) (3.7)
Subject to (3.4), (3.5) and k′n ≥ 0. The following lemma summarises the solution
to the expert’s problem. I focus on the case where the non-negativity constraint on
vacancies never binds, since my expert sector will aggregate and this case is thus
consistent with the observation that total vacancies are always positive in the data.
Lemma 2. If the non-negative vacancies constraint isn’t binding and prices are such
that the expert cannot acquire infinite value, then the solution to the individual expert’s
problem requires that capital price and tightness satisfy:
Q(s) =
κz
q (θ(s))
(3.8)
This implies that old and new matches yield the same return, and individual experts
are indifferent between the two and optimise over the sum k′ ≡ k′o + k′n. Defining
leverage as φ ≡ Q(s)k′/n, expert net worth evolves as:
n′ = ((rk(s′, s)− r(s))φ+ r(s))n (3.9)
Where rk(s
′, s) is the return on investing in a match, given by:
rk(s
′, s) ≡ z
′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)
Q(s)
(3.10)
Optimal leverage is independent of expert net worth, and optimal k′, d′ and V are
linear in net worth. Expert value is given by V (n, s) = ν(s)n, where ν(s) is defined
recursively by:
ν(s;φ) = E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) ((rk(s′, s)− r(s))φ+ r(s))| s] (3.11)
170
and ν(s) = maxφ ν(s;φ) subject to the moral hazard constraint Λφ ≤ ν(s;φ). Equi-
librium leverage, φ = φ(s), is given by the value that solves that maximisation. Total
match demand, k′ = k(s, n), and debt, d′ = d(s, n), are given by Q(s)k(s, n) = φ(s)n
and d(s, n) = (φ(s)−1)n. If the moral hazard constraint binds then value and leverage
are jointly determined by:
ν(s) = E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) ((rk(s′, s)− r(s))φ(s) + r(s))| s] (3.12)
Λφ(s) = ν(s) (3.13)
If the moral hazard constraint isn’t binding then prices must satisfy:
E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) (rk(s′, s)− r(s))| s] = 0
The expert is then indifferent about her leverage, and expert value is given by:
ν(s) = E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) r(s)| s]
The proof of this lemma is left to the appendix, but the intuition and results
are straightforward. The idea is that as long as an expert wants to post vacancies
(v > 0) then she must be indifferent between posting vacancies and purchasing ex-
isting matches on the stock market. This is because the two assets have identical
payoffs tomorrow, and the moral hazard constraint does not restrict the expert from
performing arbitrage between them. For the expert to be indifferent it must be that
the cost of purchasing an existing match, Q(s), is equal to the cost of producing a new
match, κz/q (θ(s)), as stated in equation (3.8). Notice that this equation is identical
to the free entry condition found in the standard matching model (if the value of a
match is replaced with the price of a match), even though the derivation is different.
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3.3.2 Aggregating the experts
Experts as a whole enter the period with total undepreciated matches K, and a total
value of debt to be repaid D. Define Nc as net worth from continuing experts and
Ne as net worth from new experts. Total expert net worth at the beginning of the
period is thus:
N(s) = Nc(s) +Ne(s)
Where each of the components is given by:
Ne(s) = (1− σ)wez
Nc(s) = σ ((z − w(s) + (1− ρx)Q(s))K −D)
New experts get net worth proportional to aggregate productivity. The net worth of
continuing experts comes from the output and resale value of their total capital less
their debt repayment. Thus overall expert net worth evolves according to:
N(s) = σ ((z − w(s) + (1− ρx)Q(s))K −D) + (1− σ)wez (3.14)
The transitions for K and D can be found by aggregating the individual policy
functions:
K ′(s) =
φ(s)N(s)
Q(s)
(3.15)
D′(s) = r(s) (φ(s)− 1)N(s) (3.16)
Note that the definition of D is slightly different from that of d: D is defined to
contain the interest rate, for convenience when it is used as a state.
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3.3.3 The labour market
The structure of my labour market is standard. The total mass of workers within the
household is normalised to one, so unemployment at the beginning of the period is
given by:
u(s) = 1−K (3.17)
Tightness is defined as usual as the ratio of total vacancies to unemployment:
θ(s) =
v(s)
u(s)
(3.18)
The matching function is assumed to take the constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas
form:
m(s) = ψ0u(s)
ψ1v(s)1−ψ1 (3.19)
This allows us to express the vacancy filling probability as a function only of tightness:
q(s) =
m(s)
v(s)
= ψ0θ(s)
−ψ1 (3.20)
Total employment next period is the sum of new and undepreciated matches:
K ′(s) = m(s) + (1− ρx)K (3.21)
In this paper I take a reduced form approach to wage determination, rather than
modelling the mechanisms more explicitly. While this approach is somewhat unsatis-
factory, I note that the focus of the present paper is to understand the links between
financial frictions and the matching model. Hence as long as the wage process is
chosen carefully to realistically match the data on wages one would expect my results
to also hold in a model with alternative wage determination mechanisms which were
also able to match wage data. Following Michaillat (2012), I assume that the wage
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is an exogenous function of productivity:
w = w¯zγ (3.22)
w¯ thus controls the average wage and γ the degree of wage rigidity. γ = 0 corresponds
to wages which are completely rigid, and γ = 1 corresponds to wages which move
one-for-one with productivity. This is the equilibrium outcome of fully flexible Nash-
wages in the standard DMP model when vacancy posting costs are proportional to
productivity, unemployment income is proportional to wages, and the utility function
is logarithmic. Hence I refer to low values of γ as generating relatively rigid wage,
and higher values generating flexible wages.
3.3.4 Goods market and household problem
In the baseline incomplete markets model the household lends to the expert using
a risk free, one period bond. Household optimality requires that the interest rate
satisfies the standard Euler equation:
r(s) =
u′(c(s))
βE[u′(c(s′))|s] (3.23)
Where c(s) is consumption. Since labour of each household member is indivisible,
there is no labour supply choice. I assume that the household always chooses for all
of its unemployed members to search for a job, and hence the Euler equation above
is the only household optimality condition. Goods market clearing requires that all
output is either consumed by the household, or used to pay vacancy posting costs:
zK = c(s) + κzv(s) (3.24)
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Finally, productivity follows a stationary AR(1) process:
log z′ = (1− ρ) log z¯ + ρ log z + σzε′ (3.25)
Where ε is an independent and identically distributed standard normal. z¯ controls
the mean of productivity, ρ its autocorrelation, and σz the standard deviation of
productivity innovations.
3.3.5 Definition of equilibrium
The model can be solved with three state variables: s = (z,K,D). Productivity,
z, and employment, K, the state variables in the standard matching model, are
augmented with the debt repayment made by experts to the household, D. Since I
will be linearising around a steady state where the financial friction binds, I define
equilibrium under the assumption that the financial friction always binds:
Definition 1. Incomplete markets equilibrium (IME) is a sequence of quantities and
prices v, φ, N , D, K, Q, θ, m, q, u, r, c, z, w, rk, and v such that:
1. Households optimise taking prices as given: (3.23)
2. Experts optimise taking prices as given: (3.8) (3.10) (3.12) (3.13) (3.14) (3.15)
(3.16)
3. The goods market clears: (3.24)
4. The labour market evolves according to the matching function: (3.18) (3.19)
(3.20) (3.17) (3.21)
5. The wage is given by the wage rule: (3.22)
6. Productivity evolves according to: (3.25)
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In the next section I set up two comparison models with different financial struc-
tures. Competitive equilibrium is defined similarly to the above for these economies,
and the definitions are excluded for brevity.
3.4 Comparison models
3.4.1 Model without financial frictions
The model without any financial frictions (i.e. no limited-commitment problem, and
market completeness) dispenses with most of the expert equations, and instead has
matches valued simply using the consumer’s SDF. The derivation is standard and is
omitted. Given the definition of rk optimality can be compactly stated as:
E [Ω(s′, s)rk(s′, s)| s] = 1 (3.26)
This is simply another way of writing the usual recursion for job value. This model is
simpler than the model with experts because we do not have to worry about financial
variables. The definition of equilibrium, which I label a Standard Equilibrium (SE),
is similar to the definition of an IME, replacing the expert optimality equations with
just (3.26).
3.4.2 Complete markets model
I now consider the model where experts and consumers trade state contingent securi-
ties instead of just risk free debt, but we retain the limited-commitment problem. As
in the incomplete markets model, arbitrage between vacancies and existing matches
allows me to combine them into a single asset, which I impose from the start for
simplicity of exposition. An individual expert’s balance sheet is now:
Q(s)k′ = n+
∫
s′
d(s′) ds′ (3.27)
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Where d(s′) donates the quantity of securities purchased that are payable if next pe-
riod’s state is s′, and d ≡ {d(s′)} denotes the collection. Net worth evolves according
to:
n′ = (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)) k′ − r(s′)d(s′) (3.28)
The interest rate is state contigent and derived from the representative household’s
optimality:
r(s′) =
u′(c(s))
βu′(c(s′))p(s′|s) (3.29)
Where p(s′|s) is the marginal density of the state s′ conditional on today’s state, s.
Expert value conditional on a choice of k′ and d is given by:
V ∗(n, s; k′,d) = E [Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ)n′ + σV (n′, s′))| s] (3.30)
Where it is understood that n′ is replaced using (3.28). Experts maximise overall
value:
V (n, s) = max
k′,d
V ∗(n, s; k′,d) (3.31)
Subject to (3.27), (3.28), and the moral hazard constraint:
ΛQ(s)k′ ≤ V ∗(n, s; k′,d) (3.32)
Note that now the maximisation is also over all the state contingent securities, d. The
following proposition establishes the central result of the complete markets model:
Lemma 3. Assuming that the moral hazard constraint is always binding, there is
a solution to the individual expert’s problem in the complete markets model featur-
ing constant leverage, φ¯. Expert value is linear in net worth, with a constant first
derivative: V (n, s) = ν¯n. Leverage satisfies Λφ¯ = ν¯, and the solution requires that:
E [Ω(s′, s)rk(s′, s)| s] = ν¯ − (1− φ¯) (1− σ + σν¯)
(1− σ + σν¯) φ¯ (3.33)
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The proof is relegated to the appendix, but the intuition for constant leverage
and marginal value is relatively simple. With complete markets the expert is able
to use contingent debt to allocate resources across future states of the world. She
actually has a lot of freedom to do this, because the moral hazard constraint limits
her overall borrowing, not how she allocates debt across the contingent states. This is
why marginal value, ν¯ has to be constant, because if it was not the expert would use
contingent debt to borrow in states with low value, and transfer those resources to
states with higher value. Since she is unconstrained in doing this and value is linear in
net worth, she would take infinitely large positions, and achieve infinite overall value.
This would violate that the moral hazard constraint is binding (which I assumed)
since with infinite value she can always borrow more. Given constant marginal value,
constant leverage follows trivially from the binding borrowing constraint.
Given the constant marginal value and leverage, equation (3.33) delivers the main
result of the complete markets model. Notice that the right hand side is constant,
and that apart from this the equation is identical to the first order condition of the
standard equilibrium, (3.26). In the limiting case of ν¯ = 1 the two equations are
exactly identical, and the standard and complete markets models deliver identical
equilibria. In general, the two models are identical up to this “wedge” due to the
moral hazard constraint, and we will see in later sections that they deliver very similar
dynamics.
3.5 Discussion of key equations
Having set up the three models, in this section I discuss the differences between
them using two key model equations: the free entry or arbitrage equation, and the
discounted sum pricing matches. This thus serves as an introduction to the models
before moving on to more explicit analytical and numerical results in later sections.
One key idea from this section is the tight link that the matching model imposes
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between the volatility of market tightness and asset prices, which is an idea also
taken up in Hall (2014).
3.5.1 Comparing equations: The free entry condition
The first thing to note is that both the financial frictions models and the standard
matching model contain the familiar equation:
Q(s) =
κz
q (θ(s))
=
κz
ψ0
θ(s)ψ1
The interpretation is slightly different in the three models. In the standard matching
model this is the free entry condition, stating that the value of posting a vacancy
should be equal to zero. Q, the value of a filled vacancy, should be equal to the
cost of posting a vacancy, adjusted for the probability of success, leaving no surplus.
Notice that in the standard matching model Q is both the value of a filled vancancy,
and the price a filled vacancy would trade on the market.
However, in the financial frictions models we must be careful because Q must be
interpreted as the market price of a filled match. This will be different from the value
of a match to an expert due to the financial friction. In the standard model the value
of posting a vacancy must be equal to zero in equilibrium, but this is not true if the
financial friction binds: Experts would like to post another vacancy, they just don’t
have the funds. If this is the case, how do we still recover an equation identical to
the free entry condition of the standard model?
This is because the equation is in fact a no-arbitrage equation for the experts,
which says that they must be indifferent between creating a new match themselves
(by posting 1/q vacancies) and purchasing an existing match on the spot market.
Because I have assumed away vacancy risk, these two choices represent assets which
give identical payoffs in the future: if you buy a match today or create one, you have a
match tomorrow in either case. Hence if they had different prices experts could make
179
infinite profit by going long in one and short in the other, which cannot happen in
equilibrium. This is not prevented by the financial friction. In other words, matches
are priced at marginal cost, as we would expect as the spot market for matches is
competitive.
A complete proof can be found in the appendix, and it relies on aggregate va-
cancy posting being positive, which I assume. In the appendix I also provide another
way of deriving the free entry condition in my model, by assuming the existence of
competitive “match producing firms” who create matches and sell them to experts.
Another way of putting this is to note that this equation is the key to understand-
ing where stock market value derives from in this model. Since there is no physical
capital in the economy, matches between workers and firms are the only physical asset
which can be owned. But these matches only have value to the extent that they can’t
be replicated costlessly: as discussed above, they are priced at marginal cost. In the
limit where matching frictions disappear (κ→ 0), equation (3.8) implies that Q = 0
at all times. This is because current matches must be a worthless asset in order for
this equation to hold, since they can be costlessly replicated by posting enough (free)
vacancies.
At this point it is worth noting that the free entry or arbitrage conditions place
a very strong link in the model between the volatilities of asset prices and market
tightness. To see this, take logarithms of (3.8) to get:
log
Q(s)
z
= log
κ
ψ0
+ ψ1 log θ(s)
This implies a very strong link between the standard deviations of labour market
tightness and asset prices:
σ (log θ) =
1
ψ1
σ
(
log
Q
z
)
(3.34)
Where σ(x) refers to the standard deviation of variable x. This implies that the
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volatility of log tightness, a key moment in the search and matching literature, is
pinned down exactly by the volatility of log asset prices (scaled by labour produc-
tivity). Given the standard value of ψ1 = 1/2 the above equation implies that the
model will always generate a volatility of tightness twice that of asset prices. To the
extent that the introduction of financial frictions can increase the volatility of asset
prices we should thus expect them to increase the volatility of the labour market as
well via this arbitrage equation.
3.5.2 Comparing equations: The discounted sum
Since the models with and without financial frictions both have the same free entry
condition, where is the substantive difference between them? In this section I show
that much of the difference between the models can be understood via the recursion
for the price of a match. In the standard matching model the value of a filled match
to its owner can be expressed recursively as:
Q(s) = E [Ω(s′, s) (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′))| s]
As previously explained, this is also equal to the market price of a filled match since
there are no financial frictions. However, in the appendix I derive the following
expression for the price of a match in the model with financial frictions and incomplete
markets:
Q(s) =
E
[
Ω˜(s′, s) (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′))
∣∣∣ s]
E
[
Ω˜(s′, s)
∣∣∣ s] /E [Ω(s′, s)| s] + λ(s)Λ1+λ(s)
Where Ω˜(s′, s) ≡ Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) is the expert’s SDF, which is the house-
hold’s SDF “twisted” by the fact that, due to the financial frictions, the value of
funds might be higher inside the intermediary than in the hands of the household .
The two recursions are similar except that in the incomplete markets recursion: 1)
the numerator uses the expert’s SDF instead of the consumer’s and 2) the recursion
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is divided by some extra terms.1 λ(s) is the equilibrium lagrange multiplier on an
expert’s limited commitment constraint. The equation shows us that, ceteris paribus,
Q(s) is decreasing in λ(s). In other words, the more the financial constraint binds,
the lower is the asset price, which is intuitive since we are discussing asset demand,
and a tighter borrowing constraint reduces the funds available to purchase assets,
pushing down prices. The arbitrage equation, (3.8) reveals that a lower price must
also mean lower vacancy posting. This means that we can tell a rough story where the
model with financial frictions is either a dampened or amplified version of the stan-
dard matching model, depending on the cyclical behaviour of the financial friction. If
the financial friction binds less in booms (λ(s) countercyclical) then the model will be
an amplified version of the standard matching model. This is because in a boom not
only is the value of a match higher, but also now the experts are less constrained and
can fund more matches. This can happen if asset prices are sufficiently procyclical so
that expert net worth increases enough in booms to relax their borrowing constraints.
On the other hand, if the financial friction binds more in booms (λ(s) procyclical)
then the model will be a dampened version of the standard matching model. This
can happen if asset prices are not sufficiently procyclical, so that in a boom expert
net worth does not increase enough. In this case experts will feel more constrained
in a boom, because they want to invest to take advantage of higher productivity but
do not have sufficient net worth. While both cases are possible, depending on how
you calibrate the model, we will see in the numerical section that a model calibrated
to match the volatility of asset prices in the data will deliver amplification.
Finally, the complete markets financial frictions model delivers a discounted sum
which is similar to the standard matching model up to a constant wedge. Since this
1We can verify that this equation reduces to the standard discounted sum from a normal matching
model if we remove the financial friction by setting Λ = 0 so that the experts can’t steal anything,
and hence aren’t constrained in equilibrium: If Λ = 0 then the expert is never constrained, so
λ = 0. We can verify in this case that ν ≡ 1, which means that Ω˜ = Ω (i.e. the expert’s SDF
is just the consumer’s SDF). Finally this means that the denominator is equal to one, leaving:
Q(s) = E [Ω(s′, s) (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′))| s]
182
Figure 3.1: Graphical solution to the steady state of the financial frictions model
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The left panel plots L(Q) in dashed red and R(Q) in solid blue. Their cross-
ing gives the steady state value for Q. The parameterisation is the one
used in the numerical work below. The right panel plots the same, and
the thick green line plots R(Q) for a value of Λ 20% higher than the base-
line value, leading R(Q) to shift to the left and steady state Q to be lower.
wedge is constant, we should not expect any drastic cyclical differences between the
complete markets and standard model.
3.6 Analytical results
In this section I present analytical results for the steady states of the models, as well
as for a special case of the fully dynamic model. These serve to illustrate the key
mechanisms of the models in a sharp and transparent manner before I move on to the
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numerical results. In particular, I am able to prove that financial frictions must both
increase unemployment in steady state, and increase its volatility. Using a sequence of
proofs I show how it is crucially the transmission of net worth, and experts’ inability
to insure against it, which causes the divergence between the models with and without
financial frictions.
3.6.1 Steady state results
In this section I compare how the steady states are determined in the models with
and without financial frictions. I focus on the non-stochastic steady states, which
means that the models with and without complete markets become identical. I also
abstract from wage setting and focus on steady states conditional on a given, fixed
wage. I denote steady state variables by omitting the explicit depending on the state,
s. The determination of the steady state in the model without financial frictions can
be summarised in the following three equations:
Q =
β(z − w)
1− β(1− ρx)
↓
θ =
(
ψ0Q
κz
) 1
ψ1
(3.35)
↓
K =
ψ0θ
1−ψ1
ψ0θ1−ψ1 + ρx
(3.36)
As indicated by the arrows, we can solve the equations sequentially. The discounted
match surplus is given on the top, which gives us the tightness required by free entry,
which gives us the steady state level of employment.
Solving for the steady state in the model with financial friction is more compli-
cated, but while it is hard to get analytical solutions we can characterise the equi-
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librium graphically. The definition of expert leverage gives us QK = φN , which we
can interpret as the intersection of the supply and demand for matches. The right
hand side gives us the total resources experts are putting towards buying old and
new matches: net worth multiplied by leverage. The left hand side tells us that this
must be spent on the total value of matches in the economy: their price multiplied
by their quantity. To solve for equilibrium I note that we can express both the left
and right hand sides solely as functions of Q. The left hand side, which I interpret as
match supply, uses equations (3.35) and (3.36), which are common with the standard
model:
L(Q) ≡ QK = Q ψ0
(
ψ0Q
κz
) 1−ψ1
ψ1
ψ0
(
ψ0Q
κz
) 1−ψ1
ψ1 + ρx
Notice that L′(Q) > 0, so our supply curve is upwards sloping. The demand curve
can be shown to be downwards sloping because both leverage (φ) and net worth (N)
are decreasing in Q. The proof is left to the appendix, but the intuition is simple.
The steady state return on investing is rk = (z−w)/Q+1−ρx, which is decreasing in
Q. A lower return reduces expert value and hence the maximum leverage allowed by
the borrowing constraint, hence φ′(Q) < 0. Lowever returns and leverage both reduce
expert earnings and hence steady state net worth, so N ′(Q) < 0. Hence R(Q) ≡ φN ,
with R′(Q) < 0.2
As shown in Figure 3.1, equilibrium Q is at the intersection of the supply and
demand curves. Once we have Q, equilibrium tightness and employment can be
calculated as in the model without financial frictions. We can also use the graph to
prove some results using comparative statics, and illustrate how the financial friction
2One very important issue here is uniqueness of equilibrium. Gertler & Karadi (2011) do not
discuss this, but it is actually possible to for their model to feature two steady states for some
parameterisations, and thus admit the possibility of multiple equilibria selected by sunspots. To
see this, note that in steady state we solve for φ and ν from the expert equations (3.37) and (3.38)
for a given value of rk. Combining the two equations gives a quadratic equation in φ, giving two
different solutions. Why is there multiplicity here? The intuition is simple. Leverage is limited by
expert value, but expert value is higher when you’re allowed more leverage. This multiplicity is a
potentially interesting source of fluctuations, however for my baseline calibration there is actually
only a unique steady state, around which I linearise.
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affects the economy in steady state. Firstly, it is worth asking how the steady state of
the financial frictions economy compares to the steady state of the standard matching
model when they are given the same parameter values:
Proposition 12. In a steady state where the financial friction binds, employment is
strictly lower than in the model without financial frictions.
Proof. If the financial frictions model had employment weakly greater than the model
without financial frictions then tightness would also be weakly greater, and by (3.8) so
too would be the steady state match price, Q. But since rk = (z¯− w¯)/Q+ 1−ρx and
rk = r = 1/β in the model without frictions, this would imply rk ≤ r in the financial
frictions model, in which case the financial friction does not strictly bind.
This result is perhaps to be expected. The intuition is quite simple. In the steady
state of the standard economy, the return on capital is equal to the interest rate:
rk = r. If the financial frictions economy had the same level of employment as the
standard economy it would have to be the case that rk = r in the financial frictions
economy too. However, if rk = r then the financial friction does not strictly bind,
because experts do not make positive profits on lending, and are hence indifferent
about lending more. The next proposition establishes some comparative statics within
the financial frictions models:
Proposition 13. In a steady state where the financial friction binds, an increase in
the amount that experts can expropriate, Λ, or a reduction of the equity injection given
to new experts, we, reduces the steady state match price, Q, and hence employment,
K.
Proof. Both of these changes leave the supply curve, L(Q), unchanged, while shifting
the demand curve, R(Q), to the left. For a given Q, reducing we shifts R(Q) to the
left by reducing N while leaving φ unchanged, while increasing Λ reduces φ and hence
consequently also reduces N .
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Both of these changes reduce the funds that experts can allocate to purchasing
matches. Increasing Λ allows experts to steal more, and hence requires them to have
lower leverage, and reducing we directly reduces expert net worth. Both of these
shift the demand curve to the left, as shown in Figure 3.1, reducing steady state
employment.
3.6.2 Dynamic results
In this section I analytically explore some features of the dynamic equilibria in a
special case of the models with log utility and wages proportional to productivity.
This specialisation is useful because it implies a particularly simple equilibrium in
the model without financial frictions: unemployment is constant over the business
cycle in response to productivity shocks. This stark result allows us to characterise
what elements of the financial frictions model bring to the table, because under certain
conditions we can replicate this result in the financial frictions economy. The following
proposition establishes the initial result:
Proposition 14. If wages are proportional to productivity and the household has
log utility, then the model without financial frictions has an equilibrium where un-
employment is constant in response to productivity shocks. The price of a match is
proportional to current productivity: Q(s) = Q¯z.
This result is standard, and also relies on my assumption that vacancy posting
costs are proportional to current productivity. Following a positive productivity shock
the linear wage ensures that the value of a match rises proportionally to current
productivity, as does the posting cost. Hence there is no incentive to change vacancy
posting. The stock market does move though, and stock prices are proportional to
current productivity.
Does adding financial frictions break this result? In the end it will, but I show
that the simultaneous presence of several elements is required. Firstly a volatile stock
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market is not enough on its own. After all, the model without financial frictions
generates movements in stock prices. The second element we need is an interaction
between stock prices and expert net worth.
We can see this by considering versions of the financial frictions model which
explicitly shut down the interaction between net worth and stock prices. The first
version I consider is one where experts pay out all of their net worth as dividends
each periods: σ = 0. This means that expert net worth each period is simply the net
worth of new experts, wez, which is assumed proportional to productivity. In this
case we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 15. If wages are proportional to productivity, the household has log
utility, and experts pay out all of their net worth as dividends each period (σ = 0),
then the model with financial frictions has an equilibrium where unemployment is
constant in response to productivity shocks. The price of a match is proportional to
current productivity: Q(s) = Q¯z.
This model features a moral hazard problem which restricts leverage, and incom-
plete markets since experts can only borrow risk free. However, we still recover the
result that unemployment is constant. Why is this? As in the model without fi-
nancial frictions, the match price being proportional to productivity allows vacancy
posting to be constant since posting costs are also proportional. However, we now
need to understand why the match price being proportional is allowable even with
the financial friction. Several elements come together to make this possible. Firstly,
experts optimally choose constant leverage in this model. This is because the experts
excess return on lending, once discounted with log utility and consumption which is
(in equilibrium) proportional to z, becomes constant. With constant leverage, net
worth being proportional to productivity means that even though positive produc-
tivity shocks make experts richer, they end up spending this on the increased match
price and posting costs, which are also proportional. In other words given the increase
in asset prices, experts do not have any left over cash to spend on increasing total
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matches.
The key to the result is really that net worth is proportional to z, and leverage
is constant. Since net worth is only as volatile as the productivity shock there is
no financial accelerator. The same result emerges from the model with complete
markets, even if σ > 0, because the contingency of debt leads agents to optimally
make net worth proportional to z:
Proposition 16. If wages are proportional to productivity, then the model with fi-
nancial frictions and state contingent debt has an equilibrium where unemployment
is constant in response to productivity shocks. The price of a match is proportional
to current productivity: Q(s) = Q¯z.
In this model experts receive a higher, leveraged return when there are good
productivity shocks, leading to the possibility that net worth is more volatile than
productivity. However, the contracts they choose offset this in equilibrium, since they
choose to structure their contingent claims to repay more in good states than bad,
leading to net worth again only being as volatile as productivity.
The final result considers the case of incomplete markets with σ > 0 and shows
that, in contrast to the cases above, it is not possible to generate an equilibrium with
constant unemployment:
Proposition 17. The model with financial frictions with σ > 0 does not have an
equilibrium where unemployment is constant in response to productivity shocks when
wages are proportional to productivity and utility is log.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is a simple disproof: we conjecture that the
model does have an equilibrium with constant unemployment and show this violates
one of the equilibrium conditions. Constant unemployment requires constant market
tightness, which requires, via (3.8), that Q is proportional to z: Q(s) = Q¯z. As
in the other models, this means that experts optimally choose constant leverage, φ¯.
Denote by K¯ the constant level of employment, and (3.15) requires that N = Q¯K¯z/φ¯.
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In other words, for experts to have the right amount of net worth, on aggregate, to
purchase the stock of matches requires that net worth be proportional to productivity.
However, we can easily show that this leads to a contradiction since debt is not state
contingent. Plugging in Q(s) = Q¯z to the equation governing total expert net worth,
(3.14), gives:
N = σ
((
z − w¯z + (1− ρx)Q¯z
)
K¯ −D)+ (1− σ)wez
This is not proportional to z due to the fixed stock of debt, D, which does not vary
with z. Hence it cannot be the case that N(s) = N¯z.
Since the model without financial frictions and the model with complete markets
have zero volatility of unemployment over the cycle, and we have proven that the
incomplete markets model must have positive volatility, I have proven that the in-
complete markets model is more volatile in this special case. I have also shown the
crucial role of net worth in this mechanism. Of course, one should be sceptical of
analytical results derived from special cases, and this is certainly true here. In general
we know that financial frictions can deliver either amplification or dampening, as I
discussed in the previous section. To this end, I present calibrated numerical results
in the next section.
3.7 Numerical results
In this section I present perturbation numerical result to analyse the quantitative
significance of the ideas presented in the precious sections. In particular, I calibrate
the model to assess whether it is able to match key features of the data. To test
the model, I will compare its ability to generate volatility in market tightness and
unemployment to the data, once the model is calibrated to match other moments of
the data. I will be interested in comparing the ability of the models with and without
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financial fractions to generate volatility in unemployment. Thus the calibration of the
financial frictions parameters will be important as they will determine how powerful
financial frictions can be in a quantitative sense. For this, I take an approach similar
in spirit to Winkler (2015). He chooses certain parameters of his model in order to
match properties of asset prices in the data, and I do the same here. In particular, I
will choose the parameters governing financial frictions to match certain asset price
moments.
Another key issue in assessing the quantitative performance of my model is the
current controversy over how to calibrate wages in the search and matching model.
As discussed further below, the average level of wages is important in determining the
volatility of unemployment. This is true in the baseline search and matching model,
and is also true in my extension with financial frictions. I thus perform robustness
checks for different values of this parameter, as well as various financial frictions
parameters. I solve the model using first order log-linearisation in Dynare. The
model is solved and simulated at a monthly frequency, and I take simple averages to
compute quarterly statistics.
3.7.1 Data moments
In this section I describe the data I aim to test my model against. Table 3.1 presents
the covariances and autocorrelations for seven key US time series. The data is quar-
terly, and covers the period 1951Q4 to 2014Q2. All data are seasonally adjusted,
logged, and HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 105. Any data which is collected
with monthly frequency are converted to quarterly figures by a simple average.
Non-financial moments
My measure of unemployment, u, is the Civilian Unemployment Rate in percent from
the Current Population survey. Vacancies, v, is the composite Help Wanted Index of
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Barnichon (2010), available from the author’s website.3 Market tightness, θ, is cal-
culated as the ratio of the Help Wanted Index and Total Unemployment (thousands)
from the Current Population Survey. Real wages, w, are calculated as total labour
compensation per employee from the national accounts. To measure this I first con-
struct the labour share (as detailed in my second chapter) and then measure wages
per employee as the labour share multiplied by output over employment. Output,
y, is chained real GDP taken from Line 1 of Table 1.1.6 of the National Income and
Product Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Labour productivity, z, is
my measure of output divided by total employment. Total employment is measured
as Total Nonfarm Employees from the Current Employment Statistics survey.
Constructing a measure of asset prices
Finally I need to construct a measure of asset prices. Ideally, this should be as close
as possible to the definition of the asset price in my model, Q, which is the price of
the entire equity stake in a firm with a single worker. One issue that arises is in the
treatment of firm assets in the data, which the model abstracts from. I will discuss
this in more detail below. I use two measures of equity prices, and I opt to measure in
both the data and my model the quantity Q/z, which is thus the price of equity in a
single worker firm scaled by labour productivity. This can be conveniently measured
in the data as the ratio of the total real value of equity in the economy to real GDP.4 I
use two different measures of the total nominal value of equity. The first is the closing
price of the S&P 500 index, collected from Yahoo finance.5 The second is a measure
of total market capitalisation of the US economy from the Flow of Funds accounts.
3At the time of writing, the data is available at https://sites.google.com/site/
regisbarnichon/research
4To see this, note that TE/y = (TE/n)/(y/n) = Q˜/z where TE is a measure of total equity
value, n is employment, and Q˜ is the average equity value per worker in the data.
5Series S&P500 (ˆGSPC). At the time of writing this is available at https://finance.yahoo.
com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC+Historical+Prices
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I use Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Corporate Equities; Liability.6 Both nominal
values of equity are deflated using the GDP deflator, taken from Line 1 of Table 1.1.4
of the NIPA accounts. I report the results only for my second measure of equity, but
the moments of the two series are remarkably similar: the log standard deviations
of the HP-filtered market capitalisation and S&P 500 series are 0.1516 and 0.1511
respectively. Their similarity is heartening, especially since one measure contains
financial firms and one does not, and one might think that it would be appropriate
to strip out financial firms from my measure of equity given that I split out experts
from the rest of the economy in my model. Stripping out the value of firm assets from
the data is more challenging, and I do not undertake this task here. Instead I choose
to use the raw measures of asset prices as my primary data, and discuss the effects
and challenges of attempting to split out the value of firm assets from the data in my
robustness section.
Table 3.1: Data moments
u v θ w y z Q/z
Standard deviation 0.195 0.188 0.371 0.016 0.025 0.015 0.152
Autocorrelation 0.947 0.941 0.948 0.930 0.939 0.907 0.845
Correlation 1 -0.889 -0.973 -0.237 -0.864 -0.193 -0.293
– 1 0.970 0.097 0.803 0.202 0.270
– – 1 0.177 0.856 0.211 0.297
– – – 1 0.526 0.687 0.088
– – – – 1 0.511 0.217
– – – – – 1 0.142
– – – – – – 1
All data are quarterly, logged and then HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 105.
6Series id: FL103164103.Q. Note that when using this measure, my measure Q/z is actually the
Market Capitalisation to GDP ratio popularised by Warren Buffett.
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3.7.2 Baseline calibration
In order to test my model I first calibrate the parameters. Some parameters are cali-
brated to steady state targets, while others are calibrated to match certain moments
of the data. After solving the model I compute moments which are comparable to
the moments calculated in the data. Specifically, I simulate the model for a length
of time equal to the length of my data one hundred times, and calculate the means
and standard deviations of each moment across the repetitions. A summary table of
calibration tables can be found in the appendix.
Starting with the household, I choose a standard CRRA utility function, u(c) =
c1−σc/(1 − σc), and specialise to log utility. I choose the discount factor β = 0.9966
to match an annual risk free rate of 4.17%. The parameters of the productivity
process are chosen so that, once log HP-filtered, the means of the standard deviation
and autocorrelation of the log HP-filtered series match the data I presented in the
previous section. I choose σe = 0.0043 to match the standard deviation of 0.0146
in the data, and ρz = 0.98975 to match the autocorrelation of 0.9068. I normalise
steady state productivity, z¯ to one.
The labour market is parameterised following the calibration of Den Haan &
Kaltenbrunner (2009), who report data giving a monthly job finding probability of
λw = 45.4%, vacancy filling probability of λf = 33.8% and unemployment rate of
uss = 5.7%. This allows me to pin down steady state tightness as θss = λw/λf . I
assume a standard value of ψ1 = 0.5 (Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001) for the matching
function elasticity. This allows me to pin down match efficiency as ψ0 = λfθ
ψ1
ss =
0.3917. The job separation rate is picked to equate the flows of workers in and out
of unemployment in steady state, giving ρx = λwuss/(1− uss) = 0.0274.
Real wage flexibility is set to γ = 0.7 following the empirical discussion in Michail-
lat (2012). This corresponds to an elasticity of wages to productivity of 0.7, consistent
with the empirical evidence from job movers of Haefke, Sonntag & Van Rens (2007).
I also set the steady state real wage, w¯ following Michaillat (2012). Based on empir-
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ical estimates, he requires that the steady state recruiting cost, κ, is equal to 0.32
of a worker’s steady state wage. This allows me to jointly solve for w¯ and κ from
equations (3.8) and (3.10), given a value of the steady state return on matches, rk,ss,
which I detail below. This gives values w¯ = 0.9709 and κ = 0.3107.
The expert parameters are calibrated to match asset price moments. There are
three parameters to choose: the fraction of experts who survive each period, σ, the
fraction of assets the experts can steal, Λ, and the equity injections given to new
experts, we. These are jointly chosen to match three asset pricing moments: the
equity premium and the standard deviation and autocorrelation of asset prices. I
target the values for the standard deviation and autocorrelation of asset prices from
the data in Table 3.1. For the equity premium I instead target a value lower than
that found in the data, targeting a 1% premium of yearly equity returns over the
risk free rate in steady state. This value corresponds to the premium in Gertler &
Karadi (2011). The presence of financial frictions means that my model generates
an equity premium even in the non-stochastic steady state. The equity premium
in the data presumably reflects this wedge, as well as compensation for risk. Since
there is no risk in my non stochastic steady state I do not want to attribute this
part of the data to this moment, and hence choose a lower value. I use a numerical
minimisation routine to find the values of the parameters which achieve these values of
the moments, leading me to choose Λ = 0.4854, σ = 0.9770, and we = 0.3026. These
values correspond to experts surviving 3.62 years on average, and having steady state
leverage of 2.23. The expert sector pays out a fraction 1−σ = 0.0230 of its net worth
as equity per month.
The model without financial frictions is calibrated using the same procedure as
above, but without the financial frictions components. This means that there is a
slight difference difference in the calibrated values of w¯ and κ between the two models.
The procedure to choose the values of these two parameters is exactly the same as for
the financial frictions model, imposing rkss = 1/β. For the complete markets model I
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take the values of all of the parameters as the calibrated values from the incomplete
markets model. Note that I am thus not calibrating the three models to the same
targets: the incomplete markets model is calibrated to match asset price moments,
whereas the other two models are not calibrated to match these moments. In this
sense I am not providing a test across the three models. I am only testing the ability
of the incomplete markets model to match the volatility of unemployment once it
is properly calibrated. The other two models are not tested, and their solutions are
only provided to serve as references against which to compare the incomplete markets
model.
3.7.3 Model evaluation
Moments
Table 3.2 reports moments calculated from simulating the incomplete markets model
which are comparable to the empirical moments presented in Table 3.1. I simulate
the model 100 times for a length of time equal to the length of the data sample, and
calculate the same moments I calculated in the data for each of these samples. I then
report the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of these moments. The
volatility and autocorrelation of productivity and asset prices is the same as the data
by construction since these were calibrated to fit the data.
Given that the model was not calibrated to match the volatility of unemployment,
the performance is surprisingly good. The model generates an average standard devi-
ation of labour market tightness of 0.307, which is 82% of that observed in the data.
Similarly for unemployment, the model is able to generate 72% of the volatility ob-
served in the data. In the current calibration this represents a significant improvement
over the model without financial frictions, which only delivers 61% of the volatility
of tightness from the data. Moments for the model without financial frictions are
available in Table 3.3 in the appendix.
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My calibration features a relatively high (on average 97% of productivity) and
sticky wage which explains why the model without financial frictions performs rel-
atively well compared to Shimer’s (2005) calibration. However, as I discuss in my
robustness, given my calibration strategy this does not actually impact on the ability
of my model with financial frictions to match the data significantly. The moments
and IRFs for the complete markets model are not reported since they are very similar
to the model without financial frictions. For example, the average standard devia-
tion of tightness is 0.2255 in the model without financial frictions, and 0.2212 in the
complete markets model. Where the model does not perform well is the correlation
of stock prices with real variables. The correlations in the model are all very high,
whereas in the data they tend to be much lower. This likely reflects the absence
of other shocks in the model which could introduce independent volatility into both
variables.
Impulse response functions
Figure 3.2 plots the impulse response functions of both the financial frictions model
and the standard model for comparison. That financial frictions give amplification is
clear from the tightness and unemployment panels: the peak response of tightness is
almost twice as high in the financial frictions model. The impulse responses reveal
the mechanisms behind the model’s financial accelerator, which can be traced out as
follows. Recall that experts are financial constrained, and would like to fund extra
vacancies on the margin but cannot afford to. A positive productivity shock allows
them to do so, providing an initial increase in vacancies, and hence an increase in
market tightness. An increase in market tightness makes it harder for firms to hire
workers, which increases the value of being an existing firm, hence pushing up the
stock price of existing matches. This is exactly the arbitrage argument implied by
equation (3.8). Since existing matches are owned by the expert sector this pushes up
experts’ net worth, which allows them to fund even more vacancies, and the cycle
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation innovation to productivity
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continues.
3.7.4 Robustness
Robustness to alternative parameterisations
In this section I perform robustness checks on several parameters. This serves firstly
as a check on my results, but also highlights the key role of asset price volatility
in my model. Recall that arbitrage between old matches and vacancies implied the
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following relationship between the volatilities of market tightness and asset prices:
σ (log θ) =
1
ψ1
σ
(
log
Q
z
)
This implies that any model in which this arbitrage equation holds will generate
the same standard deviation of tightness as long they share the same volatility of
stock prices, and hence that any model calibrated to match the data on the volatility
of asset prices will generate 82% of the volatility in tightness in the data, as does
my baseline model. This has strong implications for my robustness checks, since it
implies that if even if I change a parameter, as long as I recalibrate the financial
sector to match the volatility of asset prices the model will still perform just as well
at explaining the volatility in tightness.
I illustrate this by varying three parameters. I first explore the effects of varying
the average level and stickiness of the real wage. These are key parameters for which
there is still debate on how to calibrate. I also explore different values of the steady
state equity premium. I do this because my calibration strategy involved only tar-
geting an arbitrary fraction of the equity premium from the data, and I show below
that the results are robust to alternative values. After perturbing these parameters,
I report the solution to two variants of the model. The first variant holds all other
parameters at their original values. In this solution, perturbing one parameter will
thus affect the volatility of asset prices and tightness. In the second variant, I perturb
the parameter but also adjust the financial sector parameters in order to maintain
the volatility of asset prices at its original level.7
Figure 3.3 plots the results of this exercise for the average wage, w¯. The dashed
red line shows that, without recalibrating the financial parameters, a higher average
wage pushes up the volatility of tightness, unemployment, and asset prices as we
7Specifically, I keep σ at its original level, and adjust Λ and we in order to maintain the volatility
of asset prices and the steady state equity premium at their original levels. In principle I could also
adjust σ so that I also maintain the autocorrelation of asset prices. This exercise is slightly more
computationally demanding, and the results are similar.
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Figure 3.3: Robustness: w¯
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Standard deviations are computed as in the original model: these
are the average standard deviations across 100 replications for
different parameter values. Variables are logged and HP-filtered.
The solid blue line gives volatilities when the financial vari-
ables are recalibrated, the dashed red line when they are not.
would expect. However, once we recalibrate to keep the volatility of asset prices
constant, this effect disappears. The volatility of both asset prices and tightness
remain constant at their original level, the former by construction and the latter due
to the strong arbitrage arguments made above. The effect on unemployment volatility
is virtually, but not entirely removed since unemployment is a stock and its volatility
depends also on the volatility of its lagged values.
The story is the same for the changes in wage stickiness, γ, which are plotted in
Figure 3.4. Increasing γ reduces wage stickiness and hence reduces the volatility of
labour market variables. Interestingly, we can view this from a financial angle as well.
Reducing wage stickiness reduces the responsiveness of profit to shocks, which reduces
the sensitivity of net worth to shocks and hence dampens the financial accelerator.
This exercise reveals an interesting interaction between wage stickiness and the finan-
cial accelerator: wage stickiness makes the financial accelerator more severe. We can
see this by comparing the difference between the volatilities of tightness in the models
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Figure 3.4: Robustness: γ
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ables are recalibrated, the dashed red line when they are not.
with and without financial frictions for different values of γ. With the baseline value
of γ = 0.7 this difference is 0.078, but if stickiness is increased by setting γ = 0.6 the
difference widens to 0.107, showing that increases in wage stickiness generate extra
volatility in the financial frictions model above the model without financial frictions.8
The same argument holds for increases in the average wage: these increase the gap
between the volatility of the models with and without financial frictions. As before,
once we recalibrate the financial parameters, the effects disappears for θ and Q/z,
and is severely diminished for u.
Finally, I perform robustness for my assumed value of the steady state equity
premium. In this exercise the recalibrated model is calibrated to give the original
volatility of asset prices while matching the new equity premium. This exercise reveals
8This argument is similar to the argument of Schoefer (2015) within a financial accelerator
context. He makes the argument within firms: sticky wages make firm cash-flow more volatile
leading to volatility in the cash available for hiring. I make the argument that sticky wages make
asset prices more volatile, further impacting the volatility of the net worth of experts.
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Figure 3.5: Robustness: steady state rk
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ables are recalibrated, the dashed red line when they are not.
The horizontal axis gives the steady state yearly value of rk.
that my choice of equity premium target is not particularly important, and that
varying the target within a one percentage point range has very small effects on the
volatilities of asset prices and tightness even if I don’t recalibrate the other financial
parameters.
Robustness of asset price data
Checking the robustness of my measure of asset prices is an important exercise, since,
as I pointed out above, the ability of my calibrated model to match the volatility of
tightness depends crucially on the volatility of asset prices. I have already discussed
the robustness of my data to the inclusion or exclusion of financial firms, and in this
section I attempt to address another concern: the effect of controlling for the value
of firms’ assets.
Stripping out the value of firms’ assets from the data is challenging. To see why
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it is important, remember that my model abstracts from capital, and firms’ only
assets are their relationships with employees. The productivity process is calibrated
to therefore implicitly include capital movements, and firms don’t own any capital.
In the data the total equity value of firms would contain both the value of their
relationships with workers and asset ownership, as well as any other sources of value
such as tax shields or intangibles. Ultimately splitting out these various sources
reliably is a challenging feat, and data limitations place bounds on our ability to do
this. For example, Hall (2014) points out that attempts to do so lead to large periods
when the stock market value of firms falls far below the measured value of firms’
plants and equipment. These concerns aside, I make an attempt here to investigate
how robust my results are to doing so. Since we would expect the value of firms’
assets to be procyclical, due to both price and quantity effects, controlling for this
could reduce the volatility of asset prices compared to the baseline measure.
Measuring the individual components of firm value is hard, so I first present an
example showing how mismeasurement does not necessarily reduce my measure of
the volatility of the worker-relationships component of firm value. One might expect
this to be the case, especially if both relationship value and firms’ asset values are
positively correlated over the cycle: an increase in asset values should reduce the
amount of an increase in total firm value we ascribe to worker relationships, and hence
reduce its true volatility. However, since I am working with log volatilities this is not
the case. Suppose we can cleanly split total firm equity value, E, into a component
deriving from worker relationships, W , and a component deriving from the value of
owned assets, K, giving E = W + K. I should calibrate my model to movements in
W , but only measure E. To see how this mismeasurement need not reduce the true
volatility of W , consider the special case where W and K are perfectly correlated
such that we can write them both as loaded onto a common factor: W = wX and
K = kX. In this case we have that σ(logW ) = σ(logK) = σ(logE) = σ(logX).
Since we would expect that both W and K should be procyclical over the business
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cycle, to the extent that they will be highly correlated the above example suggests
that the log-volatility of total firm value should be a good proxy for the log-volatility
of the value of worker relationships.
In the case where the different components of firm value are not perfectly corre-
lated the above does not exactly hold and we need to try and measure the components
individually. I attempt to strip out the value of firm assets from my measure of firm
equity by subtracting the net worth of non-financial firms from the market value of
their equity. Their net worth is a measure of the value of their assets net of their
liabilities, and is thus a measure of the replacement cost of a firm. My measure of
firm net worth, NW , is Nonfinancial Corporate Business; Net Worth, Level from the
Flow of Funds.9 If I simply subtract this from the market value of firm equity (which
is the measure I use in the calibration, and is constructed for the same sample as net
worth) then I run in to the same problem as indicated by Hall (2014): for much of
the sample, this leaves negative value. Specifically for over 85% of the quarters in my
sample. Regardless of whether this is correct or reflecting of measurement issues, this
leaves me with the immediate problem that I cannot take logarithms of the adjusted
series to compare its logged, HP-filtered volatility to my original series. Given this
issue, my first check is to simply compare HP-filtered volatilities without taking logs.
To do this I compute σ(E/Y ) and σ(E˜/Y ) where E refers to the market value of
firm equity in the data, and E˜ = E − NW is the equity value series minus the net
worth series. Recall that measuring this ratio gives a series comparable to Q/z in my
model. If I do this, I find σ(E/Y ) = 0.1191 and σ(E˜/Y ) = 0.1318. In other words,
rather than reducing the volatility of measured asset prices, as we would expect, the
correction actually increases it slightly. This is surprising since we would expect net
worth to be procyclical. From the 90s onwards this is certainly the case, however
earlier in the sample the series (once HP-filtered) displays a slight countercyclicality,
which could be due to measurement issues.
9Series id: FL102090005.Q
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The second correction I do aims to take seriously the issue of the many negative
values of firm value once the value of assets is stripped out. In particular, it is
plausible that the way assets are market to market and valued makes the series not
easily comparable. To try and adjust for this, I construct the series E˜α = E − αNW
for different values of α ∈ (0, 1], the idea being that the scaling of the two series might
not be comparable. α = 0 corresponds to my original series, and α = 1 corresponds to
the corrected series above. This generates a minimum value of σ(E˜α/Y ) = 0.1191 and
a maximum of σ(E˜α/Y ) = 0.1318. Additionally α can be chosen to match average
values of the series. For example, α = 0.485 generates a series for E˜α which implies
that on average 20% of total equity value derives from sources other than firms’ assets,
and generates a value of σ(E˜α/Y ) = 0.1217. Overall, this exercise, while imperfect,
does not immediately suggest that any large overstatement of the correct asset price
for my model is induced by ignoring firms’ assets.
Other sources are less easy to account for. Intangible capital and the value of
tax shields are both hard to measure, and would require model based frameworks in
order to estimate their contribution to firm equity value. Ultimately, the importance
of addressing these concerns cannot be overstated, but I leave the exercise to future
work.
3.8 Conclusion
In summary, I introduce financial frictions into the labour market matching model,
and study interactions between the two frictions. I demonstrate a feedback between
asset and labour markets which amplifies the model’s response to exogenous shocks.
Shocks which increase expert net worth allow experts to fund more vacancies, raising
market tightness and lowering the ease with which firms can hire workers. This
increases the value of being an existing firm, causing stock prices to appreciate. Since
experts own firm stocks, this increases expert net worth further, amplifying the initial
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shock in a classic financial accelerator mechanism. I show how sticky wages, by
making the stock market more volatile, amplify this financial accelerator, and how
incomplete markets are required to generate the necessary volatility in expert net
worth.
I derive an arbitrage equation in my model between equity prices and market tight-
ness similar to the standard free entry condition. I show that as long as a matching
model which shares this arbitrage condition is calibrated to match the volatility in
asset prices in the data, it will always be able to generate 82% of the volatility in
market tightness, and hence do a reasonable job at describing the volatility of the
labour market. This is true in the standard matching model, and any variants where
at least one agent is free to perform arbitrage between vacancies and existing matches.
This holds regardless of the underlying source of shocks or the fractions of the
volatility caused by sticky wages or financial frictions. Does this mean that I am
simply assuming the result by calibrating my model to match the volatility of asset
prices? In a sense I am, although it is worth remembering that there is is no ex ante
guarantee that calibrating to asset prices will make the search and matching model
work well. Indeed, it is actually very good news for the matching model that one of
its key equations, the free entry condition, holds up so well against the data.
However, the key limitation of this approach is that while I have shown that
a model with financial frictions can do a good job at explaining the data, I have
not presented any direct evidence that financial frictions are the only mechanism
which can do so. One could imagine that augmenting the model instead with other
mechanisms to introduce volatility into asset demand and hence asset prices would
achieve the same end.
Learning, habit formation, and non-time separable preferences have all been shown
to improve asset pricing behaviour, and could all potentially serve as alternative
explanations to financial frictions. Ultimately more work is needed to help disentangle
which of these forces is responsible for the volatility in asset prices. However, if my
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paper has shown anything it is that once the correct source has been identified, the
matching model has the potential to utilise it to generate a meaningful fraction of
the unemployment volatility in the data.
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3.A Equations and unknowns, incomplete markets
model
3.A.1 Experts [φ, ν, rk, λ,K,D,N ]
Individual problem:
ν(s) = Λφ(s)
ν(s) = E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) ((rk(s′, s)− r(s))φ(s) + r(s))| s]
rk(s
′, s) ≡ z
′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)
Q(s)
Q(s) =
E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′)) (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′))| s]
E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′))| s] r(s) + λ(s)Λ
1+λ(s)
Aggregation:
Q(s)K ′(s) = φ(s)N(s)
D′(s) = r(s)(φ(s)− 1)N(s)
N(s) = σ ((z − w(s) + (1− ρx)Q(s))K −D) + (1− σ)wez
3.A.2 Matching [Q, θ, v, u,m, q, w]
θ(s) ≡ v(s)/u(s)
m(s) = ψ0u(s)
ψ1v(s)1−ψ1 = ψ0θ(s)1−ψ1u
q(s) = m(s)/v(s) = ψ0θ(s)
−ψ1
u(s) = 1−K
Q(s) =
κz
q(θ(s))
=
κz
ψ0
θ(s)ψ1
K ′(s) = m(s) + (1− ρx)K
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w(s) = w¯zγ
3.A.3 Goods [r, c]
r(s) =
u′(c(s))
βE[u′(c(s′))|s]
zK = c(s) + κzv(s) = c(s) + κzθ(s)u(s)
3.B Steady state equations, incomplete markets
model
3.B.1 Experts [φ, ν, rk, λ,K,D,N ]
ν = Λφ (3.37)
ν =
β (1− σ) ((rk − r)φ+ r)
1− βσ ((rk − r)φ+ r) (3.38)
rk ≡ z − w(z)
Q
+ 1− ρx
Q =
β (1− σ + σν) (z − w + (1− ρx)Q)
β (1− σ + σν) r + λΛ
1+λ
QK = φN
D = r(φ− 1)N
N = σ ((z − w(z) + (1− ρx)Q)K −D) + (1− σ)wez
3.B.2 Matching [Q, θ, v, u,m, q, w]
θ ≡ v/u
m = ψ0θ
1−ψ1(1−K)
q = m/v = ψ0θ
−ψ1
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K + u = 1
Q =
κz
ψ0
θψ1
m = ρxK
w = w¯
3.B.3 Goods [r, c]
r = 1/β
zK = c+ κzθ(1−K)
3.C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We can set up the lagrangian:
L = E [Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ)n′ + σV (n′, s′))| s]
+ λ
(
E [Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ)n′ + σV (n′, s′))| s]− Λ
(
Q(s)k′o +
κz
q(θ)
k′n
))
+ µk′n (3.39)
Where it is understood that any n′ are replaced using (3.4). The FOCs wrt k′n and
k′o are:
∂L
∂k′o
= (1+λ)E [Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ) + σV1(n′, s′)) (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)− r(s)Q(s))| s]
− λΛQ(s) = 0 (3.40)
∂L
∂k′n
= (1+λ)E
[
Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ) + σV1(n′, s′))
(
z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′)− r(s) κz
q(θ)
)∣∣∣∣ s]
− λΛ κz
q(θ)
+ µ = 0 (3.41)
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Defining Ω˜ ≡ Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ) + σV1(n′, s′)) and rearranging:
∂L
∂k′o
⇒ Q(s) =
(1 + λ)E
[
Ω˜ (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′))
∣∣∣ s]
(1 + λ)E
[
Ω˜
∣∣∣ s] r(s) + λΛ (3.42)
∂L
∂k′n
⇒ κz
q(θ)
=
(1 + λ)E
[
Ω˜ (z′ − w(s′) + (1− ρx)Q(s′))
∣∣∣ s]+ µ
(1 + λ)E
[
Ω˜
∣∣∣ s] r(s) + λΛ (3.43)
From this we see that if µ = 0 then the FOCs require that:
Q(s) =
κz
q (θ(s))
(3.44)
Since µ was the multiplier on the non-negative vacancies constraint, this means that
if experts are happy to post vacancies in equilibrium, then Q = κz/q. Since aggregate
vacancies are typically positive in the data I’ll restrict attention to the region where
µ = 0. This allows us to impose the condition Q = κz/q and treat existing matches
and vacancies as the same from the expert’s point of view. Defining k′ ≡ k′o + k′n, we
can re-express (3.4) as
n′ = (rk(s′, s)− r(s))Q(s)k′ + r(s)n (3.45)
Where rk(s
′, s) ≡ (z′ − w(s′) + (1 − ρx)Q(s′))/Q(s). The limited commitment con-
straint (3.5) becomes
ΛQ(s)k′ ≤ V (n, s; k′) (3.46)
Where the new conditional value function is:
V (n, s; k′) = E [Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ)n′ + σV (n′, s′))| s] (3.47)
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With n′ replaced with the value implied by (3.45). Experts maximise value:
V (n, s) = max
k′
V (n, s; k′) (3.48)
Subject to (3.45) and (3.46). I ignore the v ≥ 0 constraint since I have assumed it
is not binding. It is possible to show that the expert’s problem is linear in n, which
allows us to aggregate. If this is true the conditional value function is given by:
V (n, s; k′) = E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′))n′| s] (3.49)
Where V (n, s) = ν(s)n. We can define φ ≡ Q(s)k′/n and rewrite the flow BC as:
n′ = ((rk(s′, s)− r(s))φ+ r(s))n (3.50)
Thus n′ is a function only of φ and n, and not k′. Hence we can rewrite the conditional
value function as ν(s;φ)n = V (n, s; k′):
ν(s;φ)n = E [Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν(s′))n′| s] (3.51)
Hence the overall maximisation can be written as
ν(s)n = max
φ
ν(s;φ)n (3.52)
Subject to (3.9) and to
ΛQ(s)k′ ≤ ν(s;φ)n⇒ Λφ ≤ ν(s;φ) (3.53)
This gives us the policy and value functions:
Q(s)k(s, n) = φ(s)n
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d(s, n) = (φ(s)− 1)n
V (n, s) = ν(s)n
Proof of Lemma 3. Setting up the lagrangian:
L(n, s) = (1+λ)E [Ω(s′, s) ((1− σ)n′ + σV (n′, s′))| s]+µ
(
n+
∫
s′
d(s′) ds′ −Q(s)k′
)
− λΛQ(s)k′ (3.54)
Where I am implicitly assuming that vacancies are positive, λ is the multiplier on the
moral hazard constraint, µ is the multiplier on the balance sheet, and it is understood
that all n′ are replaced using (3.28). The first order condition with respect to a generic
d(s′) gives:
(1 + λ)p(s′|s)Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σV1(n′, s′)) r(s′) = µ (3.55)
Using the consumer’s first order condition, (3.29), to remove r(s′):
(1 + λ) (1− σ + σV1(n′, s′)) = µ (3.56)
Since λ and µ are common for all s′, this shows that the expert chooses state con-
tingent debt to equalise the marginal value of net worth, V1(n
′, s′) across states next
period. It is possible (proof omitted) to prove that as usual expert value is linear in
net worth: V (n, s) = ν(s)n, which implies that V1(n, s) = ν(s). Combining this with
(3.56), this implies that the value of ν(s′) doesn’t depend on next period’s shock. Us-
ing this, we can guess and verify an equilibrium where ν(s) is constant across states
and time: ν(s) = ν¯ ∀s. Notice that if the moral hazard constraint is always binding
then this implies that leverage is also constant: φ¯ = ν¯/Λ.
We can actually completely characterise asset prices and the labour market using
the recursive definition of expert value, and the fact the ν and φ are constant. Using
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(3.11), (3.27) and (3.28):
ν¯ = E
[
Ω(s′, s) (1− σ + σν¯) (rk(s′, s)φ¯+ (1− φ¯)r(s′))∣∣ s] (3.57)
Using (3.29) to remove r(s′) leaves:
ν¯ = (1− σ + σν¯) E [Ω(s′, s)rk(s′, s)| s] φ¯+ (1− φ¯) (1− σ + σν¯) (3.58)
Or:
E [Ω(s′, s)rk(s′, s)| s] = ν¯ − (1− φ¯) (1− σ + σν¯)
(1− σ + σν¯) φ¯ (3.59)
Notice that this is exactly the same as the definition of job value in the standard
economy, except for the term on the right hand side, which would be one in that
case. Notice as well that the term on the right hand side is constant over states and
time, hence the interpretation is that the complete markets model is similar to the
model without financial frictions, apart from a steady state “wedge”.
It is easy to verify that the other equilibrium conditions are satisfied, verifying our
guess. The model only has two state variables, z and K, as in the standard model.
Net worth is not a state variable because of the state contingent contracts. Net worth
is calculated as the required net worth for experts to purchase the capital stock, and
we back out the required past debt choice each period to make this hold.
Proof of Proposition 12. R(Q) = φN . I prove that R(Q) is decreasing in Q by
showing that both φ and N are. First note that Q only affects φ and N via rk, and
that rk is decreasing in Q. φ is increasing in rk because higher rk increases expert
value, allowing higher φ via φ = ν/Λ.10 Hence φ is decreasing in Q. Steady state N
is given by:
N =
(1− σ)wez
1− σ(rk − r)φ− σr
10We can show that φ is increasing rk by considering perturbations to (3.37) and (3.38). Increasing
rk increases ν in (3.38), which allows higher φ in (3.37) which feeds back into higher ν in (3.38) and
so on.
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Steady state net worth is increasing in rk as long as N > 0, and increasing in φ as long
as rk > r, which is required in a steady state where the financial friction binds. Since
φ is also increasing in rk, N is increasing in rk and hence decreasing in Q. Therefore,
R(Q) is decreasing in Q.
Proof of Proposition 14. The model equations are satisfied by constant values for
u, θ, m, q, and K, and values for c, w, and Q which are proportional to z. In
particular, the free entry condition
Q(s) =
κz
ψ0
θ(s)ψ1
is satisfied by constant θ and Q = Q¯z. The recursive value of a match, with the
definition of rk plugged in, becomes
E
[
β
c(s)
c(s′)
z′ − w¯z′ + (1− ρx)Q(s′)
Q(s)
∣∣∣∣ s] = 1
which is satisfied by Q(s) = Q¯z and c = c¯z.
Proof of Proposition 15. The model equations are satisfied by constant values for
u, θ, m, q, φ, v and K, and values for c, w, and Q which are proportional to z. To
see this, if we guess a constant value for φ then (3.13) implies a constant value for ν.
We can verify that this satisfies the recursion for expert value with the definitions of
Ω and rk substituted in, and r replaced using (3.23):
ν(s) = E
[
β
c(s)
c(s′)
(1− σ + σν(s′))
(
z′ − w¯z′ + (1− ρx)Q(s′)
Q(s)
φ(s) + (1− φ) c(s
′)
βc(s)
)∣∣∣∣ s]
This is satisfied for any z if φ and ν are constant and Q(s) = Q¯z and c(s) = c¯z. If
σ = 0 then (3.14) implies that N is proportional to z: N(s) = wez. This implies
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constant employment from (3.15):
K ′(s) =
φN(s)
Q(s)
Both N and Q are proportional to z, leaving K ′ constant. The value of D′ at any
time can be backed out from (3.16).
Proof of Proposition 16. In the proof of Lemma 3 I proved that there exists an
equilibrium with constant leverage and expert value. I now show that under the
assumptions of Proposition 16 the rest of the model equations can be satisfied with
constant employment. As previously discussed, constant employment requires con-
stant tightness, which implies that Q(s) = Q¯z via (3.8). This satisfies the main
complete markets equation, (3.33) with the definitions of Λ and rk substituted in:
E
[
β
c(s)
c(s′)
z′ − w¯z′ + (1− ρx)Q(s′)
Q(s)
∣∣∣∣ s] = ν¯ − (1− φ¯) (1− σ + σν¯)(1− σ + σν¯) φ¯
This is satisfied withQ(s) = Q¯z and c(s) = c¯z. (3.15) requires thatN(s) = N¯z, which
is always feasible for any path of shocks by picking the right sequence of contingent
claims.
3.D Alternative setup: competitive match produc-
ing firms
The model in the paper is equivalent to a model where experts only trade in completed
matches, and there exists a perfectly competitive “match producing sector”. The
match producing sector pays vacancy posting costs and sells any completed matches
on the spot market to experts. The match producing sector’s problem is thus a static
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profit maximisation problem. Profit is given by:
pi = Q(s)k′n − κzv
Where k′n = q(θ(s))v is the number of successful matches a match producing firm
produces if it posts v vacancies. Plugging this in and taking the FOC with respect
to v (or imposing zero profit) gives us the arbitrage equation from the main model,
Q(s) = κz
q(θ(s))
. The boundary case with no vacancy posting is also supported here,
since match producing firms must produce positive vacancies.
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3.E Figures and tables
Table 3.3: Simulated moments of the model without financial frictions
u v θ w y z Q/z
Standard deviation 0.104 0.127 0.226 0.010 0.021 0.015 0.113
(0.016) (0.017) (0.034) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017)
Autocorrelation 0.936 0.831 0.913 0.907 0.927 0.907 0.913
(0.018) (0.045) (0.025) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.025)
Correlation 1 -0.886 -0.965 -0.959 -0.980 -0.959 -0.965
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
– 1 0.977 0.981 0.961 0.981 0.977
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
– – 1 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000
(1e−5) (1e−4) (1e−5) (0)
– – – 1 0.996 1.000 1.000
(2e−4) (1e−16) (1e−5)
– – – – 1 0.996 0.998
(2e−4) (1e−4)
– – – – – 1 1.000
(1e−5)
– – – – – – 1
I simulate the model 100 times for 526 months, corresponding to the length of
the data sample. I convert the data to quarterly frequency as per Michaillat
(2012). All data are quarterly, logged and then HP-filtered with smoothing parameter
105. The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the sample statistics.
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